Phenomenology and

Ethno Methodology

Dr. Ashok Shivaji Yakkaldevi

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ayisrj2011@gmail.com / ayisrj@yahoo.in

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Dedicated to

My Guru Dr. H. N. Jagtap

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Dr. Ashok S. Yakkaldevi

Chapter-1

Phenomenology

Introduction:

In sociology, phenomenology is a movement that promotes an understanding of the association between states of individual awareness and social life. It seeks to reveal how human consciousness is concerned in the invention of social act, situations and worlds. Phenomenology is a philosophical method of inquiry developed by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl. It involves the systematic investigation of consciousness. Consciousness, it is argued, is the only phenomenon of which we can be sure. It is assumed that our experience of the world, including everything from our perception of objects through to our knowledge of mathematical formulae, is constituted in and by consciousness.

Phenomenology is a philosophical method of inquiry developed by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl. It involves the systematic investigation of consciousness. Consciousness, it

Definition: Phenomenological sociology was first developed by Alfred Schutz and is based on the idea of a social construction of reality through interaction among people who use symbols to interpret one another and assign meaning to perceptions and experiences. It is the study of what Schutz called the “life-world,” which is the taken-for-granted stream of everyday routines, interactions, and events that are seen as the source of not only individual experience but the shape of groups and societies. It studies of the shape of social life on the one hand and how people perceive, think, and talk about it on the other.

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Phenomenology

In sociology, a focus (from Schutz) on the taken for granted knowledge that social actors share and which underpins everyday life. It is part of the idealist tradition which focuses on consciousness and meaning, not structural social phenomena. [Tony Bilton et al., *Introductory Sociology*, 3rd edition. London, Macmillan, 1996:666]
Phenomenology originated with Edmund Husserl. Schütz became friends with Husserl and soon after began working on this concept. Phenomenology is the study of things as they appear (phenomena). It is also often said to be descriptive rather than explanatory: a central task of phenomenology is to provide a clear, undistorted description of the ways things appear"

Alfred Schütz (13 April 1899 – 20 May 1959) was an Austrian social scientist, whose workbridged sociological and phenomenological traditions to form asocial phenomenology, and who is "gradually achieving recognition as one of the foremost philosophers of social science of the [twentieth] century". Schütz "attempted to relate the thought of Edmund Husserl to the social world and the social sciences. His Phenomenology of the Social World supplied philosophical foundations for Max Weber's sociology and for economics."

Phenomenological Sociology:

Phenomenological sociology is the study of the formal structures of concrete social existence as made available in and through the analytical description of acts of intentional consciousness. The object of such an analysis is the meaningful lived world of everyday life: the *Lebenswelt*, or "Life-world". The task of phenomenological sociology,

like that of every other phenomenological investigation, is to account for, or describe, the formal structures of this object of investigation in terms of subjectivity, as an object-constituted-in-and-for-consciousness.That which makes such a description different from the "naive" subjective descriptions of the man in the street, or those of the traditional social scientist, both operating in the natural attitude of everyday life, is the utilization of phenomenological methods.

The leading exponent of Phenomenological Sociology was Alfred Schütz(1899–1959). Schütz sought to provide a critical philosophical foundation for Max Weber's interpretive sociology / verstehende soziologie by applying methods and insights derived from the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl(1859–1938) to the study of the social world.[2][3] It is the building of this bridge between Husserlian phenomenology and Weberian sociology that serves as the starting point for contemporary phenomenological sociology. This does not mean, of course, that all versions of phenomenological sociology must be based on Weberian themes. In point of fact, there is some historical evidence [Dilthey's influence on Weber re: the former's theory of *Weltanschauung*, and Husserl's influence on Dilthey re: the former's theory of meaning] that would support the argument that elements of Weberian sociology are themselves based on certain phenomenological themes; especially in regard to the theory of the intended meaning of an act, and ideas regarding theory and concept formation.

While Husserl's work was directed at establishing the formal structures of intentional consciousness, Schütz's work was directed at establishing the formal structures of what he termed the Life-world.[4] Husserl's work was conducted as atranscendental phenomenology of consciousness. Schütz's work was conducted as a mundane phenomenology of the social world.[5] The difference in their respective projects rests at the level of analysis, the

objects taken as a topic of study, and the type of phenomenological reduction that is employed for the purposes of analysis.

Ultimately these two distinct phenomenological projects should be seen as complementary, with the structures of the latter dependent on the structures of the former. That is, valid phenomenological descriptions of the formal structures of the Life-world should be wholly consistent with the descriptions of the formal structures of intentional consciousness. It is from the latter that the former derives its validity, verifiability, and truth value. This is in keeping with Husserl's conception of phenomenology as "First Philosophy", the foundation, or ground, for both philosophy and all of the sciences.[7]

General thesis of the natural attitude

The general thesis of the natural attitude is the ideational foundation for the fact-world of our straightforward, common sense social experience. It unites the world of individual objects into a unified world of meaning, which we assume is shared by any and all who share our culture (Schütz:1962). It forms the underpinning for our thoughts and actions. It is the projected assumption, or belief, in a naturally occurring social world that is both factually objective in its existential status, and unquestioned in its "natural" appearance; social objects [persons, language, institutions, etc.] have the same existential "thing" status as objects occurring in nature [rocks, trees, and animals, etc.].

Although it is often referred to as the "General Thesis of the Natural Attitude", it is not a thesis in the formal sense of the term, but a non-thematic assumption, or belief, that underlies our sense of the objectivity and facticity of the world, and the objects appearing in this world. The facticity of this world of common sense is both unquestioned and virtually "unquestionable"; it is sanctionable as to its status as that which "is", and that which "everyone", or, at least, "any reasonable

person", agrees to be the case with regard to the factual character of the world.

As far as traditional social science is concerned, this taken-for-granted world of social facts is the starting and end point for any and all investigations of the social world. It provides the raw, observable, taken-for-granted "data" upon which the findings of the social sciences are idealized, conceptualized, and offered up for analysis and discourse. Within traditional social science, this "data" is formulated into a second order world of abstractions and idealizations constituted in accordance with these sciences' pre-determined interpretive schemes (Husserl:1989).

Schutz's phenomenological descriptions are made from within the phenomenoloigcal attitude, after the phenomenological reduction [epoche], which serves to suspend this assumption, or belief, and reveal the phenomena occurring within the natural attitude as objects-for-consciousness.

Phenomenological reduction

Martin Heidegger aptly characterizes Husserl's phenomenological research project as, "...the analytic description of intentionality in its *a priori*" (Heidegger:1992); as it is the phenomenon of intentionality which provides the mode of access for conducting any and all phenomenological investigations, and the ultimate ground or foundation guaranteeing any findings resulting from any such inquiry. In recognizing consciousness as having the formal structure of intentionality, as always having *consciousness of* an intended object, Husserlian phenomenology has located the access point to a radical new form of scientific description.

Methodologically, access to this field is obtained through the phenomenological reduction. While there is some controversy as to the

official name, number, and levels of the reduction, this internal argument among the philosophers need not concern us. For the purposes of a mundane phenomenology of the social world, we, as phenomenological social scientists, engage in a mundane phenomeological reduction called the Epoché. The hallmark of this form of the reduction is what it reveals about its field of inquiry: a mundane phenomenology of the social world defines its phenomenal field as the intersubjective region of mundane consciousness as appearing from within the natural attutude.

The phenomenological reduction as applied to a mundane analysis of the social world consists of the bracketing [equivalents: methodical disregard, putting out of play, suspension] of the thesis of the natural attitude. This bracketing is nothing more than a bracketing of the existential belief in the existence of the objective world; the existential status of the world itself is *not* called into question. The result of this bracketing is that our attention is shifted from the objects in the world as they occur in nature, to the objects in the world as they appear for consciousness - as phenomenon for intentional consciousness. Our descriptions of objects in the world are now transformed from the naive descriptions of objects as occurring in nature, to phenomenological descriptions of objects as appearing for consciousness. In short, for the purpose of a mundane phenomenological analysis within the natural attitude, the epoche transforms objects as occurring in nature into: objects-for-subjectivity, objects-for-consciousness, objects-as-intended.

Keep in mind that for positivism, the meaning of an object is, by definition, "objective". That is, the meaning of the object is a property of the object itself, is independent of any particular observer, and "the same" for any and all observers regardless of their orientation or perspective. For phenomenology, an object is always intended, and constituted, as meaningful by a particular intending subject from a

particular orientation and from a particular perspectival viewing point. In addition, pheno-menologically speaking, the meaning of the object cannot be separated from its phenomenonality, or materiality, and cannot be constituted qua meaningful object without the meaning bestowing act of intending on the part of a constituting subject.

For a phenomenology undertaken within the natural attitude, meaning does not inherently accrue to an object as a thing-in-itself, is not an "add-on" to the object [a label], and is not separable from the object as constituted by the intending subject in the act of meaning constitution. For phenomenology, the meaning and the object [in its "materiality"] are co-constituted in the intending of the object by the subject - pheno-menologically speaking there are only meaningful objects. There is no such thing as a neutrally valued object, or a meaningless object, and the notion of an object as "nonsense" is itself a meaningful determination - as the existentialists would say, we are condemned to meaning.

Note that because we are born into an already existing social world that is already pre-interpreted and meaningful as an intersubjectively available "entity", any proposal that the subject is creating the object, or creating the meaning of the object as an individual achievement in a particular situation is a misrepresentation of what is actually taking place. Within the Natural Attitude of Everyday Life, the subject's role in the constitution of meaningful objects is better understood as a reading off, or interpretation, of the meaning from the object-as-intended. This reading off, or interpretation, of the object's meaning is an intersubjective achievement of the intending subject that takes place within the intersubjective realm of the natural attitude.

Phenomenology is an approach to psychological subject matter that has its roots in the philosophical work of Edmund Husserl.[1] Early phenomenologists such as Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre, andMaurice

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Merleau-Ponty conducted philosophical investigations of consciousness in the early 20th century. Their critiques of psychologism and positivism later influenced at least two main fields of contemporary psychology: the phenomenological psychological approach of the Duquesne School (The Descriptive Phenomenological Method in Psychology), including Amedeo GiorgiandFrederick Wertz; and the experimental approaches associated with Francisco Varela, Shaun Gallagher, Evan Thompson, and others (embodied mind thesis). Other names associated with the movement include Jonathan Smith (Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis), Steinar Kvale, and Wolfgang Köhler. Phenomenological psychologists have also figured prominently in the history of thehumanistic psychology movement.

The experiencing subject can be considered to be the person or self, for purposes of convenience. In phenomenological philosophy (and in particular in the work of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty), "experience" is a considerably more complex concept than it is usually taken to be in everyday use. Instead, experience (or being, or existence itself) is an "in-relation-to" phenomenon, and it is defined by qualities of directedness, embodiment, and worldliness, which are evoked by the term "Being-in-the-World".

The quality or nature of a given experience is often referred to by the term qualia, whose archetypical exemplar is "redness". For example, we might ask, "Is my experience of redness the same as yours?" While it is difficult to answer such a question in any concrete way, the concept of intersubjectivity is often used as a mechanism for understanding how it is that humans are able to empathise with one another's experiences, and indeed to engage in meaningful communication about them. The phenomenological formulation

of Being-in-the-World, where person and world are mutually constitutive, is central here.

PHENOMENOLOGY

Myron Orleans

Encyclopedia of Sociology

Phenomenology is a movement in philosophy that has been adapted by certain sociologists to promote an understanding of the relationship between states of individual consciousness and social life. As an approach within sociology, phenomenology seeks to reveal how human awareness is implicated in the production of social action, social situations and social worlds (Natanson 1970).

Phenomenology was initially developed by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), a German mathematician who felt that the objectivism of science precluded an adequate apprehension of the world (Husserl 1931, 1970). He presented various philosophical conceptualizations and techniques designed to locate the sources or essences of reality in the human consciousness. It was not until Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) came upon some problems in Max Weber's theory of action that phenomenology entered the domain of sociology (Schutz 1967). Schutz distilled from Husserl's rather dense writings a sociologically relevant approach. Schutz set about describing how subjective meanings give rise to an apparently objective social world (Schutz, 1962, 1964, 1966, 1970. 1996; Schutz and Luckmann 1973; Wagner 1983).

Schutz's migration to the United States prior to World War II, along with that of other pheno-menologically inclined scholars, resulted in the transmission of this approach to American academic circles and to its ultimate transformation into interpretive sociology. Two expressions of this approach have been called *reality constructionism* and *ethno-*

methodology. Reality constructionism synthesizes Schutz's distillation of phenomenology and the corpus of classical sociological thought to account for the possibility of social reality (Berger 1963, 1967; Berger and Berger 1972; Berger and Kellner 1981; Berger and Luckmann 1966; Potter 1996). Ethno-methodology integrates the Parsonian concern for social order into phenomenology and examines the means by which actors make ordinary life possible (Garfinkel 1967; Garfinkel and Sacks 1970). Reality constructionism and ethno-methodology are recognized to be among the most fertile orientations in the field of sociology (Ritzer 1996).

Phenomenology is used in two basic ways in sociology: (1) to theorize about substantive sociological problems and (2) to enhance the adequacy of sociological research methods. Since phenomenology insists that society is a human construction, sociology itself and its theories and methods are also constructions (Cicourel 1964; 1973). Thus, phenomenology seeks to offer a corrective to the field's emphasis on positivist conceptualizations and research methods that may take for granted the very issues that phenomenologists find of interest. Phenomenology presents theoretical techniques and qualitative methods that illuminate the human meanings of social life.

Phenomenology has until recently been viewed as at most a challenger of the more conventional styles of sociological work and at the least an irritant. Increasingly, phenomenology is coming to be viewed as an adjunctive or even integral part of the discipline, contributing useful analytic tools to balance objectivist approaches (Aho 1998; Levesque-Lopman 1988; Luckmann 1978; Psathas 1973; Rogers 1983).

Techniques

Phenomenology operates rather differently from conventional social science (Darroch and Silvers 1982). Phenomenology is a theoretical

orientation, but it does not generate deductions from propositions that can be empirically tested. It operates more on a metasociological level, demonstrating its premises through descriptive analyses of the procedures of self-, situational, and social constitution. Through its demonstrations, audiences apprehend the means by which phenomena, originating in human consciousness, come to be experienced as features of the world.

Current phenomenological techniques in sociology include the method of "bracketing" (Bentz 1995; Ihde 1977). This approach lifts an item under investigation from its meaning context in the common-sense world, with all judgments suspended. For example, the item "alcoholism as a disease" (Peele 1985; Truan 1993) is not evaluated within phenomenological brackets as being either true or false. Rather, a *reduction* is performed in which the item is assessed in terms of how it operates in consciousness: What does the disease notion do for those who define themselves within its domain? A phenomenological reduction both plummets to the essentials of the notion and ascertains its meanings independent of all particular occasions of its use. The reduction of a bracketed phenomenon is thus a technique to gain theoretical insight into the meaning of elements of consciousness.

Phenomenological tools include the use of introspective and *Verstehen* methods to offer a detailed description of how consciousness itself operates (Hitzler and Keller 1989). Introspection requires the phenomenologist to use his or her own subjective process as a resource for study, while *Verstehen* requires an empathic effort to move into the mind of the other (Helle 1991; Truzzi 1974). Not only are introspection and *Verstehen* tools of phenomenological analysis, but they are procedures used by ordinary individuals to carry out their projects. Thus, the phenomenologist as analyst might study himself or herself as an ordinary subject dissecting his or her own self-

consciousness and action schemes (Bleicher 1982). In this technique, an analytic attitude toward the role of consciousness in designing everyday life is developed.

Since cognition is a crucial element of phenomenology, some theorists focus on social knowledge as the cornerstone of their technique (Berger and Luckmann 1966). They are concerned with how common-sense knowledge is produced, disseminated, and internalized. The technique relies on theoretical discourse and historical excavation of the usually taken for granted foundations of knowledge. Frequently, religious thought is given primacy in the study of the sources and legitimations of mundane knowledge (Berger 1967).

Phenomenological concerns are frequently researched using qualitative methods (Bogdan and Taylor 1975; Denzin and Lincoln 1994, 1998). Phenomenological researchers frequently undertake analyses of small groups, social situations, and organizations using face-to-face techniques of participant observation (Bruyn 1966; Psathas and Ten Have1994; Turner 1974). Ethnographic research frequently utilizes phenomenological tools (Fielding 1988). Intensive interviewing to uncover the subject's orientations or his or her "life world" is also widely practiced (Costelloe 1996; Grekova, 1996; Porter 1995). Qualitative tools are used in phenomenological research either to yield insight into the micro-dynamics of particular spheres of human life for its own sake or to exhibit the constitutive activity of human consciousness (Langsdorf 1995).

Techniques particular to the ethno-methodological branch of phenomenology have been developed to unveil the practices used by people to produce a sense of social order and thereby accomplish everyday life (Cuff 1993; Leiter 1980; Mehan and Wood 1975). At one time, "breaching demonstrations" were conducted to reveal the

essentiality of taken-for-granted routines and the means by which threats to these routines were handled. Since breaching these routines sometimes resulted in serious disruptions of relationships, this technique has been virtually abandoned. Social situations are video- and audiotaped to permit the painstaking demonstration of the means by which participants produce themselves, their interpretations of the meanings of acts, and their sense of the structure of the situation (Blum-Kulka 1994; Jordan and Henderson 1995). Conversational analysis is a technique that is frequently used to describe how people make sense of each other through talk and how they make sense of their talk through their common background knowledge (Psathas 1994; Schegloff and Sacks 1974; Silverman, 1998). The interrelations between mundane reasoning and abstract reasoning are also examined in great depth as researchers expose, for example, the socially constituted bases of scientific and mathematical practice in common-sense thinking (Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay 1983; Livingston, 1995; Lynch, 1993).

Theory

The central task in social phenomenology is to demonstrate the reciprocal interactions among the processes of human action, situational structuring, and reality construction. Rather than contending that any aspect is a causal factor, phenomenology views all dimensions as constitutive of all others. Phenomenologists use the term *reflexivity* to characterize the way in which constituent dimensions serve as both foundation and consequence of all human projects. The task of phenomenology, then, is to make manifest the incessant tangle or reflexivity of action, situation, and reality in the various modes of *being in the world*.

Phenomenology Commences With An Analysis Of The *Natural Attitude*. This is understood as the way ordinary individuals participate in

the world, taking its existence for granted, assuming its objectivity, and undertaking action projects as if they were predetermined. Language, culture, and common sense are experienced in the natural attitude as objective features of an external world that are learned by actors in the course of their lives.

Human beings are open to patterned social experience and strive toward meaningful involvement in a knowable world. They are characterized by a typifying mode of consciousness tending to classify sense data. In phenomenological terms humans experience the world in terms of *typifications*: Children are exposed to the common sounds and sights of their environments, including their own bodies, people, animals, vehicles, and so on. They come to apprehend the categorical identity and *typified* meanings of each in terms of conventional linguistic forms. In a similar manner, children learn the formulas for doing common activities. These practical means of doing are called *recipes for action.* Typifications and recipes, once internalized, tend to settle beneath the level of full awareness, that is, become *sedimented*, as do layers of rock. Thus, in the natural attitude, the foundations of actors' knowledge of meaning and action are obscured to the actors themselves.

Actors assume that knowledge is objective and all people reason in a like manner. Each actor assumes that every other actor knows what he or she knows of this world: All believe that they share common sense. However, each person's biography is unique, and each develops a relatively distinct stock of typifications and recipes. Therefore, interpretations may diverge. Everyday social interaction is replete with ways in which actors create feelings that common sense is shared, that mutual understanding is occurring, and that everything is all right. Phenomenology emphasizes that humans live within an intersubjective world, yet they at best approximate shared realities. While a*paramount*

reality is commonly experienced in this manner, particular realities or *finite provinces of meaning* are also constructed and experienced by diverse cultural, social, or occupational groupings.

For phenomenology, all human consciousness is practical---it is always of something. Actors intend projects into the world; they act in order to implement goals based on their typifications and recipes, their *stock of knowledge*at hand. Consciousness as an *intentional process* is composed of thinking, perceiving, feeling, remembering, imagining, and anticipating directed toward the world. The objects of consciousness, these intentional acts, are the sources of all social realities that are, in turn, the materials of common sense.

Thus, typifications derived from common sense are internalized, becoming the tools that individual consciousness uses to constitute a *lifeworld*, the unified arena of human awareness and action. Common sense serves as an ever-present resource to assure actors that the reality that is projected from human subjectivity is an objective reality. Since all actors are involved in this intentional work, they sustain the collaborative effort to reify their projections and thereby reinforce the very frameworks that provide the construction tools.

Social interaction is viewed pheno-menologically as a process of reciprocal interpretive constructions of actors applying their stock of knowledge at hand to the occasion. Interactors orient themselves to others by taking into account typified meanings of actors in typified situations known to them through common sense. Action schemes are geared by each to the presumed projects of others. The conduct resulting from the intersection of intentional acts indicates to members of the collectivity that communication or coordination or something of the like is occurring among them. For these members, conduct and utterances serve as *indexical* expressions of the properties of the

situation enabling each to proceed with the interaction while interpreting others, context, and self. Through the use of certain interpretive practices, members order the situation for themselves in sensical and coherent terms: In their talk they gloss over apparent irrelevancies, fill in innumerable gaps, ignore inconsistencies, and assume a continuity of meaning, thereby formulating the occasion itself.

Ongoing social situations manifest patterned routine conduct that appears to positivist investigators to be normative or rule-guided. Pheno-menologically, rules are indexical expressions of the interpretive processes applied by members in the course of their interactions. Rules are enacted in and through their applications. In order to play by the book, the interpreter endeavors to use the rule as an apparent guide. However, he or she must use all sorts of background expectancies to manage the fit somehow between the particular and the general under the contexted conditions of the interaction, and in so doing is acting creatively. Rules, policies, hierarchy, and organization are accomplished through the interpretive acts or negotiations of members in their concerted efforts to formulate a sense of operating in accord with a rational, accountable system. This work of doing structure to the situation further sustains its common-sensical foundations as well as its facticity.

Phenomenologists analyze the ordering of social reality and how the usage of certain forms of knowledge contributes to that ordering. It is posited that typified action and interaction become *habitualized*. Through sedimentation in layered consciousness, human authorship of habitualized conduct is obscured and the product is externalized. As meaning-striving beings, humans create theoretical explanations and moral justifications in order to legitimate the habitualized conduct. Located in higher contexts of meaning, the conduct becomes objectivated. When internalized by succeeding generations, the conduct

is fully institutionalized and exerts compelling constraints over individual volition. Periodically, the institutions might be repaired in response to threats, or individuals might be realigned if they cognitively or affectively migrate.

The reality that ordinary people inhabit is constituted by these legitimations of habitualized conduct. Ranging from common sense typifications of ordinary language to theological constructions to sophisticated philosophical, cosmological, and scientific conceptualizations, these legitimations compose the paramount reality of everyday life. Moreover, segmented modern life, with its proliferation of meaning-generating sectors, produces multiple realities, some in competition with each other for adherents. In the current marketplace of realities, consumers, to varying degrees, may select their legitimations, as they select their occupation and, increasingly, their religion (Berger, 1967).

Practice

Doing phenomenological sociology involves procedures that are distinct from positivist research. Phenomenological practice is increasingly evident in the discipline as more subjectivist work is published. The phenomenological analysis of mass media culture content, for example, applies the elements of the approach to yield an understanding of the reflexive interplay of audience lifeworlds and program material (Wilson 1996). Thus, TV talk show discourses may be described as social texts that are refracted by programmers from common sense identity constructs. The visual realization yields narrative images that audiences are seduced into processing using their own experiences. The viewers' lifeworlds and the TV representations are blended into reality proxies that provide viewers with schema to

configure their personal orientations. Subsequently, programmers draw upon these orientations as additional identity material for new content development.

Phenomenological work with young children examines how both family interactions and the practices of everyday life are related to the construction of childhood (Davila and Pearson 1994). It is revealed how the children's elemental typifications of family life and common sense are actualized through ordinary interaction. Penetrating the inner world of children requires that the phenomenological practitioner view the subjects in their own terms, from the level and viewpoints of children (Waksler, 1991; Shehan, 1999). Such investigation shuns adult authoritative and particularly scientific perspectives and seeks to give voice to the children's experience of their own worlds. Infants' and children's communicative and interactive competencies are respected and are not diminished by the drive toward higher level functioning (Sheets-Johnstone 1996).

At the other end of the lifecycle, phenomenologists investigate how aging and its associated traumas are constituted in the consciousness of members and helpers. The struggle for meaning during aging accompanied by chronic pain may be facilitated or impaired by the availability of constructs that permit the smoother processing of the experiences. Members of cultures that stock typifications and recipes for managing aging and pain skillfully may well be more likely than others to construct beneficial interpretations in the face of these challenges (Encandela 1997). Phenomenological work encourages the helpers of the elderly to gain empathic appreciation of their clients' lifeworlds and enhanced affiliation with them through the use of biographical narratives that highlight their individuality and humanity (Heliker 1997).

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The healing professions, particularly nursing, seem to be deeply imbued with a phenomenological focus on the provision of care based on a rigorous emphasis on the patient's subjective experience (Benner 1995). Substantial attention has been devoted to the ethical implications of various disease definitions, to how language shapes the response to illness, and to how disease definitions and paradigmatic models impact communication between health professionals and patients (Rosenberg and Golden 1992). Significant work on the phenomenology of disability has demonstrated how the *lived body* is experienced in altered form and how taken for granted routines are disrupted invoking new action recipes (Toombs 1995). Nonconventional healing practices have also been examined revealing how embodiment and the actor's subjective orientation reflexively interrelate with cultural imagery and discourse to transfigure the self (Csordas 1997). Further, phenomenological work has suggested that emotions are best analyzed as interpreted processes embedded within experiential contexts (Blum 1996; Solomon 1997).

Implications

For phenomenology, society, social reality, social order, institutions, organizations, situations, interactions, and individual actions are constructions that appear as suprahuman entities. What does this suggest regarding humanity and sociology? Phenomenology advances the notion that humans are creative agents in the construction of social worlds (Ainlay 1986). It is from their consciousness that all being emerges. The alternative to their creative work is meaninglessness, solipsism, and chaos: a world of dumb puppets, in which each is disconnected from the other, and where life is formless (Abercrombie 1980). This is the nightmare of phenomenology. Its practitioners fear that positivist sociologists actually theorize about such a world (Phillipson 1972).

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Phenomenologists ask sociologists to note the misleading substantiality of social products and to avoid the pitfalls of reification. For the sociologist to view social phenomena within the natural attitude as objects is to legitimate rather than to analyze. Phenomenological sociologists investigate social products as humanly meaningful acts, whether these products are termed attitudes, behaviors, families, aging, ethnic groups, classes, societies, or otherwise (Armstrong 1979; Gubrium and Holstein 1987; Herek 1986; Petersen 1987; Starr 1982). The sociological production of these fictive entities are understood within the context of their accomplishment, that is, the interview setting, the observational location, the data collection situation, the field, the research instrument, and so forth (Schwartz and Jacobs 1979). The meaning contexts applied by the analyst correlates with those of the subjects under investigation and explicates the points of view of the actors as well as express their life world. Phenomenological sociology strives to reveal how actors construe themselves, all the while recognizing that they themselves are actors construing their subjects and themselves.

Pheno-menologically understood, society is a fragile human construction, thinly veneered by abstract ideas. Phenomenology itself is evaluatively and politically neutral. Inherently, it promotes neither transformative projects nor stabilization. In the work of a conservatively inclined practitioner, the legitimation process might be supported, while the liberative practitioner might seek to puncture or debunk the legitimations (Morris 1975). Phenomenology can be used to reveal and endorse the great constructions of humankind or to uncover the theoretical grounds of oppression and repression (Smart 1976). Phenomenologists insist upon the human requirements for meaning, subjective connectedess, and a sense of order. These requirements may be fulfilled within existent or emancipative realities (Murphy 1986).

Phenomenology and Ethno-methodology

The phenomenological influence upon contemporary sociology can be seen in the increased humanization of theoretical works, research methods, educational assessment procedures, and instructional modes (Aho 1998; Darroch and Silvers 1982; O'Neill 1985; Potter 1996). Phenomenological thought has influenced the work of postmodernist, poststructuralist, critical, and neo-functional theory (Ritzer 1996). Notions such as constructionism, situationalism and reflexivity that are at the core of phenomenology also provide the grounds for these recent formulations. For example, the premise of poststructuralism that language is socially constituted denying the possibility of objective meaning is clearly rooted in phenomenology. The procedure known as *deconstruction* essentially reverses the reification process highlighted in phenomenology (Dickens and Fontana 1994). The postmodernist argument that knowledge and reality do not exist apart from discourse is also clearly rooted in phenomenology. Postmodernism's emphasis on the representational world as reality constructor further exemplifies the phenomenological bent toward reflexivity (Bourdieu 1992). On the other hand, phenomenology has been used to reverse nihilistic excesses of postmodernism and poststructuralism (O'Neil 1994). The emphases of the critical school on the constitution of the liberative lifeworld by the autonomous, creative agent via the transcendence of linguistic constraint echoes a theme of phenomenological thought (Bowring 1996). Neo-functionalism, a looser and more inclusive version of its predecessor, finds room for a micro-social foundation focusing on the actor as a constructive agent (Layder 1997).

Phenomenology, while remaining an identifiable movement within the discipline of sociology, has influenced mainstream research. Inclusion of qualitative research approaches in conventional research generally expresses this accommodation (Bentz and Shapiro 1998). The greater acceptance of intensive interviewing, participant observation

and focus groups reflect the willingness of non-phenomenological sociologists to integrate subjectivist approaches into their work. The study of constructive consciousness as a method of research has broadened and strengthened the standing of sociology in the community of scholars (Aho 1998).

Phenomenology has made a particular mark in the area of educational policy on a number of levels. The flaws of objective testing have been addressed using phenomenological tools. The issue of construct validity, the link between observation and measurement, has been studied ethnographically as a discursive activity to clarify the practices employed by education researchers to establish validity (Cherryholmes 1988). Testing of children has increasingly respected the subjectivity of the test taker (Gilliatt and Hayward 1996: Hwang 1996). Educators are more alert to the need for understanding the learner's social and cognitive processes, for taking into account the constraining parameters of consciousness, and for encouraging self-conscious reflection. Instructional practices that emphasize constructivist approaches have gained great support among professionals and have been broadly implemented to the benefit of learners (Marlowe and Page 1997).

The future impact of phenomenology will depend on its resonance with the needs and aspirations of the rising generations of sociologists. The drive of some among this emerging generation is to examine the obvious with the infinite patience and endurance that is required to come up with penetrating insight. The arena of discourse analysis perhaps holds the greatest promise of this achievement and will likely elicit substantial effort. The phenomenology of emotions also appears to entice young scholars. The reflexive analyses of popular and mediated culture in relation to identity formation will likely draw further interest as will the study of virtuality, cyberspace, and computer

simulcra. The study of children, the family and education will increasingly be informed by an emphasis on constructive consciousness. Due its lack of presumption and openness the phenomenological movement in sociology has proven hardy during the closing decades of the twentieth century and is well situated to encounter the new millennium.

Phenomenology has been subjected to extensive criticism. It has been argued that it deals with trivial topics, is purely descriptive and neglects the notion of social structure. Nevertheless it has been influential in certain spheres. The emphasis given to common-sense knowledge has influenced the development of ethno-methodology in particular.

Phenonmenology Peter Berger

Peter Ludwig Berger (March 17, 1929) is an Austrian-born American sociologist known for his work in the sociology of knowledge, the sociology of religion, study of modernization, and theoretical contributions to sociological theory. He is best known for his book, co-authored with Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*(New York, 1966), which is considered one of the most influential texts in the sociology of knowledge and played a central role in the development of social constructionism. The book was named by the International Sociological Association as the fifth most influential book written in the field of sociology during the 20th century. Berger has spent most of his career teaching at The New School for Social Research, Rutgers University, and Boston University.

Professor Berger previously taught at the New School for Social Research, at Rutgers University, and at Boston College. He has written numerous books on sociological theory, the sociology of religion, and Third World development, which have been translated into dozens of

foreign languages. Among his more recent books are *Redeeming Laughter: The Comic Dimension of Human Experience*(1997); *Modernity, Pluralism and the Crisis of Meaning* (with Thomas Luckmann, 1995); *The Capitalist Revolution: Fifty Propositions About Prosperity, Equality and Liberty* (1988); and *The War Over the Family: Capturing the Middle Ground* (with Brigitte Berger, 1983). In 1992, Professor Berger was awarded the Manes Sperber Prize, presented by the Austrian government for significant contributions to culture. Since 1985, Professor Berger has been Director of the Institute for the Study of Economic Culture. The institute is a research center committed to systematic study of relationships between economic development and sociocultural change in different parts of the world

Family Life

Berger was born on March 17, 1929, in Vienna, Austria, to George William and Jelka (Loew) Berger. In 1946, he emigrated to the United States, shortly after World War II and in 1952 became a naturalized citizen. On September 28, 1959, he married Brigitte Kellner. They had two sons, Thomas Ulrich and Michael George.

Education & Career

In 1949 he graduated from Wagner College with a Bachelor of Arts. He continued his studies at The New School in New York (M.A. in 1950, Ph.D. in 1954). In 1955 and 1956 he worked at the Evangelische Akademie in Bad Boll, Germany. From 1956 to 1958 Berger was an assistant professor at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro; from 1958 to 1963 he was an associate professor at Hartford Theological Seminary. The next stations in his career were professorships at the New School for Social Research, Rutgers University, and Boston College. Since 1981 Berger has been University Professor of Sociology and Theology

at Boston University, and since 1985 also director of the Institute for the Study of Economic Culture, which transformed, a few years ago, into the Institute on Culture, Religion and World Affairs.

Thoughts

Social Reality: Society &The Individual

Berger is perhaps best known for his view that perceived reality is constructed by social consensus. Central to Berger's work is the relationship between society and the individual. With Thomas Luckmann in *The Social Construction of Reality*, Berger develops a sociological theory: 'Society as Objective Reality and as Subjective Reality'. His analysis of society as subjective reality describes the process by which an individual's conception of reality is produced by his or her interaction with social structures. He writes about how new human concepts or inventions become a part of our reality through the process of objectivation. Often this reality is then no longer recognized as a human creation, through a process Berger calls reification.[2]

Religion

Like most other sociologists of religion of his day, he once predicted the all-encompassing secularization of the world.[3] This he has quite humorously admitted on a number of occasions, concluding that the data in fact proves otherwise.[4]By the late 1980s, Berger publicly recognized that religion (both old and new) was not only still prevalent, but in many cases was more vibrantly practiced than in periods in the past, particularly in the United States.

He does, however, qualify these concessions. While recognizing that religion is still a powerful social force, he points to the fact that pluralism and the globalized world fundamentally change how the

individual experiences faith, with the taken-for-granted character of religion often being replaced by an individual's search for a personal religious preference. Likewise, in *The Desecularization of the World*, he cites both Western academia and Western Europe itself as exceptions to the triumphant desecularization hypothesis: these cultures have remained highly secularized despite the resurgence of religion in the rest of the world.

Despite the rise of a new paradigm in the sociology of religion, which draws upon insights from rational choice theory in explaining the behavior of religious firms (churches) and consumers (individuals), Berger's thought has influenced many significant figures in the field of sociology of religion today, including his colleague at Boston University, Robert Hefner, and former students Michael Plekon of Baruch College, CUNY, James Davison Hunter, and Nancy Ammerman. Additionally, Berger portrays two opposite, contradictory aspects in relation to work done by Karl Marx and Max Weber, images regarding the 'homeless mind' theory, saying that it reconciles 'iron' and 'melting/crumbling' portrayals.[6]

Berger in Perspective

Sociology of Knowledge

Berger and Luckmann both were concerned with the study of human reality; as a result of their concern, they studied into the sociology of knowledge and phenomenology. The sociology of knowledge posits that society and social position have a tendency to affect what we know. On broader terms, the sociology of knowledge is concerned with the epistemological foundations of knowledge, the history of knowledge production, and the uses to which knowledge is applied- more specifically, the history of science and the ideology of the

ruling class. Opposing this approach, Berger and Luckmann focused on everyday "common" knowledge, those things that "everybody knows".[7]

Theoretical Contributions

In "Making Sense of Modern Times: Peter L. Berger and the Vision of Interpretive Sociology", by James Davison Hunter and Stephen C. Ainlay et al., their social theories are built upon Berger's social theories, using Berger's ideologies as a foundation and framework for this particular book. Nicholas Abercrombie begins by examining his reformation of the sociology of knowledge. Shifting his focus on the subjective reality of everyday life, Berger enters a dialogue with traditional sociologies of knowledge - more specific, those of Marx and Mannheim. Abercrombie digs deeper into this dialogue Berger brings up, and he considers ways in which Berger goes beyond these figures. Stephen Ainlay then pursues the notable influence on Berger's work. He also recognizes the notable influence of Berger's popularization of a variety of phenomenological concepts, in which Berger actually avoids certain areas of analysis.[8]

Study of Modernization

Berger has made many notable contributions to the study of modernization. Anton Zijderveld extends the relationship of technology and bureaucracy to modern consciousness - which are familiar concepts in Berger's work. Zijderveld expands and discusses even further Berger's handling on such issues in relationship to classical figures such as Marx, Weber, Pareto, and Gehlen. Additionally, James Hunter explored the 'malaise' that is argued to be a cost of modernity. He studied Berger's own brand of social criticism by discussing a half century of writing on the modern world. Therefore, Berger contributed and laid the foundation for Hunter to explore the interplay between political

ideology and social criticism (Berger's particularly) and the importance of this connection in order to understand modern life.[9]

Influences

Max Weber

As categories of philosophical discourse, reason and freedom are not empirically available for scientific study. Weber focused on the empirical realities of rationality as a characteristic of action and rationalization. In comparison, Berger proposed that we use the word 'options' rather than freedom as an empirical concept. Therefore, much of the empirical work of Berger and Weber have revolved around the relationship between modern rationalization and options for social action. Weber argued redundantly that rationalism can mean a variety of things at the subjective level of consciousness and at the objective level of social institutions. In terms of rationality described by Weber, the threats to freedom come mainly from one: the objectified, formal rationality of rules and regulations. These threats are predominantly notable in two institutional spheres: the bureaucratization of the state and the machine production of individuals. This rationality in the bureaucratization of the state and the machine production of individuals ultimately limits the opportunity for personal choice amongst human beings.

On the other hand, although Berger is no less worried about the possible threats to freedom from modern rationality, Berger paints a different picture for possible options for action. Berger and Luckmann argued that technologization andbureaucratization encounter consequences at the micro-level that are more complex than what

Weber had realized at his macro-historical focus. Through work being removed from the home, modernization has divided experience between public and private spheres. As the spheres were separated, the public sphere of technological production and bureaucratic management became exceedingly rationalized, whereas the private sphere placed heavy emphasis on traditional and emotional bonds. However, Berger largely accepted Weber's analysis of the rationality of the public sphere. Therefore, Weber and Berger respectively hold different views about rationalization on options for individual actions. Weber explained how bureaucratization and technologization would take away the individuality and differentiated behavior. However, Berger argues that modernity has created unprecedented options, especially in the private sphere, warning that these options can truly have a negative impact on individuals.

Social phenomenology is an approach within the field of sociology that aims to reveal what role human awareness plays in the production of social action, social situations and social worlds. In essence, phenomenology is the belief that society is a human construction.

Phenomenology was originally developed by a German mathematician named Edmund Husserlin the early 1900s in order to locate the sources or essences of reality in the human consciousness. It wasn't until the 1960s that it entered the field of sociology by Alfred Schutz, who sought to provide a philosophical foundation for Max Weber's interpretive sociology. He did this by applying the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl to the study of the social world. Schutz postulated that it is subjective meanings that give rise to an apparently objective social world. He argued that people depend upon language and the "stock of knowledge" they have accumulated to enable social interaction. All social interaction requires that individuals

characterize others in their world, and their stock of knowledge helps them with this task.

The central task in social phenomenology is to explain the reciprocal interactions that take place during human action, situational structuring, and reality construction. That it, phenomenologists seek to make sense of the relationships between action, situation, and reality that take place in society. Phenomenology does not view any aspect as causal, but rather views all dimensions as fundamental to all others.

Application Of Social Phenomenology

One classic application of social phenomenology was done by Peter Berger and Hansfried Kellner in 1964 when they examined the social construction of marital reality. According to their analysis, marriage brings together two individuals, each from different lifeworlds, and puts them into such close proximity to each other that the lifeworld of each is brought into communication with the other. Out of these two different realities emerges one marital reality, which then becomes the primary social context from which that individual engages in social interactions and functions in society. Marriage provides a new social reality for people, which is achieved mainly through conversations with their spouse in private. Their new social reality is also strengthened through the couple's interaction with others outside of the marriage. Over time a new marital reality will emerge that will contribute to the formation of new social worlds within which each spouse would function.

Peter Berger/Thomas Luckman

Phenomenology - A philosophy or method of inquiry based on the premise that reality consists of objects and events as they are perceived or understood in human consciousness and not of anything independent of human consciousness.

Berger and Luckmann's famous assertion that "*society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product*."

From Fehlen and Plessner, Berger and Luckmann borrow the idea that humans, unlike other animals, are "instinctually deprived" or biology underdeveloped. Important organismic developments that take place in the womb in other animals take place in humans' first year of life. This means not only the survival of the human infant is dependent on certain social arrangements, but that lacking an instinctual basis for action, human beings have to create a world that ensures social stability. Common-sense knowledge and social institutions compensate for biological underdevelopment. They provide a "base" that operates "automatically" (analogous to the instincts that guide other animals' behavior). "Commonsense knowledge is the knowledge that I share with others in the normal, self-evident routines of everyday life." It is what allows us to perceive the reality of everyday life as "reality," to suspend our doubts so that we can act in the world. Social institutions are the bridges between humans and their physical environments. Following Schutz, Berger and Luckmann emphasize that it is the intersubjective character of common-sense knowledge that enables human institutions and culture to produce stability. It is because "most of the time, my encounters with others in everyday life are typical in a double senseI apprehend the other as a type and I interact with him in a situation that is itself typical" that social interaction is successful. Without intersubjectivitythat you know that I know that we both knowsocial order and interaction would break down, as we would be left to doubt the most fundamental aspects of communication (554-5).

Luckmann's first major sole-authored publication, *The Invisible Religion* (original title *Das problem der Religion*, 1963). Did not appear in English until the year after the publication of Berger and Luckmann's groundbreaking *The Social Construction of Reality*(1966), and he never

became quite as well known in the United States as either his teacher, Alfred Schutz, or his collaborator, Peter Berger. Luckmann's "unequal" relationship with Schutz is duly noted by Luckmann himself in the preface to *The Structures of the Life World* (Schutz and Luckmann 1973), which he finished editing after Schutz's death (554).

Berger was a fervent student of religion. He continuously contemplated his own Christian beliefs and spent a "very happy" year at the Lutheran Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, where he studied to be a minister. Indeed, Berger is just as well known for his work in the sociology of religion as in phenomenology and the sociology of knowledge. His now-classic *Invitation to Sociology* (1963) continues to be one of the most acclaimed and inspiring introductions to the discipline of sociology today.

Habitualization - the process by which the flexibility of human actions is limited. All activity is subject to habitualization, as repeated actions inevitably become rountinized. Habitualization carries with it the psychological advantage that choices are narrowed. Hat an action may be "performed again in the future in the same manner and with the same economical effort" provides a stable back-ground from which human activity can proceed. In other words, from the time we wake up in the morning until we go to bed at night, we can direct our minds and bodies to constructive action only because we take most actions for granted.

Habitualization actions set the stage for institutionalization, for "institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized action by types of actors." That is, it is when habitualized action are shared and/or "available to all members of the particular social group" that institutions are born. Akin to habits that function at the level of the individual, then, institutions are not created instantaneously, but rather are "built up in the course of a shared

history. In other words, over times, shared habitualized actions become institutions that are taken for granted and therefore limiting for the individuals who are subject to them. Thus, it is through institutions that human life becomes coherent, meaningful, and continuous.

Berger and Luckmann use the terms externalization, objectivation, and reification to refer to the process by which human activity and society attain the character of objectivity. Externalization and objectivation enable the actor to confront the social world as something outside herself. Institutions appear external to the individual, as historical and objective facticities. They confront the individual as undeniable facts. Reification is "an extreme step" in process of objectivation. In reification, "the real relationship between man and his world is reversed in consciousness. Man, the producer of a world, is apprehended as its product, and human activity as an epiphenome-non of non-human process." That is, reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were "non-human or possibly suprahuman" things. For instance, we reify our social roles in such a way that we say, "I have no choice in the matter. I have to act this way." That is what Berger refers to as "bad faith." Of course, history is full of examples of the horrendous consequences that ensue from such reification. The Nazi concentration camps relied on guards who are said to have merely "taken orders." A parallel also can be drawn with the recent example of torture in the Abu Ghraib prison.

Internalization – is "the immediate apprehension or interpretation of an objective event as expressing meaning," that is, the process through which individual subjectivity is attained. Internalization means that "the objectivated social world is retrojected into consciousness in the course of socialization." As such, internalization is the "beginning point" in the process of becoming a member of society, as well as the "end point" in institutionalization. The three moment s of

externalization, objectivation, and internalization are not to be understood "as occurring in a temporal sequence," but rather as a simultaneous, dialectical process. Nevertheless, it is in intergenerational transmission that the process of internalization is complete. As Berger and Luckmann maintain:*only with the transmission of the social world to a new generation (that is, internalization as effectuated in socialization) does the fundamental social dialectic appear in its totality. To repeat, only with the appearance of a new generation can one properly speak of a social world.*

In other words, every individual is born into an environment within which she encounters the significant others who are in charge of her socialization. One does not choose one's own significant others; rather, they are imposed on her. In the process of socialization, the stocks of knowledge that the individual experiences as preexisting objective reality are imposed on her. The individual is thereby "born into not only an objective social structure but also an objective social world."

Berger and Luckmann differentiate two types of socialization based on the extent to which individuals are active and conscious of the process of internalization. Primary socialization refers to "the first socialization an individual undergoes in childhood, through which he becomes a member of society." On the other hand, secondary socialization refers to subsequent processes of socialization that induct "an already socialized individual into new sectors of the objective world of this society." Whereas primary socialization is predefined and taken for granted, secondary socialization is acquired in a more conscious way. It is for this reason that primary socialization has so much more of an impact on the individual than secondary socialization. As Berger and Luckmann state:

The child does not internalize the world of his significant others as one of many possible worlds. He internalized it as the world, the only

existent and only conceivable world, the world tout court. It is for this reason that the world internalized in primary socialization is so much more firmly entrenched in consciousness than worlds internalized in secondary socialization.

Furthermore, primary socialization is distinguished by the fact that it cannot take place without an emotionally shared identification of the children with his significant others: you have to love your mother, but not your teacher. This distinction between the more intimate (primary) and less intimate (secondary) types of socialization recalls Schutz's more abstract discussion of umwelt versus mitwelt relations. Each type of relationship is distinguished by a different level of intersubjectivity and typification. Primary socialization and significant others (essential to "we relations") are far more central to the maintenance of "identity" than are secondary relationships/socialization.

Alfred Schutz, more than any other phenomenologist, attempted to relate the thought of Edmund Husserl to the social world and the social sciences. His *Phenomenology of the Social World*supplied philosophical foundations for Max Weber's sociology and for economics, with which he was familiar through contacts with colleagues of the Austrian school. When Schutz fled Hitler's *Anschluss* of Austria and immigrated to the United States in 1939, he developed his thought further in relationship to the social sciences, American pragmatism, logical empiricism, and to various other fields of endeavor such as music and literature. His work has been influential on new movements in sociological thought such as ethno-methodological and conversation analysis.

The Phenomenology of the Social World

In his principal work, Schutz placed three chapters of philosophical discussion between introductory and concluding chapters that discussed the social scientific positions his philosophy attempted to engage. In the initial chapter Schutz praised Max Weber's views on value-freedom in social science and the autonomy of science vis-à-vis other activities (e.g. politics), and he commended Weber's methodological individualism and ideal-type methodology. In addition, he applauded Weber's refusal to reduce the social sciences to the natural sciences, while allowing their ideal-typical results to be testable for adequacy. However, Schutz also supplemented Weber, pointing out how interpretation was involved even in selecting an experience out of one's stream of experience and highlighting how the meaning of an action to an actor depended upon the project guiding the extended temporal process of the sub-acts leading to its realization.

These initial criticisms of Weber required Schutz to develop his *own* theory of meaning and action, beginning with Husserl's study of the consciousness of internal time, in particular consciousness's capacity to capture reflectively and distinguish lived experiences, which at first appear as undefined phases melting into each other. Schutz had appropriated this notion of flowing consciousness, or *duration*, from Bergson, on whom he had relied in the manuscripts later published as *Life Forms and Meaning Structure*. Those manuscripts, for analytic purposes, split the ego, indivisible in its lived experience, into ideal-typical constructs of various life forms, that included the "I" living in duration, remembering, acting, thinking, and relating to a "Thou." Though Schutz never made explicit his reasons for not publishing those earlier manuscripts, Helmut Wagner rightly speculated that he was ill at ease since one could only have access to duration through acts of memory, which, of course, constituted a life-form entirely separate from duration itself. As a result of this methodology relying on distinct ideal-

types, duration began to appear as an inaccessible *Ding-an-sich*. Husserl's account of the consciousness of inner time remedied just this problem by carefully describing how the stream of duration was changed at every moment into a remembered *having-just-been-thus*, as the primal impression passed into into primary remembrance, or retention. The continuum extending backward from the *now* of the primal impression through its retentions formed a “specious” present, to which the reflective acts of secondary remembrance, that is, recollection or reproduction, turned, differentiating one experience from another. In sum, Husserl's phenomenological description of experience uncovered the process of retention that bridged the duration/(reflective) memory gap that had bedeviled Schutz's earlier efforts insofar as he had relied on an ideal-typical methodology, which prevented insight into what goes on within conscious processes themselves.

Schutz, though, turned the Husserlian account of temporality in the direction of an action theory, demarcating levels of passive experience (e.g. bodily reflexes), spontaneous activity without a guiding project (e.g., acts of noticing environmental stimuli), and deliberately planned and projected activity, known technically as “action” (e.g., writing a book). In planning an action to be realized in the future, one relies on reflective acts of “projection”, like those found in reflective memory, only now oriented in a future as opposed to past direction. Through such reflectivity, one imagines a project as completed in future perfect tense, that is, what will have been realized after one's acting, and this project, also of central importance for Martin Heidegger and the pragmatist tradition, establishes the “in-order-to motive” of one's action. By contrast, one's “because motives” consist in the environmental, historical factors that influenced the (now past) decision to embark upon the project and that can only be discovered by investigating in the

"pluperfect tense," that is, exploring those past factors that preceded that past decision.

Schutz's distinctions here are relevant to contemporary debates about whether freedom is compatible with determinism since from the perspective of the lived in-order-to motive, one experiences oneself as free and morally responsible, but from the perspective of examining one's because motives after completing one's action, one correlates, as an observer of oneself, the choice of the project with its historical determinants. Of course, Schutz, working within the parameters of Husserl's non-naturalistic account of consciousness, would have conceived such determinants not so much as empirico-mechanical causes but rather as influences discoverable through an interpretive process, associating earlier events with the later ones they seem to have influenced. Schutz's position comes closest to the roughly compatibilist outlooks of P.F. Strawson and Thomas Nagel, who distinguish between the participant and observer attitudes prior to theoretical discussions and who align the participant attitude with freedom and the observer attitude with determinism. Schutz, however, contributes the unique insight that these attitudes take place within distinctive temporal frameworks, oriented toward the future or the past.

Schutz's account of the temporal framework of motivation permitted criticism of Weber's view that one could orient one's action to the past behavior of others, since, while such behavior might have served as the because motive of an action, one could not aim at affecting another's already completed action. Similarly, failure to appreciate temporality often leads to*misinterpretations* of action, as when one assumes that the outcome of an act may have been its motive without considering the actor's in-order-to motive, which due to unforeseen events may have been adjusted or may have led to results contrary to those intended. Likewise, one can interpret an economic action after the

fact as less than rational without taking sufficient account of the limited information that was available to the actor at the time of deciding to act and that might make her action seem perfectly rational. Moreover, the fact that one's own temporal stream of consciousness never completely coincides with that of another, whose sequence of events and intensity of experience inevitably differs from one's own, places limits on one's understanding of another. As a consequence, the objective meanings of language, defined in dictionaries as invariant regardless of users, also bear subjective connotations for language users due to their unique histories of linguistic experience, even though for practical purposes of communication they are able to set aside such differences. For instance, one would have to consider in depth Goethe's works as a whole to understand what he meant by "demonic." Schutz's basic point in all these examples involves getting behind constituted meanings to the temporal processes by which actors build up the meaning of their own actions a meaningful build-up accentuated by the German title of his *Phenomenology of the Social World* (*Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt*).

In addition to this account of consciousness, motivation, and action, he examined the structure of the social world, including Consociates who share the same time and spatial access to each other's bodies, Contemporaries with whom one shares only the same time, and Predecessors and Successors with whom one does not share the same time and to whose lived bodies one lacks access. Consociates, present to each other physically, partake of each other's inner time, that is, the on-rolling life of the other, grasp the building up of the other's experience, and live in a We-relationship that entails "growing older together." While Consociates revise their types of each other immediately, one must proceed more inferentially with Contemporaries, Predecessors, and Successors, constructing ideal types based on letters or reports and

running greater risks of misunderstanding, depending on the degree of anonymity of the person to be understood. One could say, then, that Weber's method of ideal type construction, illustrated in his sociological account of the Protestant at the origins of capitalism, is not really that foreign to the everyday life-world in which actors beyond the Consociate level continually relate to each other via such type construction. Human actors in everyday life already adopt toward each other the attitudes of social scientists.

Schutz conceived his work as developing a “phenomenological psychology” of “inner experience” and focusing on the invariant features of the life-world toward which theoreticians, including social scientists, turn reflectively. Although Jürgen Habermas criticizes Schutz's account of the life-world for being “abridged in a culturalistic fashion” and not addressing institutional orders and personality structures (Habermas 1987, 2:126–132), it would seem that Schutz himself delimits his own work in just this fashion. According to him, social scientists develop constructs, ideal types, of the meaning-contexts of life-world actors, and they test these types to determine if they are causally adequate, that is conforming to past experience, and meaning adequate, that is, consistent with whatever else is known about the actor. Responding to Mises's critique that Weber's ideal-types are too historically specific, Schutz suggested that the later Weber's ideal types in *Economy and Society* attain a generality comparable to that of Mises' own economic theory, which itself could be interpreted as presenting ideal-typical descriptions of the behavior of economic agents. The later Weber's types depict the invariant subjective experiences of anyone who acts within the economic framework as defined by the principle of marginal utility, that is, choosing to maximize satisfaction.
Summary of excerpt of Alfred Schutz’s

Phenomenology and Ethno-methodology

"Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action"

Common-sense thinking

Common-sense thinking consists of a system of constructs or meanings fororganizing the world and acting in it. Although each of our total set of constructs isunique (originating in our biographical situation), most of our common-senseconstructs are socially derived. This shared inter-subjective stock of knowledge andassumptions we develop through interactions allows us to engage in joint projectswith other people.

The more anonymous our partners in action are, the more we rely on standardizedrecipes of action. We may understand consociates in face-to-face relationships asunique individuals, but only as "partial selves."

We act by attempting to bring about a future state of affairs an "in-order-to-motive." When observing himself, an actor can also determine "because-motives,"which determined him to act as he did. People interact by taking each others' in-order-to-motives as because-motives.

The meaning of an action is different for an actor (who understands how any givenin-order-to-motive fits into larger projects), the actor's partner in action (who adoptsthe actor's in-order-to-motives as because-motives) and a disinterested observer(whose motives are not interlocked with the actor's).

Rational interaction (involving shared understandings of end, means and secondaryresults) seems impractical. But "rational action" really involves action within ashared set of constructs.

Social science thinking

Phenomenology and Ethno-methodology

In order to understand human behavior, social scientists, like anyone else, need tounderstand it from the point of view of the actor (with his constructs, motives andprojects). But social scientists are disinterested observers.Most social science constructs are constructs of common-sense constructs and aremeant to supercede them. But the scientific model of the social world uses models ofactors that "are not human beings living within their biographical situation in thesocial world of everyday life." Their situation is defined by the social scientist, notthemselves.

Alfred Schutz (1899-1959): Student of Edmund Husserl, founder of phenomenological philosophyHusserl's other students included existentialists Heidegger and SartreThe Phenomenology of the Social World (1932)Fled Austria in 1939. Took position at New School for Social Research.Students there included Berger, Luckmann and GarfinkelFounded phenomenological sociology: Attempt to understand the worldfrom the perspective of the ordinary person1966-67: Invasion of the sociology of everyday life with publication of:

- English translation of The Phenomenology of the Social World
- Berger and Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality
- Garfinkel's Studies in Ethno-methodological

All based in second emphasis of the sociology of knowledge:
Proposition #2: Reality is socially constructed by knowledges

This proposition asserts that social reality is not a social fact in its ownright, but is something produced and communicated, its meaning derivedin and through these systems of communication.

Key Ideas of Phenomenological SociologyEveryday life is interpreted through a stock of knowledge (meanings,

categories,constructs).The dialectical nature of everyday lifeConsists of meanings derived frompersonal experienceConsists of meanings handed down fromour predecessorsConstructed by us Preexisting and constrainingUnique, based in our biographicalsituationConsists of shared (intersubjective)meanings and recipes for actionWe cannot gain access to anotherperson's lifeworld; the other appears atbest as a "partial self"Shared constructs and assumptions(reciprocity of perspectives) allow peopleto interact and engage in joint projectsFace-to-face relations ("we-relations"with "consociates"), especially ongoingones, allow us to understand others asunique individuals (although theirbiographical situation is revealed only"fragmentarily")

Relationships with distant and/oranonymous others ("they relations') relyon standardized recipes for action("course-of-action" types)Some assumptions that allow people to interact (reciprocity of perspectives)Objects of the world are accessible to other people, but they may mean somethingdifferent to other people because:

a. They can perceive things I can't and vice versa
b. We have different biographically determined situations and purposes

This problem is overcome by two idealizations:

a. The interchangeability of standpoints: if you were where I am, you would see what I see and vice versa
b. The congruency of the system of relevances: for all practical purposes, our unique biographical situations are irrelevant for the purposes at hand Phenomenological Criminology: Katz's (1988) Seductions of Crime

Three stages of "doing stickup"

- **Subjective moral advantage:** the would-be robber attains a private sense of moral competence to control the situation, often through some "angle."
- **Declaration:** the robber must commit himself wholeheartedly he must announce publicly and clearly that he is trying to commit a crime
- **Sticking beyond reason with stickup:** "Whether it fails or is successful, a stickup has the potential for transcendent significance for the offender.… If they are to persist, stickup men must adopt a characteristic hardness of will and insist on being criminal, regardless of the dictates of moral reason or instrumental considerations for disciplining their violence. In a phrase, they must become fascinated with the project of being a 'hardman.'"

Three stages of the sneaky thrills

1. Tacitly generating the experience of being seduced to devianceObjective is to become taken with object (which may lose charm oncetaken).
2. Reconquering emotions in a concentration dedicated to the productionof normal appearancesThief must attempt a sociological analysis and focus on normalinteractional tasks.
3. Appreciating the reverberating significance of accomplishment in aeuphoric thrillmay be described with ludic (game), religious and sexualmetaphors.

Phenomenology and Ethno-methodology

Chapter- 2

Ethno Methodology

Harold Garfinkel (October 29, 1917 – April 21, 2011) was a sociologist, ethnomethodologist, and a Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is known for establishing and developing ethno-methodology as a field of inquiry in sociology. He published multiple books throughout his lifetime and is well known for his book, Studies in Ethno-methodology, which was published in 1967.
Ethno-methodology studies procedures people carry out in order to create a sense of orderliness within a particular institution or community.

Ethno-methodology - the study of the ways in which ordinary people construct a stable social world through everyday utterances and actions - is now a major component of all sociology and linguistics courses. Garfinkel's formidable reputation as one of the world's leading sociologists rest largely on the work contained in this book.

Studies in Ethno-methodology was originally published by Prentice Hall in 1967 and has remained in print ever since. It is widely used as a text book in this country and in the United States. This new paperback is a special student edition of Garfinkel's modern classic.

Ethno-methodology is an approach to sociological inquiry introduced by the American sociologist Harold Garfinkel. Ethno-methodology's research interest is the study of the everyday methods that people use for the production of social order (Garfinkel:2002). Ethno-methodology's goal is to document the methods and practices through which society's members make sense of their world.

Ethno-methodology is a theoretical approach in sociology based on the belief that you can discover the normal social order of a society by disrupting it. Ethnomethodologists often deliberately disrupt social norms to see how people respond and how they try to restore social order.

Ethno-methodology is based on the belief that human interaction takes place within a consensus and interaction is not possible without this consensus. The consensus is part of what holds society together and is made up of the norms for behavior that people carry around with them. It is assumed that people in a society share the same norms and expectations for behavior and so by breaking these norms, we can study more about that society and how they react to broken normal social behavior. Ethnomethodologists argue that you cannot simply ask a person what norms he or she uses because most people are not able to articulate or describe them. People are generally not wholly conscious of what norms they use and so ethno-methodology is designed to uncover these norms and behaviors.

Ethnomethodologists often use ingenious procedures for uncovering social norms by thinking of clever ways to disrupt normal social interaction. In a famous series of ethno-methodology experiments, college students were asked to pretend that they were guests in their own home without telling their families what they were doing. They were instructed to be polite, impersonal, use terms of formal address (Mr. and Mrs.), and to only speak after being spoken to. When the experiment was over, several students reported that their families treated the episode as a joke. One family thought their daughter was being extra nice because she wanted something, while another's believed their son was hiding something serious. Other parents reacted with anger, shock, and bewilderment, accusing their children of being impolite, mean, and inconsiderate. This experiment allowed the students

to see that even the informal norms that govern our behavior inside our own homes are carefully structured. By violating the norms of the household, the norms become clearly visible.

Ethnomethodological research teaches us that society behaves as if there were no other way to do so. Usually people go along with what is expected of them and the existence of norms only becomes apparent when they are violated.

Ethno-methodology is a study concerned with the methods used by people to construct, account for and give meaning to their social world. Ethno-methodology means a study of the methods used by people.

Ethnomethodologists such as Schutz believe there is no real social order, as other sociological perspectives assume. Social life appears orderly to members of society only because members actively engage in making sense of social life. Societies have regular and ordered patterns only because the members within that society perceive them in this way, therefore leading social order to become a convenient fiction.

The point of ethno-methodology, according to Zimmerman and Wieder, is to explain how members of society go about the task of seeing, describing and explaining order in the world in which they live.

Ethnomethodologists are highly critical of other branches of sociology. They argue that conventional sociologists have misunderstood the nature of social reality. They have treated the social world as if it has an objective reality that is independent of member's accounts and interpretation. Thus they have regarded aspects of the social world such as suicide and crime as facts with an existence of their own. They have then attempted to provide explanations for these facts.
By contrast, ethno-methodologists argue that the social world consists of nothing more than the constructs, interpretations and accounts of its members. The job of the sociologist is therefore to explain the methods

and accounting procedures that members employ to construct their social world. According to ethno-mythologists this is the very job that mainstream sociology has failed to do.

Definition

This particular approach in sociology is closely related to applications and approaches employed by researchers of ethnology, ethnobotany, ethno-physiology, and ethnomusicology. According to Garfinkel, ethno-methodology is an appropriate term for the study of, “a member’s knowledge of his ordinary affairs, of his own organized enterprises, where that knowledge is treated by us [as researchers] as part of the same setting that makes it orderable.”[2] According to Anne Rawls[editor of Garfinkel's Nachlass] ethno+method+ology means the study of members' methods for producing recognizable social order/s.

Example

Investigating the conduct of jury members, an ethnomethodologist would seek to describe the common sense methods through which members of a jury produce themselves in a jury room as jurors: methods for establishing matters of fact; methods for developing evidence chains; methods for determining the reliability of witness testimony; methods for establishing the hierarchy of speakers in the jury room; methods for determining the guilt or innocence of defendants, etc. (see Garfinkel:1967). Such methods, taken individually, in combination, or collectively, depending on the scope of the investigation, would serve to constitute the social order of being a juror for the participants, and researcher(s), in that specific social setting [see below: "Some leading policies...": "Social Orders"]. For the ethnomethodologist, participants bring order to social settings - make

them orderable - through the sense making activities of their shared methods and practices as witnessably enacted in those settings.
In this way, ethno-methodology points to a broad and multi-faceted area of inquiry. John Heritage writes, “In it’s open-ended reference to [the study of] any kind of sense-making procedure, the term represents a signpost to a domain of uncharted dimensions rather than a staking out of a clearly delineated territory.”

Origins of ethno-methodology

Theoretical concerns, influences and resources used in the development of ethno-methodology include: traditional sociological concerns, especially the Parsonian [Talcott Parsons], "Problem of Order"; traditional sociological theory and methods, primarily Parsons, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber; Aron Gurwitsch's phenomenological field theory of consciousness / Gestalt Psychology; the Transcendental Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl; Alfred Schutz's Phenomenology of the Natural Attitude; Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of embodiment, Martin Heidegger's phenomenology of being / Existential Phenomenology; and Ludwig Wittgenstein's investigations regarding ordinary language use.Anne Rawls provides a brief developmental history of Garfinkel, and ethno-methodology, in "Ethno-methodology's Program" (Rawls/Garfinkel: 2002).

Theory and methods

One of the most perplexing problems for those new to ethno-methodology is the discovery that it lacks both a formally stated theory and a formal methodology. As serious as these problems might appear on the face of it, neither has prevented ethno-methodologists from doing ethno-methodological studies, and generating a substantial literature of "findings".

John Heritage has noted the, "off-stage role of theory", in ethnomethodological writings, and the concern that there is nowhere in the ethnomethodological corpus a systematic theoretical statement that would serve as a touchstone for ethnomethodological inquiries.

Instead, as in the case of, Studies in Ethno-methodology (1967), we are given oblique theoretical references to: Wittgenstein [Ordinary Language Philosophy]; Husserl [Transcendental Phenomenology]; Gurwitsch [Phenomenology/Gestalt Theory]; the works of the social phenomenologist Alfred Schutz [Phenomenology of the Natural Attitude]; and an assortment of traditional social theorists generally appearing as antipodes and/or sounding boards for ethnomethodological ideas.

Likewise in, Ethno-methodology's Program (2002), we again find a multiplicity of theoretical references, including the usual suspects from Studies, and introducing among others [Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, etc.], a key theoretical statement by Emile Durkheim regarding the objectivity of social facts, and a key insight into ethomethodology's way of doing theory.

This statement by Durkheim, although not a fully worked out theory or directive in its original form, or conceived as an aphorism for that matter, becomes, in the hands of Garfinkel, a theoretical directive - an "aphorism" regarding both the object of ethnomethodological studies, and the focus of ethnomethodological description. For this interpretation, Garfinkel "appropriates" Durkheim's statement, "misreads" it ethnomethodologically, and transforms its meaning through its "respecification" into an ethno-methodologically useful directive for ethno-methodological studies.

Durkheim's statement: "...our basic principle, that of the objective reality of social facts. It is...upon this principle that in the end everything rests, and everything comes back to it".

Rawls/Garfinkel's characterization: "Durkheim's aphorism refers to Durkheim's statement in, The Rules of Sociological Method, to the effect that, 'The objective reality of social facts is sociology's fundamental principle'".

"Misreading" Durkheim's statement in the context of, as juxtaposed to, or read against, the fundamental assumption of Ethno-Methodology studies [see below: "Some leading policies..."], produces an Ethno-Methodology "respecification" of Durkheim's statement [a rationale w/a strictly textual reading is also offered Garfinkel writes: "Ethno-methodology's fundamental phenomenon and it's standing technical preoccupation in its studies is to find, collect, specify, and make instructably observable the local endogenous production and natural accountability of immortal familiar society's most ordinary organizational things in the world, and to provide for them both and simultaneously, as objects, and procedurally, as alternate methods".

"Durkheim's aphorism", now Ethno-Methodologyly respecified, directs us to account for this, "objective reality of social facts" (Durkheim), these, "organizational things in the world" (Garfinkel), as, social "objects", and there, in situ"methods" of production; that is, in terms of their factual status as, "organizational things in the world", and simultaneously, as methodic achievements by real individuals in actual social settings.

This, in a nutshell, becomes the central tenet of ethno-methodology's research program: "working out Durkheim's aphorism". Rawls states: "According to Garfinkel, the result of Ethno-Methodology studies is the fulfillment of Durkheim's promise that the objective reality of social facts is sociology's fundamental principle". As such, ethno-methodology's programmatic directive becomes,"...to restore Sociology to the pursuit of Durkheim's aphorism, through an insistence on the concreteness of things [as opposed to theoretical and conceptual

constructionism (see Garfinkel:2002:50-52)], and on the claim that the concreteness of things necessarily depends on, and is produced in and through, complex mutually recognizable practices enacted by participants in social scenes".

Such a reading serves to locate ethno-methodology firmly in the sociological tradition, if not de facto serving to appropriate that tradition [despite periodic declarations to the contrary], and serves as an example of Ethno-Methodology theorizing, but it does not in itself, or combined with any or all of the other references, constitute a unified theoretical statement in any traditional sense.

The larger point here is that the authors and theoretical references cited in Garfinkel's work do not themselves serve as a rigorous theoretical underpinning for ethno-methodology, in whole or in part. Ethno-methodology is not Durkheimian, although it shares some of the interests of Durkheim; it is not a form of phenomenology, although it borrows from Husserl and Schutz's studies of the Lifeworld; it is not a form of Gestalt theory, although it describes social orders as having Gestalt-like properties; and, it is not a version of Wittgenstein's Ordinary Language Analysis, although it makes use of Wittgenstein's understanding of rule-use, etc.

Instead, these borrowings are only fragmentary references to theoretical works from which ethno-methodology has "appropriated", "misread", and/or, "respecified", the theoretical ideas of others for the expressed purposes of doing Ethno-Methodology investigations.

In terms of the question of Ethno-Methodology methods, it is the position of Anne Rawls, speaking for Garfinkel, that ethno-methodology is itself not a method. That is, it does not have a set of formal research methods or procedures. Instead, the position taken is that ethno-methodologists have conducted their studies in a variety of ways,[8] and that the point of these investigations is, " ...to discover the

things that persons in particular situations do, the methods theyuse, to create the patterned orderliness of social life".[9]

As Rawls states: "Ethno-methodology...is not a methodology, but rather a study of methodology" . That is, it does not have a formal methodology, but is the study of, "member's methods", the methods of others. Michael Lynch has also noted that: "Leading figures in the field have repeatedly emphasized that there is no obligatory set of methods [employed by ethno-methodologists, and no prohibition against using any research procedure whatsoever, if it is adequate to the particular phenomena under study".

Again, as perplexing as this position might seem to a traditional social scientist, such a proposition is consistent with ethno-methodology's understanding of "member's methods", and has philosophical standing when looked at in terms of certain lines of philosophical thought regarding the philosophy of, and the study of the actual practices of scientific procedure.

Some leading policies, methods and definitions

The Fundamental Assumption of Ethno-Methodology Studies. As characterized by Anne Rawls, speaking for Garfinkel: "If one assumes, as Garfinkel does, that the meaningful, patterned, and orderly character of everyday life is something that people must work to achieve, then one must also assume that they have some methods for doing so". That is, "...members of society must have some shared methods that they use to mutually construct the meaningful orderliness of social situations".

Ethno-methodology is an Empirical Enterprise. Rawls states: "Ethno-methodology is a thoroughly empirical enterprise devoted to the discovery of social order and intelligibility [sense making] as witnessable collective achievements." "The keystone of the [Ethno-Methodology] argument is that local [social] orders exist; that these orders are

witnessable in the scenes in which they are produced; and that the possibility of [their] intelligibility is based on the actual existence and detailed enactment of these orders".

Ethno-MethodologyIndifference. This is the policy of deliberate agnosticism, or indifference, towards the dictates, prejudices, methods and practices of sociological analysis as traditionally conceived (examples: theories of "deviance", analysis of behavior as rule governed, role theory, institutional (de)formations, theories of social stratification, etc.). Dictates and prejudices which serve to pre-structure traditional social scientific investigations independently of the subject matter taken as a topic of study, or the investigatory setting being subjected to scrutiny. The policy of Ethno-Methodology indifference is specifically not to be conceived of as indifference to the problem of social order taken as a group [member's] concern.

First Time Through. This is the practice of attempting to describe any social activity, regardless of its routine or mundane appearance, as if it were happening for the very first time. This is in an effort to expose how the observer of the activity assembles, or constitutes, the activity for the purposes of formulating any particular description. The point of such an exercise is to make available and underline the complexities of sociological analysis and description, particularly the indexical and reflexive properties of the actors', or observer's, own descriptions of what is taking place in any given situation. Such an activity will also reveal the observer's inescapable reliance on the hermeneutic circleas the defining "methodology" of social understanding for both lay persons and social scientists.

Breaching Experiment. A method for revealing, or exposing, the common work that is performed by members of particular social groups in maintaining a clearly recognizable and shared social order. For example, driving the wrong way down a busy one-way street can reveal

myriads of useful insights into the patterned social practices, and moral order, of the community of road users. The point of such an exercise is to demonstrate that gaining insight into the work involved in maintaining any given social order can often best be revealed by breaching that social order and observing the results of that breach - especially those activities related to the reassembly of that social order, and the normalization of that social setting.

Sacks' Gloss. A question about an aspect of the social order that recommends, as a method of answering it, that the researcher should seek out members of society who, in their daily lives, are responsible for the maintenance of that aspect of the social order. This is in opposition to the idea that such questions are best answered by a sociologist. Sacks' original question concerned objects in public places and how it was possible to see that such objects did or did not belong to somebody. He found his answer in the activities of police officers who had to decide whether cars were abandoned.

Durkheim's Aphorism. Durkheim famously recommended: "...our basic principle, that of the objectivity of social facts". This is usually taken to mean that we should assume the objectivity of social facts as a principle of study (thus providing the basis of sociology as a science). Garfinkel's alternative reading of Durkheim is that we should treat the objectivity of social facts as an achievement of society's members, and make the achievement process itself the focus of study. An Ethno-Methodology respecification of Durkheim's statement via a "misreading" [see below] of his quote appears above. There is also a textual link/rationale provided in the literature. Both links involve a leap of faith on the part of the reader; that is, we don't believe that one method for this interpretation is necessarily better than the other, or that one form of justification for such an interpretation outweighs its competitor.

Accounts. Accounts are the ways members signify, describe or explain the properties of a specific social situation. They can consist of both verbal and non-verbal objectifications. They are always both indexical to the situation in which they occur [see below], and, simultaneously reflexive - they serve to constitute that situation. An account can consist of something as simple as a wink of the eye, a material object evidencing a state of affairs, or something as complex as a story detailing the boundaries of the universe.

Indexicality. The concept of Indexicality is a key core concept for Ethno-methodology. Garfinkel states that it was derived from the concept of indexical expressions appearing in ordinary language philosophy (1967), wherein a statement is considered to be indexical insofar as it is dependent for its sense upon the context in which it is embedded. The phenomenon is acknowledged in various forms of analytical philosophy, and sociological theory and methods, but is considered to be both limited in scope and remedied through specification. In ethno-methodology, the phenomenon is universalized to all forms of language and behavior, and is deemed to be beyond remedy for the purposes of establishing a scientific description and explanation of social behavior.The consequence of the degree of contextual dependence for a "segment" of talk or behavior can range from the problem of establishing a "working consensus" regarding the description of a phrase, concept or behavior, to the end-game of social scientific description itself. Note that any serious development of the concept must eventually assume a theory of meaning as its foundation. Without such a foundational underpinning, both the traditional social scientist and the ethno-methodologist are relegated to merely telling stories around the campfire.

Misreading. Misreading a text, or fragments of a text, does not denote making an erroneous reading of a text in whole or in part. As

Garfinkel states, it means to denote an, "alternate reading", of a text or fragment of a text. As such, the original and its misreading do not, "...translate point to point", but, "...instead, they go together". No criteria are offered for the translation of an original text and its misreading - the outcome of such translations are in Garfinkel's term: "incommensurable". The misreading of texts or fragments of texts is a standard feature of ethno-methodology's way of doing theory, especially in regards to topics in phenomenology.

Reflexivity. Despite the fact that many sociologists use "reflexivity" as a synonym for "self-reflection," the way the term is used in ethno-methodology is different: it is meant "to describe the acausal and non-mentalistic determination of meaningful action-in-context."

Documentary Method of Interpretation. The Documentary Method is the method of understanding utilized by everyone engaged in trying to make sense of their social world - this includes the ethno-methodologist. Garfinkelrecovered the concept from the work of Karl Mannheim and repeatedly demonstrates the use of the method in the case studies appearing in his central text, Studies in Ethno-methodology (1967). Mannheim defined the term as a search for an identical homologous pattern of meaning underlying a variety of totally different realizations of that meaning. Garfinkel states that the documentary method of interpretation consists of treating an actual appearance as the "document of", "as pointing to", as "standing on behalf of", a presupposed underlying pattern. These "documents" serve to constitute the underlying pattern, but are themselves interpreted on the basis of what is already known about that underlying pattern. This seeming paradox is quite familiar to hermeneuticians who understand this phenomenon as a version of the hemeneutic circle. This phenomenon is also subject to analysis from the perspective ofGestalt theory

[part/whole relationships], and the phenomenological theory of perception.

Social Orders. Theoretically speaking, the object of Ethno-Methodology research is social order taken as a group members' concern. Methodologically, social order is made available for description in any specific social setting as an accounting of specific social orders: the sensible coherencies of accounts that order a specific social setting for the participants relative to a specific social project to be realized in that setting. Social orders themselves are made available for both participants and researchers through phenomena of order: the actual accounting of the partial [adumbrated] appearances of these sensibly coherent social orders. These appearances [parts, adumbrates] of social orders are embodied in specific accounts, and employed in a particular social setting by the members of the particular group of individuals party to that setting. Specific social orders have the same formal properties as identified by A. Gurwitsch in his discussion of the constituent features of perceptual noema, and, by extension, the same relationships of meaning described in his account of Gestalt Contextures. As such, it is little wonder that Garfinkel states: "you can't do anything unless you do read his texts".

Ethno-methodology's Field of Investigation. For ethno-methodology the topic of study is the social practices of real people in real settings, and the methods by which these people produce and maintain a shared sense of social order.

Ethno-methodology and traditional sociology

Core differences between traditional sociology and ethno-methodology are:

1. While traditional sociology usually offers an analysis of society which takes the facticity [factual character, objectivity] of the

social order for granted, ethno-methodology is concerned with the procedures [practices, methods] by which that social order is produced, and shared.

2. While traditional sociology usually provides descriptions of social settings which compete with the actual descriptions offered by the individuals who are party to those settings, ethno-methodology seeks to describe the actual procedures [practices, methods] these individuals use in their actual descriptions of those settings.
3. While Structural Functionalist research programs methodically impose pre-existing analytical schemata on their fields of study; Symbolic Interactionist programs assume the facticity of the symbols being interpreted by actors party to social scenes; and various forms of Social Constructionism assume the objective character of the building blocks that make up their descriptions of social structures, and then work retrospectively to account for these social constructions in terms of a formal, predetermined conceptual apparatus; Ethno-methodology specifically avoids engaging with these types of taken-for-granted programmatic assumptions and descriptive resources in its descriptions of social scenes.

In contrast to traditional sociological forms of inquiry, it is a hallmark of the Ethno-Methodology perspective that it does not make theoretical or methodological appeals to: outside assumptions regarding the structure of an actor or actors' characterization of social reality; refer to the subjective states of an individual or groups of individuals; attribute conceptual projections such as, "value states", "sentiments", "goal orientations", "mini-max economic theories of behavior", etc., to any

actor or group of actors; or posit a specific "normative order" as a transcendental feature of social scenes, etc.

For the Ethno-methodologist, the methodic realization of social scenes takes place within the actual setting under scrutiny, and is structured by the participants in that setting through the reflexive accounting of that setting's features. The job of the Ethno-methodologist is to describe the methodic character of these activities, not account for them in a way that transcends that which is made available in and through the actual accounting practices of the individual's party to those settings.

In 1967, Garfinkel states: Ethno-methodology's, "...central recommendation is that the activities whereby members produce and manage settings of organized everyday affairs are identical with member's procedures for making those settings 'account-able' "(1967:1).

Over thirty-five years later, Garfinkel states: "Phenomena of order are identical with [the] procedures for their endogenous production and accountability.

Although the language has changed, the message remains the same: social orders are identical with the procedures [practices, methods] members of a particular social group employ to produce and manage a particular setting of organized everyday affairs. These social orders are endogenous [generated from within the particular setting], and made available for study through the demonstrable [objectified, recognizable, embodied] accounting practices of the group members party to that particular setting.

These characters of particularity and embeddedness of the: social order, procedures [practices, methods], activities, accounts, and person's party to such settings are essential features of the Ethno-Methodology perspective, and clearly differentiate it from traditional sociological forms.

Ethno-methodology and phenomenology

Even though ethno-methodology has been characterized as having a "phenomenological sensibility",[24] and reliable commentators have acknowledged that, "there is a strong influence of phenomenology on ethno-methodology...", orthodox adherents to the discipline - those who follow the teachings of Garfinkel - know better than to represent it as a branch, or form, of phenomenology, or phenomenological sociology. The confusion between the two disciplines stems, in part, from the practices of some ethno-methodologists [including Garfinkel], who sift through phenomenological texts, recovering phenomenological concepts and findings relevant to their interests, and then transpose these concepts and findings to topics in the study of social order. Such interpretive transpositions do not make the ethno-methodologist a phenomenologist, or ethno-methodology a form of phenomenology.

To further muddy the waters, some phenomenological sociologists seize upon Ethno-Methodology findings as examples of applied phenomenology; this even when the results of these Ethno-Methodology investigations clearly do not make use of phenomenological methods, or formulate their findings in the language of phenomenology. So called phenomenological analyses of social structures that do not have prima facie reference to any of the structures of intentional consciousness should raise questions as to the phenomenological status of such analyses.

Another way of convincing yourself of the difference between these two disciplines is to read, Studies in Ethno-methodology (1967), and try to find any reference to: a subject [other than experimental], consciousness, intentionality, or phenomenological methodology, etc. There are no such references. A phenomenological analysis should reflect phenomenological methods. This text clearly does not.

Phenomenology and Ethno-methodology

In, Ethno-methodology's Program (2002), Garfinkel speaks of phenomenological texts and findings as being, "appropriated", and intentionally, "misread", for the purposes of exploring topics in the study of social order. These appropriations and methodical "misread[ings]" of phenomenological texts and findings are clearly made for the purposes of furthering Ethno-Methodology analyses (2002:177), and should not be mistaken for logical extensions of these phenomenological texts and findings.

, there is no claim in any of Garfinkel's work that ethno-methodology is a form of phenomenology, or phenomenological sociology. To state that ethno-methodology has a, "phenomenological sensibility", or that, "there is a strong influence of phenomenology on ethno-methodology", is not the equivalent of describing ethno-methodology as a form of phenomenology.

This having been said, one should also note that even though ethno-methodology is not a form of phenomenology, the reading and understanding of phenomenological texts, and developing the capability of seeing phenol-menologically is essential to the actual doing of Ethno-Methodology studies. As Garfinkel states in regard to the work of the phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch, especially his, "Field of Consciousness" "you can't do anything unless you do read his texts".

Ethno-methodology (EM) and conversation analysis (CA)

The relationship between EM and CA has always been somewhat contentious in terms of boundaries. The clearest single statement appearing in the literature, from an orthodox EM perspective, appears in Rawls' formulation spanning pages 40–41 of, Ethno-methodology's Program.

Unpacking Rawls' statement, we can note two essential distinctions:

In as much as the study of social orders is, "inexorably intertwined", with the constitutive features of talk about those social orders, EM is committed to an interest in both conversational talk, and the role this talk plays in the constitution of that order; think indexicality / reflexivity here and the essential embeddedness of talk in a specific social order, and the role of the reflexivity of accounts in the constitution of that order. It is in this sense that Rawls states that, "Conversational Analysis is not separate from Ethno-methodology". Such a position is wholly consistent with the orthodox EM literature, and posts as nothing new to any orthodox ethno-methodologist - one who follows the teachings of Garfinkel.

On the other hand, where the study of conversational talk is divorced from its situated context, and de-linked from its reflexive character in terms of constituting a specific social order - that is, as it takes on the character of a purely "technical method", and, "formal analytic enterprise in its own right" it is not a form of ethno-methodology understood in any orthodox sense. The "danger" of misunderstanding here, as Rawls notes, is that CA in this sense, becomes just another formal analytic enterprise, like any other formal method which brings an analytical toolbox of preconceptions, formal definitions, and operational procedures to the situation/setting under study. It might further be noted that when such analytical concepts are generated from within one setting, and conceptually applied (generalized) to another, the (re)application represents a violation of the orthodox EM position regarding the Ethno-Methodology description of a given social order, as it ignores the essential/fundamental EM principle of the embeddedness of talk in a specifically situated social order.

In general, we can say the following: Both EM and CA are independent forms of investigation; There is no necessary connection between EM and CA studies in terms of principles or methods; EM and CA studies may overlap in terms of interests and projects; CA studies must adhere to the foundational tenants of EM studies in order to be considered properly Ethno-Methodology; EM studies may utilize CA methods, as anecdotal descriptions, as substantive findings (when in conformity with foundational EM principles), or as supplemental findings germane to the in situ findings of a particular EM study; and, Both disciplines can function very well without the other, but in as much as their interests coincide in any given instance, both can profit from the understanding of the others investigational methods and findings.

Varieties of ethno-methodology

According to George Psathas, five types of Ethno-Methodology study can be identified. These may be characterised as:

The organization of practical actions and practical reasoning.Including the earliest studies, such as those in Garfinkel's seminal Studies in Ethno-methodology.

The organization of talk-in-interaction. More recently known as conversation analysis, Harvey Sacks established this approach in collaboration with his colleagues Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson.

Talk-in-interaction within institutional or organizational settings. While early studies focused on talk abstracted from the context in which it was produced (usually using tape recordings of telephone conversations) this approach seeks to identify interactional structures that are specific to particular settings.

The study of work. 'Work' is used here to refer to any social activity. The analytic interest is in how that work is accomplished within the setting in which it is performed.

The haecceity of work. Just what makes an activity what it is? e.g. what makes a test a test, a competition a competition, or a definition a definition?

Further discussion of the varieties and diversity of Ethno-Methodology investigations can be found in Maynard & Clayman.[25] Article is available online.

Reference Work: "Garfinkel", Sage "Masters" series (2003:4Vols:approx.1500 pages). Compendium of theoretical papers, Ethno-Methodology studies, and discussions, edited by M.Lynch & W. Sharrock. Table of contents is available on the publisher's website.

Reference Work: "Ethno-methodology", Sage "Research" series (2011:4Vols:approx. 1500 pages). Compendium of theoretical papers, Ethno-Methodology studies, and discussions, edited by M.Lynch & W. Sharrock. Table of contents is available on the publisher's website.

The Theory

Ethno-methodology is a perspective within sociology which focuses on the way people make sense of their everyday world. People are seen as rational actors, but employ practical reasoning rather than formal logic to make sense of and function in society. The theory argues that human society is entirely dependent on these methods of achieving and displaying understanding. The approach was developed by Harold Garfinkel, based on Alfred Schütz's phenomenologicalreconstruction of Max Weber's verstehen sociology.

Like Durkheim, the fundamental sociological phenomenon for Ethno-methodologists is the social fact. But, unlike Durkheim, the social fact is not external of the individual. The social fact is the product of the social member's methodological activities; it is their understanding of their everyday world. Members, here, are understood not simply as individuals but any social entity (i.e., individuals and organizations) that

can produce a social fact. In short, members of society (individuals and organizations) make sense of and function in society by creating social facts or understandings of how society works. In this sense, ethno-methodology is at the same time both macro and micro oriented in that members can produce social facts at either level, for either the personal structure (the individual's level of everyday meaning) or the organizational/institutional structure (the organization's level of everyday meaning).

One of the key points of the theory is that ethno-methods or social facts are reflexively accountable. Accounts are the ways members describe or explain specific situations. Accounting is the process of describing or explaining social situations or how members make sense of their everyday world. Ethno-methodologists are interested in both the account and the method by which the account is made meaningful to the recipient of the account, and tend to emphasize the latter. The interest is not in determining if the account is accurate or otherwise judging the account but rather in exploring how the account is conveyed. For example, the explanation given by a husband for arriving home late at night is an account. The ethno-methodologist is interested in both the account and the methods used to convey that account to the recipient, in this case, the wife. Whether the account is factual or not does not interest the ethno-methodologist.

Sociology, generally, seeks to provide accounts of society. Ethno-methodologists view such accounts - sociological ones - the same way they view the account given by the husband above. In other words, ethno-methodologists break down the accounts given by other sociologists (and other scientists, for that matter) the same way they break down the accounts of interpersonal interaction in romantic relationships. Ethno-methodologists are not interested in whether or not the accounts given by sociologists are accurate but rather are interested

in the accounts that are given and the methods used to develop and convey those accounts.

The accounts people use to explain their behavior or help them understand social interactions are generally taken for granted (e.g., you don't have to ask permission to use the restroom in your own home). To illustrate how these accounts are usually taken for granted, Ethno-methodologists have used research methods in the past that 'breach' or 'break' the everyday routine of interaction in order to reveal the work that goes into maintaining the normal flow of life. Some examples include:pretending to be a stranger in one's own homeblatantly cheating at board gamesattempting to bargain for goods on sale in stores

In most of these situations, the individuals who are unaware that the researcher is intentionally breaching social norms attempt to explain the breacher's behavior by providing accounts for them. These interventions demonstrate the creativity with which ordinary members of society are able to interpret and maintain the unspoken social order that Ethno-methodologists study.

Impact of Ethno-methodology

While ethno-methodology is often seen as being removed from more mainstream sociology, it has proven to be influential. For instance, ethno-methodology notes that words are reliant for their meaning based on the context in which they are used; they are indexical. This has led to insights into the objectivity of social science and the difficulty in establishing a description of human behavior which has an objective status outside the context of its creation. Ethno-methodology has also influenced the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge by providing a research strategy that precisely describes the methods of its research subjects without the necessity of evaluating their validity. This proved to be useful to researchers studying social order in laboratories who wished to

understand how scientists conducted their experiments without either endorsing or criticising their activities.

Ethno-methodology has had an impact on linguistics and particularly on pragmatics. Ethno-Methodology studies of work have played a significant role in the field of human-computer interaction, informing design by providing engineers with descriptions of the practices of users. Additionally, Ethno-Methodologyly informed management and leadership studies are newly emerging fields.

Worthy of separate mention, ethno-methodology has developed what is often considered a sub-field or perhaps an entirely new discipline, conversation analysis, which has its own chapter.

Key Points

Ethno-methodology's goal is to document the methods and practices through whichsociety’s members make sense of their worlds.

Anne Rawls characterizes the fundamental assumption of Ethno-Methodology studies, saying, "members of society must have some shared methods that they use to mutually construct the meaningful orderliness of social situations".

Ethno-methodology is different from traditional sociology because it is not as concerned by the analysis of society, but rather by the procedures through which social order is produced.

In contrast to traditional sociological forms of inquiry, the Ethno-Methodology perspective does not make theoretical or methodological appeals to outside assumptions regarding the structure of an actor or actors' characterization of social reality.

Phenomenology and Ethno-methodology

Terms

Ethno-Methodology

An academic discipline that attempts to understand the social orders people use to make sense of the world through analyzing their accounts and descriptions of their day-to-day experiences.The view that the existence of God or of all deities is unknown, unknowable, unproven, or un-provable.

Harold Garfinkel

He is known for establishing and developing ethno-methodology as a field of inquiry in sociology.

Ethno-methodology is an approach to sociological research founded in the 1960s by Harold Garfinkel and developed by Harvey Sacks and many others. Early initiatives challenged the more abstract types of social theory, and developed distinctive methodological initiatives for a sustained programme of empirical research on social and communicative actions. This four-volume set includes selections that discuss and exemplify how Ethno-methodologists use observations, analyses, and interventions to gain insight into larger questions of social order and the organization of practical.

Section One: Background on Social Scientific and Everyday Methods

Section Two: Ethno-methodology and the Practical Resolution of Methodological Problems

Section Three: Indexical Expressions - Topic, Resource or Nuisance?

Section Four: Objectification in Discourse

Section Five: Language, Categories and Membership

Section Six: Studies of Work

Section Seven: Action as Algorithm - Computer Supported Cooperative Work

Section Eight: Ethno-methodology and Social Institutions

Section Nine: Language, Interaction, Embodied Conduct

Chapter-3

Experts Opinion

GOFFMAN

Erving Goffman (11 June 1922 – 19 November 1982), a Canadian-born sociologist and writer, was considered "the most influential American sociologist of the twentieth century".In 2007 he was listed by *The Times Higher Education Guide* as the sixth most-cited author in the humanities and social sciences, behind Anthony Giddens and ahead of Jürgen Habermas.

Goffman was the 73rd president of the American Sociological Association. His best-known contribution to social theory is his study of symbolic interaction. This took the form of dramaturgical analysis, beginning with his 1956 book, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. Goffman's other major works include *Asylums* (1961),*Stigma* (1963), *Interaction Ritual* (1967), *Frame Analysis*(1974), and *Forms of Talk* (1981). His major areas of study included the sociology of everyday life, social interaction, the social construction of self, social organization (framing) of experience, and particular elements of social life such as total institutions and stigmas.

Erving Goffman's distinctive contribution to an understanding of others was grounded in his information control and ritual models of the interaction process. This contribution centered on the forms of the interaction order rather than self-other relations as traditionally conceived in phenomenology. Goffman came to phenomenology as a sympathetic but critical outsider who sought resources for the sociological mining of the interaction order. His engagement with

phenomenological thinkers (principally Gustav Ichheiser, Jean-Paul Sartre and Alfred Schutz) has to be understood in these terms. The article traces basic differences in analytical focus through a range of phenomenological critiques of Goffman and a comparison of salient aspects of Schutz's and Goffman's writings. While the contrasts have perhaps been overplayed, I conclude that Goffman's thinking about others probably owed more to his pragmatist roots than to his later encounters with phenomenology.

Goffman was born 11 June 1922, in Mannville, Alberta, Canada, to Max Goffman and Anne Goffman, née Averbach. He was from a family of Ukrainian Jews who had emigrated to Canada at the turn of the century.He had an older sibling, Frances Bay, who became an actress.The family moved to Dauphin, Manitoba, where his father operated a successful tailoring business.

From 1937 Goffman attended St. John's Technical High School in Winnipeg, where his family had moved that year. In 1939 he enrolled at the University of Manitoba, majoring in chemistry. He interrupted his studies and moved to Ottawa to work in the film industry for the National Film Board of Canada, established by John Grierson.Later he developed an interest in sociology. Also during this time, he met the renowned North American sociologist, Dennis Wrong. Their meeting motivated Goffman to leave the University of Manitoba and enroll at the University of Toronto, where he studied under C. W. M. Hart and Ray Birdwhistell, graduating in 1945 with a B.A. in sociology and anthropology.Later he moved to the University of Chicago, where he received anM.A. (1949) and Ph.D. (1953) in sociology.[3][7] For his doctoral dissertation, from December 1949 to May 1951 he lived and collected ethnographic data on the island of Unst in the Shetland Islands.

In 1952 Goffman married Angelica Choate; in 1953, their son Thomas was born. Angelica suffered from mental illness and committed

suicide in 1964. Outside his academic career, Goffman was known for his interest, and relative success, in the stock market and in gambling. At one point, in pursuit of his hobbies and ethnographic studies, he became a pit boss at a Las Vegascasino.

In 1981 Goffman married socio-linguist Gillian Sankoff. The following year, their daughter Alice was born. In 1982 Goffman died in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on 19 or 20 November (sources vary), of stomach cancer.[9][10][11] Alice Goffman is also a sociologist.

Career

The research that Goffman had done at Unst inspired him to write his first major work, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1956).After graduating from the University of Chicago, in 1954–57 he was an assistant to the athletic director at the National Institute for Mental Health in Bethesda, Maryland. Participant observation done there led to his essays on mental illness and total institutions which came to form his second book, *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates* (1961).

In 1958 Goffman became a faculty member in the sociology department at the University of California, Berkeley, first as a visiting professor, then from 1962 as a full professor. In 1968 he moved to the University of Pennsylvania, receiving the Benjamin Franklin Chair in Sociology and Anthropology. In 1969 he became a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. In 1971 he published *Relations in Public*, in which he tied together many of his ideas abouteveryday life, seen from a sociological perspective. Another major book of his, *Frame Analysis*, came out in 1974. He received a Guggenheim Fellowship for 1977–78. In 1979, Goffman received the Cooley-Mead Award for Distinguished Scholarship, from the Section on Social Psychology of the American Sociological Association.He was

elected the 73rd president of the American Sociological Association, serving in 1981–82; he was, however, unable to deliver the presidential address in person due to progressing illness.

Posthumously, in 1983, he received the Mead Award from the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction.

Influence and legacy

Goffman was influenced by Herbert Blumer, Émile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud, Everett Hughes, Alfred Radcliffe-Brown, Talcott Parsons, Alfred Schütz, Georg Simmel and W. Lloyd Warner. Hughes was the "most influential of his teachers", according to Tom Burns. Gary Alan Fine and Philip Manning state that Goffman never engaged in serious dialogue with other theorists. His work has, however, influenced and been engaged by numerous contemporary sociologists, including Anthony Giddens, Jürgen Habermas and Pierre Bourdieu.

Though Goffman is often associated with the symbolic interaction school of sociological thought, he himself did not see himself as a representative of it, and so Fine and Manning conclude that he "does not easily fit within a specific school of sociological thought". His ideas are also "difficult to reduce to a number of key themes"; his work can be broadly described as developing "a comparative, qualitative sociology that aimed to produce generalizations about human behavior".

Goffman made substantial advances in the study of face-to-face interaction, elaborated the "dramaturgical approach" to human interaction, and developed numerous concepts that have had a massive influence, particularly in the field of themicro-sociology of everyday life.[19][21] Many of his works have concerned the organization of everyday behavior, a concept he termed "interaction order". He contributed to the sociological concept of framing (frame analysis), togame theory (the concept of strategic interaction), and to the study of

interactions and linguistics. With regard to the latter, he argued that the activity of speaking must be seen as a social rather than a linguistic construct.[24] From a methodological perspective, Goffman often employed qualitative approaches, specifically ethnography, most famously in his study of social aspects of mental illness, in particular the functioning of total institutions.[19] Overall, his contributions are valued as an attempt to create a theory that bridges the agency-and-structure divide for popularizing social constructionism, symbolic interaction, conversation analysis, ethnographic studies, and the study and importance of individual interactions.

In 2007 Goffman was listed by *The Times Higher Education Guide* as the sixth most-cited author in the humanities and social sciences, behind Anthony Giddens and ahead of Jürgen Habermas.His popularity with the general public has been attributed to his writing style, described as "sardonic, satiric, jokey", and as "ironic and self-consciously literary",and to its being more accessible than that of most academics. His style has also been influential in academia, and is credited with popularizing a less formal style in academic publications.

His students included Carol Brooks Gardner, Charles Goodwin, Marjorie Goodwin, John Lofland, Gary Marx, Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff, David Sudnow and Eviatar Zerubavel.

Despite his influence, according to Fine and Manning there are "remarkably few scholars who are continuing his work", nor has there been a "Goffman school"; thus his impact on social theory has been simultaneously "great and modest". Fine and Manning attribute the absence of subsequent Goffman-style research and writing to the nature of his signature style, very difficult to duplicate (even "mimic-proof"), and also to his stylistics and subjects not being broadly valued in the social sciences. With regard to his style, Fine and Manning remark that he tends to be seen either as a scholar whose style is difficult to

reproduce, and therefore daunting to those who might wish to emulate his style, or as a scholar whose work was transitional, bridging the work of the Chicago school and that of contemporary sociologists, and thus of less interest to sociologists than the classics of either of those two groups.[20][25] With regard to his subjects, Fine and Manning observe that the topic of behavior in public places is often stigmatized as being trivial, and thus unworthy of serious scholarly attention.

Nonetheless, Fine and Manning note that Goffman is "the most influential American sociologist of the twentieth century".Elliott and Turner see him as "a revered figure an outlaw theorist who came to exemplify the best of the sociological imagination", and "perhaps the first postmodern sociological theorist".

Works

Early works

Goffman's early works consist of his graduate writings of 1949–53.His master's thesis was a survey of audience responses to a radio soap opera, *Big Sister*.[19] One of its most important elements was a critique of his research methodology – of experimental logic and of variable analysis.Other writings of the period include *Symbols of Class Status* (1951) and *On Cooling the Mark Out* (1952). His doctoral dissertation, *Communication Conduct in an Island Community* (1953), presented a model of communication strategies in face-to-face interaction, and focused on how everyday life rituals affect public projections of self.

Presentation of Self

Goffman's *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* was published in 1956, with a revised edition in 1959. He had developed the book's core ideas from his doctoral dissertation. It was Goffman's first

and most famous book, for which he received the American Sociological Association's 1961 MacIver Award.

Goffman describes the theatrical performances that occur in face-to-face interactions.[32] He holds that when an individual comes in contact with another person, he attempts to control or guide the impression that the other person will form of him, by altering his own setting, appearance and manner. At the same time, the person that the individual is interacting with attempts to form an impression of, and obtain information about, the individual.[33] Goffman also believes that participants in social interactions engage in certain practices to avoid embarrassing themselves or others. Society is not homogeneous; we must act differently in different settings. This recognition led Goffman to his dramaturgical analysis. He saw a connection between the kinds of "acts" that people put on in their daily lives and theatrical performances. In a social interaction, as in a theatrical performance, there is an onstage area where actors (individuals) appear before the audience; this is where positive self-concepts and desired impressions are offered. But there is, as well, a backstage – a hidden, private area where individuals can be themselves and drop their societal roles and identities.

Asylums

Goffman is sometimes credited with having in 1957 coined the term "total institution", though Fine and Manning note that he had heard it in lectures by Everett Hughes in reference to any type of institution in which people are treated alike and in which behavior is regulated. Regardless of whether Goffman coined the term "total institution", he popularized it with his 1961 book, *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates*.The book has been described as "ethnography of the concept of the total institution". The book was one of the first sociological examinations of the social situation

of mental patients in psychiatric hospitals and a major contribution to understanding of social aspects of mental illness.

The book is composed of four essays: "Characteristics of Total Institutions" (1957); "The Moral Career of the Mental Patient" (1959); "The Underlife of a Public Institution: A Study of Ways of Making Out in a Mental Hospital"; and "The Medical Model and Mental Hospitalization: Some Notes on the Vicissitudes of the Tinkering Trades". The first three essays focus on the experiences of patients; the last, on professional-client interactions. Goffman is mainly concerned with the details of psychiatric hospitalization and with the nature and effects of the process he calls "institutionalization". He describes how institutionalization socializes people into the role of a good patient, someone "dull, harmless and inconspicuous" – a condition which in turn reinforces notions of chronicity in severe mental illness. Total institutions greatly affect people's interactions; yet, even in such places, people find ways to redefine their roles and reclaim their identities.

Asylums has been credited with helping catalyze the reform of mental health systems in a number of countries, leading to reductions in the numbers of large mental hospitals and of the individuals locked up in them. It has also been influential in the anti-psychiatry movement.

Behavior in Public

In *Behavior in Public Places* (1963), Goffman again focuses on everyday public interactions. He draws distinctions between several types of public gatherings ("gatherings", "situations", "social occasions") and types of audiences (acquainted versus unacquainted).

Stigma

Goffman's book *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (1963) examines how, to protect their identities when they

depart from approved standards of behavior or appearance, people manage impressions of themselves – mainly through concealment. Stigma pertains to the shame that a person may feel when he or she fails to meet other people's standards, and to the fear of being discredited – which causes the individual not to reveal his or her shortcomings. Thus, a person with a criminal record may simply withhold that information from fear of being judged by whomever that person happens to encounter.

Interaction Ritual

Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior is a collection of six Goffman essays. The first four were originally published in the 1950s, the fifth in 1964, and the last was written for the collection. They include: "On Face-work" (1955); "Embarrassment and Social Organization" (1956); "The Nature of Deference and Demeanor" (1956); "Alienation from Interaction" (1957); "Mental Symptoms and Public Order" (1964); and "Where the Action Is".

The first essay, "On Face-work", discusses the concept of face, which is the positive self-image that an individual holds when interacting with others. Goffman believes that face "as a sociological construct of interaction, is neither inherent in nor a permanent aspect of the person".[48] Once an individual offers a positive self-image of him or herself to others, that individual feels a need to maintain and live up to that image. Inconsistency in how a person projects him or herself in society risks embarrassment and discrediting. Therefore people remain guarded, to ensure that they do not show themselves to others in an unfavorable light.

Strategic Interaction

Goffman's book *Strategic Interaction* (1969) is his contribution to game theory. It discusses the compatibility of game theory with the legacy of the Chicago School of sociology and with the perspective of symbolic interactionism. It is one of his few works that clearly engage with that perspective. Goffman's view on game theory was shaped by the works of Thomas Schellin. Goffman presents reality as a form of game, and discusses its rules and the various moves that players can make (the "unwitting", the "naive", the "covering", the "uncovering", and the "counter-uncovering").

Frame Analysis

Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (1974) is Goffman's attempt to explain how conceptual frames – ways to organize experience – structure an individual's perception of society. This book is thus about the organization of experience rather than the organization of society. A frame is a set of concepts and theoretical perspectives that organize experiences and guide the actions of individuals, groups and societies. Frame analysis, then, is the study of the organization of social experience. To illustrate the concept of the frame, Goffman gives the example of a picture frame: a person uses the frame (which represents structure) to hold together his picture (which represents the content) of what he is experiencing in his life.

The most basic frames are called primary frameworks. A primary framework takes an individual's experience or an aspect of a scene that would originally be meaningless and makes it meaningful. One type of primary framework is a natural framework, which identifies situations in the natural world and is completely biophysical, with no human

influences. The other type of framework is a social framework, which explains events and connects them to humans. An example of a natural framework is the weather, and an example of a social framework is a meteorologist who predicts the weather. Focusing on the social frameworks, Goffman seeks to "construct a general statement regarding the structure, or form, of experiences individuals have at any moment of their social life".

Forms of Talk

Goffman's book, *Forms of Talk* (1981), includes five essays: "Replies and Responses" (1976); "Response Cries" (1978); "Footing" (1979); "The Lecture" (1976); and "Radio Talk" (1981). Each essay addresses both verbal and non-verbal communication through a sociolinguistic model. The book provides a comprehensive overview of the study of talk. In the introduction, Goffman identifies three themes that recur throughout the text: "ritualization, participation framework, and embedding".

The first essay, "Replies and Responses", concerns "conversational dialogue" and the way people respond during a conversation, both verbally and non-verbally. The second essay, "Response Cries", considers the use of utterances and their social implications in different social contexts. Specifically, Goffman discusses "self-talk" (talking to no one in particular) and its role in social situations. Next, in "Footing", Goffman addresses the way that footing, or alignment, can shift during a conversation. The fourth essay, "The Lecture", originally an oral presentation, describes different types and methods of lecture. Lastly, in "Radio Talk", Goffman describes the types and forms of talk used in radio programming and the effect they have on listeners.

Phenomenology and Ethno-methodology

- Major figure in the symbolic interaction perspective
- Dramaturgical Perspective
- 73rd President of The American Sociological Association

Birth:

Erving Goffman was born June 11, 1922.

Death:

He died November 20, 1982 of stomach cancer.

Early Life And Education:

Goffman was born in Canada to Ukrainian Jewish immigrants. He studied sociology as an undergraduate at the University of Toronto and completed his graduate work at the University of Chicago.

Career and Later Life:

Goffman began teaching at the University of California at Berkley and becoming a full professor in 1962. In 1968 he became a Chair in Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Pennsylvania with a salary of $30,000, which at the time set a new high for a sociology professor.

Goffman pioneered the study of face-to-face interaction, also known as micro-sociology, which he made famous in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. He used the imagery of the theater to portray the importance of human and social action. All actions, he argued, are social performances that aim to give off and maintain certain desired impressions of the self to others. In social interactions, humans are actors on a stage playing a performance for an audience. The only time that individuals can be themselves and get rid of their role or identity in society is backstage where no audience is present.

In 1961, Goffman published the book *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates* in which he

examined the nature and effects of being hospitalized in a psychiatric hospital. He described how this process of institutionalization socializes people into the role of a good patient (i.e. someone dull, harmless and inconspicuous), which in turn reinforces the notion that severe mental illness is a chronic state.

Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience was another of Goffman's well-known books that was published in 1974. Frame analysis is the study of the organization of social experiences and so with his book, Goffman wrote about how conceptual frames structure an individual's perception of society. He used the concept of a picture frame to illustrate this concept. The frame, he described, represents structure and is used to hold together an individual's context of what they are experiencing in their life, represented by a picture.

Garfinkel

Harold Garfinkel (October 29, 1917 – April 21, 2011) was a sociologist, ethnomethodologist, and a Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is known for establishing and developing ethno-methodological as a field of inquiry in sociology. He published multiple books throughout his lifetime and is well known for his book,

Influences

Garfinkel was very intrigued by Parson's study of social order Parsons sought to offer a solution to the problem of social order (i.e., How do we account for the order that we witness in society?) and, in so doing, provide a disciplinary foundation for research in sociology. Drawing on the work of earlier social theorists (Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, Weber), Parsons postulated that all social

action could be understood in terms of an “action frame” consisting of a fixed number of elements (an agent, a goal or intended end, the circumstances within which the act occurs, and its “normative orientation”). Agents make choices among possible ends, alternative means to these ends, and the normative constraints that might be seen as operative. They conduct themselves, according to Parsons, in a fashion “analogous to the scientist whose knowledge is the principal determinant of his action.” Order, by this view, is not imposed from above, but rather arises from rational choices made by the actor. Parsons sought to develop a theoretical framework for understanding how social order is accomplished through these choices.

Ethno-methodological was not designed to supplant the kind of formal analysis recommended by Parsons. Garfinkel stipulated that the two programs are “different and unavoidably related.” Both seek to give accounts of social life, but ask different kinds of questions and formulate quite different sorts of claims. Sociologists operating within the formal program endeavor to produce objective (that is to say, non-indexical) claims similar in scope to those made in the natural sciences. To do so, they must employ theoretical constructs that pre-define the shape of the social world. Unlike Parsons, and other social theorists before and since, Garfinkel’s goal was not to articulate yet another explanatory system. He expressed an “indifference” to all forms of sociological theorizing.Instead of viewing social practice through a theoretical lens, Garfinkel sought to explore the social world directly and describe its autochthonous workings in elaborate detail. Durkheim famously stated, "the objective reality of social facts is sociology’s fundamental principle." Garfinkel substituted ‘phenomenon’ for ‘principle’, signaling a different approach to sociological inquiry. The task of sociology, as he envisions it, is to conduct investigations into just how Durkheim’s social

facts are brought into being. The result is an “alternate, asymmetric and incommensurable” program of sociological inquiry.

While Garfinkel was studying at Harvard, he also became acquainted with a number of European scholars who had recently immigrated to the U.S. These would include Aron Gurwitsch, Felix Kaufmann, and Alfred Schütz, who introduced the young sociologist to newly emerging ideas in social theory, psychology and phenomenology.

Alfred Schütz, like Parsons, was concerned with establishing a sound foundation for research in the social sciences. He took issue, however, with the Parsonsian assumption that actors in society always behave rationally. Schütz made a distinction between reasoning in the ‘natural attitude’ and scientific reasoning. The reasoning of scientists builds upon everyday commonsense, but, in addition, employs a “postulate of rationality.” This imposes special requirements on their claims and conclusions (e.g., application of rules of formal logic, standards of conceptual clarity, compatibility with established scientific ‘facts’). This has two important implications for research in the social sciences. First, it is inappropriate for sociologists to use scientific reasoning as a lens for viewing human action in daily life, as Parsons had proposed, since they are distinct kinds of rationality. On the other hand, the traditionally assumed discontinuity between the claims of science and commonsense understandings is dissolved since scientific observations employ both forms of rationality. This raises a flag for researchers in the social sciences, since these disciplines are fundamentally engaged in the study of the shared understandings that underlie the day-to-day functioning of society. How can we make detached, objective claims about everyday reasoning, if our conceptual apparatus is hopelessly contaminated with commonsense categories and rationalities?

The Roots of Ethno-methodological

Garfinkel's concept of Ethno-methodological started with his attempt at analyzing a jury discussion after a Chicago case in 1945. Garfinkel was attempting to understand the way jurors knew how to act as jurors. After attempting to understand the jurors actions, Garfinkel created the term "ethno-methodological" as a way to describe how people use different methods in order to understand the society they live in. Garfinkel noticed through his study of Ethno-methodological that the methods people use to understand the society they live in are very much fixed in people's natural attitudes.

Rationality

Accepting Schütz's critique of the Parsonian program, Garfinkel sought to find another way of addressing the Problem of Social Order. He wrote, "Members to an organized arrangement are continually engaged in having to decide, recognize, persuade, or make evident the rational, i.e., the coherent, or consistent, or chosen, or planful, or effective, or methodical, or knowledgeable character of [their activities]". On first inspection, this might not seem very different from Parsons' proposal. Their views on rationality, however, are not compatible. For Garfinkel, society's character is not dictated by an imposed standard of rationality, either scientific or otherwise.

To Garfinkel, rationality is itself produced as a local accomplishment in, and as, the very ways that society's members craft their moment-to-moment interaction. He writes:*Instead of the properties of rationality being treated as a methodological principle for interpreting activity, they are to be treated only as empirically problematical material. They would have the status of data and would have to be accounted for in the same way that the more familiar properties of conduct are accounted for.*

Social order arises in the very ways that participants conduct themselves together. The sense of a situation arises from their interactions. Garfinkel writes, “any social setting [can] be viewed as self-organizing with respect to the intelligible character of its own appearances as either representations of or as evidences-of-a-social-order.” The orderliness of social life, therefore, is produced through the moment-to-moment work of society’s members and ethno-methodology’s task is to explicate just how this work is done. In his chapter, "Rational Behaviors" in his book, *Studies in Ethno-methodology, 1967,* Garfinkel discusses how there are various meanings of the term "rationality" in relation to the way people behave. Garfinkel mentions Schutz' paper on the issues of rationality and his various meanings of the term rationality. Garfinkel discusses each of these "rationalities" and the "behaviors" that result.The rationalities listed in Garfinkel's chapter are listed below.

1. Categorizing and Comparing
2. Tolerable error
3. Search for "means"
4. Analysis of alternatives and consequences
5. Strategy
6. Concern for timing
7. Predictability
8. Rules of procedure
9. Choice
10. Grounds of choice
11. Compatibility of ends-means relationships with principles of formal logic
12. Semantic clarity and distinctness
13. Clarity and distinctness "for its own sake."
14. Compatibility of the definition of a situation with scientific knowledge.

Garfinkel notes that often, rationality refers to "the person's feelings that accompany his conduct, e.g. "affective neutrality," "unemotional," "detached," "disinterested," and "impersonal." For the theoretical tasks of this paper, however, the fact that a person may attend his environment with such feelings is uninteresting. It is of interest, however, that a person uses his feelings about his environment to recommend the sensible character of the thing he is talking about or the warrant of a finding."

Reflexivity:

Garfinkel regarded indexical expressions as key phenomena. Words like *here*, *now*, and *me* shift their meaning depending on when and where they are used. Philosophers and linguists refer to such terms as indexicals because they point into (index) the situational context in which they are produced. One of Garfinkel's contributions was to note that such expressions go beyond "here", "now," etc. and encompass any and all utterances that members of society produce. As Garfinkel specified, "The demonstrably rational properties of indexical expressions and indexical actions are an ongoing achievement of the organized activities of everyday life". The pervasiveness of indexical expressions and their member-ordered properties mean that all forms of action provide for their own understandability through the methods by which they are produced. That is, action has the property of reflexivity whereby such action is made meaningful in the light of the very situation within which it is produced.

The contextual setting, however, should not be seen as a passive backdrop for the action. Reflexivity means that members shape action in relation to context while the context itself is constantly being redefined through action. The initial insight into the importance of reflexivity occurred during the study of juror's deliberations, wherein what jurors

had decided was used by them to reflexively organize the plausibility of what they were deciding. Other investigations revealed that parties did not always know what they meant by their own formulations; rather, verbal formulations of the local order of an event were used to collect the very meanings that gave them their coherent sense. Garfinkel declared that the issue of how practical actions are tied to their context lies at the heart of ethno-methodological inquiry. Using professional coffee tasting as an illustration here, taste descriptors do not merely describe but also direct the tasting of a cup of coffee; hence, a descriptor is not merely the causal result of what is tasted, as in:

coffee⇒ taste descriptor

Nor is it an imperialism of a methodology:

taste descriptor ⇒ coffee

Rather, the description and what it describes are mutually determinative:

taste descriptor ⇔ coffee

The descriptors operate reflexively by finding in the coffee what they mean, and each is used to make the other more explicit. Much the same may be said about rules-in-games or the use of accounts in ordinary action. This reflexivity of accounts is ubiquitous, and its sense has nearly nothing to do with how the term “reflexivity” is used in analytic philosophy, in “reflexive ethnographies” that endeavor to expose the influence of the researcher in organizing the ethnography, or the way many social scientists use "reflexivity" as a synonym for "self-reflection." For ethno-methodological reflexivity is an actual, unavoidable feature of everyone’s daily life.

Service Lines

Garfinkel has frequently illustrated ethno-methodological analysis by means of the illustration of service lines. Everyone knows

what it is like to stand in a line. Queues are a part of our everyday social life; they are something within which we all participate as we carry out our everyday affairs. We recognize when someone is waiting in a line and, when we are "doing" being a member of a line, we have ways of showing it. In other words, lines may seem impromptu and routine, but they exhibit an internal, member-produced embodied structure. A line is “witnessably a produced social object;” it is, in Durkheimian terms, a “social fact.” Participants' actions as "seeably" what they are (such as occupying a position in a queue) depend upon practices that the participant engages in relation to others' practices in the proximate vicinity. To recognize someone as in a line, or to be seen as "in line" ourselves requires attention to bodily movement and bodily placement in relation to others and to the physical environment that those movements also constitute. This is another sense that we consider the action to be indexicalit is made meaningful in the ways in which it is tied to the situation and the practices of members who produce it. The ethnomethodologist's task becomes one of analyzing how members' ongoing conduct is a constituent aspect of this or that course of action. Such analysis can be applied to any sort of social matter (e.g., being female, following instructions, performing a proof, participating in a conversation). These topics are representative of the kinds of inquiry that ethno-methodological was intended to undertake.

Breaching Experiments

According to George Ritzer, Breaching experiments are experiments where "social reality is violated in order to shed light on the methods by which people construct social reality." In Garfinkel's work, Garfinkel encouraged his students to attempt breaching experiments in order to provide examples of basic ethno-methodological. According to Garfinkel, these experiments are important because they help us

understand '"the socially standardized and standardizing, 'seen but unnoticed,' expected, background features of everyday scenes.'" He highlights many of these experiments in his books.

The following is an example of one of Garfinkel's breaching experiments from his book, Studies in Ethno-methodological.

Case 3: "On Friday night my husband and I were watching television. My husband remarked that he was tired. I asked, 'How are you tired? Physically, mentally, or just bored?'"

S: I don't know, I guess physically, mainly.

E: You mean that your muscles ache or your bones?

S: I guess so. Don't be so technical. (After more watching)

S: All these old movies have the same kind of old iron bedstead in them.

E: What do you mean? Do you mean all old movies, or some of them, or just the ones you have seen?

S: What's the matter with you? You know what I mean.

E: I wish you would be more specific.

S: you know what I mean! Drop dead!"

Influence on later research

A substantial corpus of empirical work has developed exploring the issues raised by Garfinkel's writings.

Directly inspired by Garfinkel, Harvey Sacks undertook to investigate the sequential organization of conversational interaction. This program, pioneered with colleagues Gail Jefferson and Emanuel Schegloff, has produced a large and flourishing research literature. A second, smaller literature has grown out of another of Sacks' interests having to do with social categorization practices.

Sociologist Emanuel A. Schegloff used the concept of ethno-methodological to study telephone conversations and how these they

influence social interaction. Gail Jefferson usedethno-methodological to study laughter and how people know when it is appropriate to laugh in conversation. John Heritage and David Greatbach studied rhetoric of political speeches and their relation to the amount of applause the speaker receives, whereas Steven Clayman studied how booing in an audience is generated. Philip Manning and George Ray studied shyness in an ethno-methodological way. Ethno-methodologists such as Button, Anderson, Hughes, Sharrock, Angela Garcia, Whalen and Zimmerman all study ethno-methodological within institutions.

Early on, Garfinkel issued a call for ethno-methodologically-informed investigations into the nature of work. This led to a wide variety of studies focusing on different occupations and professions including, laboratory science, law, police work, medicine, jazz improvisation, education, mathematics, philosophy, and others.

Lucy Suchman, an anthropologist, did an ethno-methodologically-informed analysis of learning to use a copy machine.It came to serve as an important critique of theories of planning in Artificial Intelligence.

Selected Publication:

The bulk of Garfinkel's original writings came in the form of scholarly articles and technical reports most of which were subsequently republished as book chapters. To appreciate the sequential development of Garfinkel's thought, however, it is important to understand when these pieces were actually written. Although published in 2006, *Seeing Sociologically* was actually written as an annotated version of a draft dissertation proposal two years after arriving at Harvard. *Toward a Sociological Theory of Information* was also written while Garfinkel was a student and was based on a 1952 report prepared in conjunction with the Organizational Behavior Project at Princeton. Some of Garfinkel's

early papers on ethno-methodological were republished as *Studies in Ethno-methodological*.This publication is well known by many sociologists. Garfinkel subsequently published an edited anthology showcasing selected examples of ethno-methodologically-informed work. Later still, a mix of previously published papers and some new writing was released as *Ethno-methodological's Program: Working Out Durkheim's Aphorism*. This latter collection, in conjunction with the *Studies,*represent the definitive exposition of the ethno-methodological approach. Garfinkel had planned to publish a companion piece to *Ethno-methodological's Program*, which was tentatively entitled, "Workplace and Documentary Diversity of Ethno-methodological Studies of Work and Sciences by Ethno-methodological's Authors: What did we do? What did we learn?". This project was never completed, but some preliminary notes were published in *Human Studies.*

Harold Garfinkel

Harold Garfinkel, who brought phenomenology back to the core of social theory, died last week in Los Angeles. His best-known work, *Studies in Ethno-methodological*, has led a double life. It's put to work in introductory courses so that people can read about breaching experiments, and maybe do some minor ones themselves while pining for the days before IRBs. Here its contents are often played for laughs, or the general lesson that social life is a funny old thing and simultaneously more rulebound and more fragile than one might expect. On the other hand, the essays are a thoroughgoing and deep critique of the Parsonian approach to theorizing action, and relentlessly problematize the ongoing accomplishment of everyday life.

In the 1980s, the main problematic of social theory was micro- vs macro- and how to reconcile them. A common line of argument was that

macro-theory required microfoundations, and these foundations were to be sought in the stable preferences and actions of (perhaps rational) individuals. Garfinkel's vision of micro and macro was very different. Unlike the perhaps difficult but ultimately comforting search for a well-founded base to build society on, the ethno-methodological approach was more like the discovery of subatomic states and quantum-mechanical phenomena: way up there in the world of big celestial bodies, things looked orderly and stable, and there was some plausible prospect of discovering laws of society. Even a little further down the scale you could see where the structure was, even if it was inevitably messier. *Studies in Ethno-methodological*, however, zoomed in even closer on the micro-level and found that it wasn't a level at all, that everything was constantly on the verge of going completely to hell, and that chaos loomed at every turn. Even today, when I read the breaching experiments it's still striking just how quickly things move from an ordinary, boring interaction to a bunch of confused, upset, and very, very angry people who don't know what is happening.

It turned out to be difficult to build on the discovery of the foamy, swirling reality that society was supposed to rest its weight on. Beyond some passing remarks I've seen in print or heard in person by those who were connected with Garfinkel and his circle, I don't really know (nor do I much care) why the research program stalled out or became marginalized in the way that it did. Maybe it was the problem faced by a lot of phenomenological work, which finds it hard to reconcile its key insight (based on first-person experience) with a generative research program. Maybe it was a failure to transcend a little cult of personality. Maybe it was opposition from better-positioned competitors. I don't know. Either way, it seems like a waste. But the core contribution is still there, and Garfinkel represents a vital link between

the Husserlian tradition of the early 20th century and contemporary developments in the theory of social fields.

Luckmann

Luckmann is a follower of the pheno-menologically oriented school of sociology, established by the Austrian-American scholar Alfred Schütz. In his works, he has developed a theory, known as social constructionism, which argues that all knowledge, including the most basic common sense knowledge of everyday reality, is derived from and maintained by social interactions. Luckmann is probably best known for the books *The Social Construction of Reality*, written together with Peter L. Berger in 1966, and *Structures of the Life-World*, which he wrote with Alfred Schütz in 1982.

Luckmann is a member of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts and holds honorary doctorates from the Universities of Linköping, Ljubljana, Trier and Buenos Aires.

Sociologist born in Slovenia, his sociological education took place partly in Europe (at the Universities of Vienna and Innsbruck) and partly in North America (at the New School for Social Research in New York); he has, in addition, honorary doctorates from the Universities of Linköping (Sweden) and Ljubljana (Slovenia). His teaching career has been equally international, with spells in New York State, Frankfurt, Constance, New York, Harvard, and as a fellow at Stanford and at Wollongong (Australia). Thomas Luckmann is a major figure in the postwar development of the social sciences; his influence is by no means confined to the aspects of social science that relate to religion. On the contrary, his name has been associated with major theoretical and methodological developments in both philosophy and sociology.

The Invisible Religion (Macmillan 1967, original title *Das problem der Religion* , 1963), Luckmann's first major publication—although it

appeared in English *after* Luckmann's joint work with Peter Berger, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Doubleday 1966), leading to some misunderstandings with respect to the development of his ideas—has become a milestone in sociological thinking. As a systematic treatise in the sociology of knowledge, it is a key text within the subjectivist approach to sociology—a form of sociology in which human beings are not merely acted upon by social facts or social forces but are themselves constantly involved in the shaping and creating of social worlds as they interact with other human beings. Social order exists; it is, however, constructed from below, not imposed from above. The methodological implications follow. If we are to study human processes from a subjective point of view, appropriate methodologies must be put in place that enable the nuances of meaning to emerge. Positivist techniques are unlikely to suffice.

Luckmann's relationship to his former teacher Alfred Schutz (already evident in the Berger and Luckmann text) requires further elaboration. In the preface to the first volume of *The Structures of the Life World* (Northwestern University Press 1973:xii)—published under the names of Schutz and Luckmann—Luckmann explains the genesis of the book:

The completion of the *Strukturen der Lebenswelt* combined the difficulties of the posthumous editing of the manuscripts of a great teacher by his student with the problems of collaboration between two unequal authors: one dead, the other living; one looking back at the results of many years of singularly concentrated efforts devoted to the resolution of the problems that were to be dealt with in the book, the other the beneficiary of these efforts; one a master, always ready to revise his analyses but now incapable of doing so, the other a pupil, hesitant to revise what the master had written but forced by the

exigencies of the analyses that he continued in the direction indicated by the master to go back, occasionally, to the beginning.

The basic problematic of the book concerns the methodological foundations of the social sciences, bringing together Schutz's formation as both philosopher and social scientist. Schutz sought to analyze the structures of everyday life, uncovering those elementary structures that "provide the foundation of social experience, language, and social action, and thus of the complete historical world of human life" (p. xv). Luckmann's preface continues by indicating his own variations from Schutz's original outline; it concludes by announcing the imminent publication of a second volume. This did not in fact appear for more than a decade (1984 in German; 1989 in English, Northwestern University Press).

The themes of this joint work are developed in *Life World and Social Realities* (Heinemann 1983) in which Luckmann gathers together his own essays in social theory. These essays fall into two categoriesphenomenological investigations and sociological analyses. There is, however, a common thread between them all (a motif that repeats itself in much of Luckmann's writing), that is, an attempt to minimize the cost of the separation of the new social sciences from the old philosophies. More specifically, Luckmann follows both Schutz and Gurvitch "in the conviction that an accurate phenomenological description of the lifeworld provides a foundation for the social sciences" (p. viii). Phenomenological description uncovers the universal and invariant structures of human existence at all times and in all places; one of these structures (a crucially important one) can be found in the forms of communication that are based on intersubjective production and interpretation of meaning.

In 1978, Luckmann edited a Penguin reader, *Phenomenology and Sociology* . In collecting this set of readings, Luckmann aims once again

to elucidate the connections between the two disciplines and to reconcile two modes of human knowledge that have become separate in recent history. The influence of Weber, Husserl, Gurvitch, and, above all, Schutz can be seen clearly. Part One of the reader draws together all those who have illuminated the connections between phenomenology and sociology; Part Two is intended to be a small sample of work in progress within the perspective already outlined. A final edited text (together with James Beckford), *The Changing Face of Religion* (Sage 1989), assembles papers presented at the International Sociological Association in New Delhi in 1996, an appropriate enough place for a discussion of religious change that questions the assumptions of Western—at times triumphalist—thinking about secularization. Such a volume, moreover, brings the reader back to the social scientific study of religion per se. The collection is wide ranging and has two principal objectives: The first is to account for the changing meaning and form of religion in the modern world; the second is to discuss the challenge that changes in religion are continually presenting to social scientists. In so doing, the book invites questions that concern the discipline of sociology in general as well as the sociology of religion, an essential feature of Luckmann's work in this field. The study of religion necessarily involves the study of rapidly changing societies.

Phenomenology

Myron Orleans

Phenomenology is a movement in philosophy that has been adapted by certain sociologists to promote an understanding of the relationship between states of individual consciousness and social life. As an approach within sociology, phenomenology seeks to reveal how human awareness is implicated in the production of social action, social situations and social worlds (Natanson 1970).

Phenomenology and Ethno-methodology

Phenomenology was initially developed by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), a German mathematician who felt that the objectivism of science precluded an adequate apprehension of the world (Husserl 1931, 1970). He presented various philosophical conceptualizations and techniques designed to locate the sources or essences of reality in the human consciousness. It was not until Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) came upon some problems in Max Weber's theory of action that phenomenology entered the domain of sociology (Schutz 1967). Schutz distilled from Husserl's rather dense writings a sociologically relevant approach. Schutz set about describing how subjective meanings give rise to an apparently objective social world (Schutz, 1962, 1964, 1966, 1970. 1996; Schutz and Luckmann 1973; Wagner 1983).

Schutz's migration to the United States prior to World War II, along with that of other phenomenological inclined scholars, resulted in the transmission of this approach to American academic circles and to its ultimate transformation into interpretive sociology. Two expressions of this approach have been called *reality constructionism* and *ethno-methodology.* Reality constructionism synthesizes Schutz's distillation of phenomenology and the corpus of classical sociological thought to account for the possibility of social reality (Berger 1963, 1967; Berger and Berger 1972; Berger and Kellner 1981; Berger and Luckmann 1966; Potter 1996). Ethno-methodology integrates the Parsonian concern for social order into phenomenology and examines the means by which actors make ordinary life possible (Garfinkel 1967; Garfinkel and Sacks 1970). Reality constructionism and ethno-methodology are recognized to be among the most fertile orientations in the field of sociology (Ritzer 1996).

Phenomenology is used in two basic ways in sociology: (1) to theorize about substantive sociological problems and (2) to enhance the

adequacy of sociological research methods. Since phenomenology insists that society is a human construction, sociology itself and its theories and methods are also constructions (Cicourel 1964; 1973). Thus, phenomenology seeks to offer a corrective to the field's emphasis on positivist conceptualizations and research methods that may take for granted the very issues that phenomenologists find of interest. Phenomenology presents theoretical techniques and qualitative methods that illuminate the human meanings of social life.

Phenomenology has until recently been viewed as at most a challenger of the more conventional styles of sociological work and at the least an irritant. Increasingly, phenomenology is coming to be viewed as an adjunctive or even integral part of the discipline, contributing useful analytic tools to balance objectivist approaches (Aho 1998; Levesque-Lopman 1988; Luckmann 1978; Psathas 1973; Rogers 1983).

Techniques

Phenomenology operates rather differently from conventional social science (Darroch and Silvers 1982). Phenomenology is a theoretical orientation, but it does not generate deductions from propositions that can be empirically tested. It operates more on a meta-sociological level, demonstrating its premises through descriptive analyses of the procedures of self-, situational, and social constitution. Through its demonstrations, audiences apprehend the means by which phenomena, originating in human consciousness, come to be experienced as features of the world.

Current phenomenological techniques in sociology include the method of "bracketing" (Bentz 1995; Ihde 1977). This approach lifts an item under investigation from its meaning context in the common-sense world, with all judgments suspended. For example, the item "alcoholism as a disease" (Peele 1985; Truan 1993) is not evaluated within

phenomenological brackets as being either true or false. Rather, a *reduction* is performed in which the item is assessed in terms of how it operates in consciousness: What does the disease notion do for those who define themselves within its domain? A phenomenological reduction both plummets to the essentials of the notion and ascertains its meanings independent of all particular occasions of its use. The reduction of a bracketed phenomenon is thus a technique to gain theoretical insight into the meaning of elements of consciousness.

Phenomenological tools include the use of introspective and *Verstehen* methods to offer a detailed description of how consciousness itself operates (Hitzler and Keller 1989). Introspection requires the phenomenologist to use his or her own subjective process as a resource for study, while *Verstehen* requires an empathic effort to move into the mind of the other (Helle 1991; Truzzi 1974). Not only are introspection and *Verstehen* tools of phenomenological analysis, but they are procedures used by ordinary individuals to carry out their projects. Thus, the phenomenologist as analyst might study himself or herself as an ordinary subject dissecting his or her own self-consciousness and action schemes (Bleicher 1982). In this technique, an analytic attitude toward the role of consciousness in designing everyday life is developed.

Since cognition is a crucial element of phenomenology, some theorists focus on social knowledge as the cornerstone of their technique (Berger and Luckmann 1966). They are concerned with how common-sense knowledge is produced, disseminated, and internalized. The technique relies on theoretical discourse and historical excavation of the usually taken for granted foundations of knowledge. Frequently, religious thought is given primacy in the study of the sources and legitimations of mundane knowledge (Berger 1967).

Phenomenology and Ethno-methodology

Phenomenological concerns are frequently researched using qualitative methods (Bogdan and Taylor 1975; Denzin and Lincoln 1994, 1998). Phenomenological researchers frequently undertake analyses of small groups, social situations, and organizations using face-to-face techniques of participant observation (Bruyn 1966; Psathas and Ten Have1994; Turner 1974). Ethnographic research frequently utilizes phenomenological tools (Fielding 1988). Intensive interviewing to uncover the subject's orientations or his or her "life world" is also widely practiced (Costelloe 1996; Grekova, 1996; Porter 1995). Qualitative tools are used in phenomenological research either to yield insight into the microdynamics of particular spheres of human life for its own sake or to exhibit the constitutive activity of human consciousness (Langsdorf 1995).

Techniques particular to the ethnomethodological branch of phenomenology have been developed to unveil the practices used by people to produce a sense of social order and thereby accomplish everyday life (Cuff 1993; Leiter 1980; Mehan and Wood 1975). At one time, "breaching demonstrations" were conducted to reveal the essentiality of taken-for-granted routines and the means by which threats to these routines were handled. Since breaching these routines sometimes resulted in serious disruptions of relationships, this technique has been virtually abandoned. Social situations are video- and audiotaped to permit the painstaking demonstration of the means by which participants produce themselves, their interpretations of the meanings of acts, and their sense of the structure of the situation (Blum-Kulka 1994; Jordan and Henderson 1995). Conversational analysis is a technique that is frequently used to describe how people make sense of each other through talk and how they make sense of their talk through their common background knowledge (Psathas 1994; Schegloff and Sacks 1974; Silverman, 1998). The interrelations between mundane

reasoning and abstract reasoning are also examined in great depth as researchers expose, for example, the socially constituted bases of scientific and mathematical practice in common-sense thinking (Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay 1983; Livingston, 1995; Lynch, 1993).

Theory

The central task in social phenomenology is to demonstrate the reciprocal interactions among the processes of human action, situational structuring, and reality construction. Rather than contending that any aspect is a causal factor, phenomenology views all dimensions as constitutive of all others. Phenomenologists use the term *reflexivity* to characterize the way in which constituent dimensions serve as both foundation and consequence of all human projects. The task of phenomenology, then, is to make manifest the incessant tangle or reflexivity of action, situation, and reality in the various modes of *being in the world*.

Phenomenology commences with an analysis of the *natural attitude*. This is understood as the way ordinary individuals participate in the world, taking its existence for granted, assuming its objectivity, and undertaking action projects as if they were predetermined. Language, culture, and common sense are experienced in the natural attitude as objective features of an external world that are learned by actors in the course of their lives.

Human beings are open to patterned social experience and strive toward meaningful involvement in a knowable world. They are characterized by a typifying mode of consciousness tending to classify sense data. In phenomenological terms humans experience the world in terms of *typifications*: Children are exposed to the common sounds and sights of their environments, including their own bodies, people, animals, vehicles, and so on. They come to apprehend the categorical

identity and *typified* meanings of each in terms of conventional linguistic forms. In a similar manner, children learn the formulas for doing common activities. These practical means of doing are called *recipes for action.* Typifications and recipes, once internalized, tend to settle beneath the level of full awareness, that is, become *sedimented*, as do layers of rock. Thus, in the natural attitude, the foundations of actors' knowledge of meaning and action are obscured to the actors themselves.

Actors assume that knowledge is objective and all people reason in a like manner. Each actor assumes that every other actor knows what he or she knows of this world: All believe that they share common sense. However, each person's biography is unique, and each develops a relatively distinct stock of typifications and recipes. Therefore, interpretations may diverge. Everyday social interaction is replete with ways in which actors create feelings that common sense is shared, that mutual understanding is occurring, and that everything is all right. Phenomenology emphasizes that humans live within an intersubjective world, yet they at best approximate shared realities. While a*paramount reality* is commonly experienced in this manner, particular realities or *finite provinces of meaning* are also constructed and experienced by diverse cultural, social, or occupational groupings.

For phenomenology, all human consciousness is practical---it is always of something. Actors intend projects into the world; they act in order to implement goals based on their typifications and recipes, their *stock of knowledge*at hand. Consciousness as an *intentional process* is composed of thinking, perceiving, feeling, remembering, imagining, and anticipating directed toward the world. The objects of consciousness, these intentional acts, are the sources of all social realities that are, in turn, the materials of common sense.

Thus, typifications derived from common sense are internalized, becoming the tools that individual consciousness uses to constitute a *lifeworld*, the unified arena of human awareness and action. Common sense serves as an ever-present resource to assure actors that the reality that is projected from human subjectivity is an objective reality. Since all actors are involved in this intentional work, they sustain the collaborative effort to reify their projections and thereby reinforce the very frameworks that provide the construction tools.

Social interaction is viewed pheno-menologically as a process of reciprocal interpretive constructions of actors applying their stock of knowledge at hand to the occasion. Interactors orient themselves to others by taking into account typified meanings of actors in typified situations known to them through common sense. Action schemes are geared by each to the presumed projects of others. The conduct resulting from the intersection of intentional acts indicates to members of the collectivity that communication or coordination or something of the like is occurring among them. For these members, conduct and utterances serve as *indexical* expressions of the properties of the situation enabling each to proceed with the interaction while interpreting others, context, and self. Through the use of certain interpretive practices, members order the situation for themselves in sensical and coherent terms: In their talk they gloss over apparent irrelevancies, fill in innumerable gaps, ignore inconsistencies, and assume a continuity of meaning, thereby formulating the occasion itself.

Ongoing social situations manifest patterned routine conduct that appears to positivist investigators to be normative or rule-guided. Pheno-menologically, rules are indexical expressions of the interpretive processes applied by members in the course of their interactions. Rules are enacted in and through their applications. In order to play by the book, the interpreter endeavors to use the rule as an apparent guide.

However, he or she must use all sorts of background expectancies to manage the fit somehow between the particular and the general under the contexted conditions of the interaction, and in so doing is acting creatively. Rules, policies, hierarchy, and organization are accomplished through the interpretive acts or negotiations of members in their concerted efforts to formulate a sense of operating in accord with a rational, accountable system. This work of doing structure to the situation further sustains its common-sensical foundations as well as its facticity.

Phenomenologists analyze the ordering of social reality and how the usage of certain forms of knowledge contributes to that ordering. It is posited that typified action and interaction become *habitualized*. Through sedimentation in layered consciousness, human authorship of habitualized conduct is obscured and the product is externalized. As meaning-striving beings, humans create theoretical explanations and moral justifications in order to legitimate the habitualized conduct. Located in higher contexts of meaning, the conduct becomes objectivated. When internalized by succeeding generations, the conduct is fully institutionalized and exerts compelling constraints over individual volition. Periodically, the institutions might be repaired in response to threats, or individuals might be realigned if they cognitively or affectively migrate.

The reality that ordinary people inhabit is constituted by these legitimations of habitualized conduct. Ranging from common sense typifications of ordinary language to theological constructions to sophisticated philosophical, cosmological, and scientific conceptualizations, these legitimations compose the paramount reality of everyday life. Moreover, segmented modern life, with its proliferation of meaning-generating sectors, produces multiple realities, some in competition with each other for adherents. In the current marketplace of

realities, consumers, to varying degrees, may select their legitimations, as they select their occupation and, increasingly, their religion (Berger, 1967).

Practice

Doing phenomenological sociology involves procedures that are distinct from positivist research. Phenomenological practice is increasingly evident in the discipline as more subjectivist work is published. The phenomenological analysis of mass media culture content, for example, applies the elements of the approach to yield an understanding of the reflexive interplay of audience life worlds and program material (Wilson 1996). Thus, TV talk show discourses may be described as social texts that are refracted by programmers from common sense identity constructs. The visual realization yields narrative images that audiences are seduced into processing using their own experiences. The viewers' lifeworlds and the TV representations are blended into reality proxies that provide viewers with schema to configure their personal orientations. Subsequently, programmers draw upon these orientations as additional identity material for new content development.

Phenomenological work with young children examines how both family interactions and the practices of everyday life are related to the construction of childhood (Davila and Pearson 1994). It is revealed how the children's elemental typifications of family life and common sense are actualized through ordinary interaction. Penetrating the inner world of children requires that the phenomenological practitioner view the subjects in their own terms, from the level and viewpoints of children (Waksler, 1991; Shehan, 1999). Such investigation shuns adult authoritative and particularly scientific perspectives and seeks to give voice to the children's experience of their own worlds. Infants' and

children's communicative and interactive competencies are respected and are not diminished by the drive toward higher level functioning (Sheets-Johnstone 1996).

At the other end of the lifecycle, phenomenologists investigate how aging and its associated traumas are constituted in the consciousness of members and helpers. The struggle for meaning during aging accompanied by chronic pain may be facilitated or impaired by the availability of constructs that permit the smoother processing of the experiences. Members of cultures that stock typifications and recipes for managing aging and pain skillfully may well be more likely than others to construct beneficial interpretations in the face of these challenges (Encandela 1997). Phenomenological work encourages the helpers of the elderly to gain empathic appreciation of their clients' lifeworlds and enhanced affiliation with them through the use of biographical narratives that highlight their individuality and humanity (Heliker 1997).

The healing professions, particularly nursing, seem to be deeply imbued with a phenomenological focus on the provision of care based on a rigorous emphasis on the patient's subjective experience (Benner 1995). Substantial attention has been devoted to the ethical implications of various disease definitions, to how language shapes the response to illness, and to how disease definitions and paradigmatic models impact communication between health professionals and patients (Rosenberg and Golden 1992). Significant work on the phenomenology of disability has demonstrated how the *lived body* is experienced in altered form and how taken for granted routines are disrupted invoking new action recipes (Toombs 1995). Nonconventional healing practices have also been examined revealing how embodiment and the actor's subjective orientation reflexively interrelate with cultural imagery and discourse to transfigure the self (Csordas 1997). Further, phenomenological work has

suggested that emotions are best analyzed as interpreted processes embedded within experiential contexts (Blum 1996; Solomon 1997).

Implications

For phenomenology, society, social reality, social order, institutions, organizations, situations, interactions, and individual actions are constructions that appear as suprahuman entities. What does this suggest regarding humanity and sociology? Phenomenology advances the notion that humans are creative agents in the construction of social worlds (Ainlay 1986). It is from their consciousness that all being emerges. The alternative to their creative work is meaninglessness, solipsism, and chaos: a world of dumb puppets, in which each is disconnected from the other, and where life is formless (Abercrombie 1980). This is the nightmare of phenomenology. Its practitioners fear that positivist sociologists actually theorize about such a world (Phillipson 1972).

Phenomenologists ask sociologists to note the misleading substantiality of social products and to avoid the pitfalls of reification. For the sociologist to view social phenomena within the natural attitude as objects is to legitimate rather than to analyze. Phenomenological sociologists investigate social products as humanly meaningful acts, whether these products are termed attitudes, behaviors, families, aging, ethnic groups, classes, societies, or otherwise (Armstrong 1979; Gubrium and Holstein 1987; Herek 1986; Petersen 1987; Starr 1982). The sociological production of these fictive entities are understood within the context of their accomplishment, that is, the interview setting, the observational location, the data collection situation, the field, the research instrument, and so forth (Schwartz and Jacobs 1979). The meaning contexts applied by the analyst correlates with those of the subjects under investigation and explicates the points of view of the

actors as well as express their life world. Phenomenological sociology strives to reveal how actors construe themselves, all the while recognizing that they themselves are actors construing their subjects and themselves.

Pheno-menologically understood, society is a fragile human construction, thinly veneered by abstract ideas. Phenomenology itself is evaluatively and politically neutral. Inherently, it promotes neither transformative projects nor stabilization. In the work of a conservatively inclined practitioner, the legitimation process might be supported, while the liberative practitioner might seek to puncture or debunk the legitimations (Morris 1975). Phenomenology can be used to reveal and endorse the great constructions of humankind or to uncover the theoretical grounds of oppression and repression (Smart 1976). Phenomenologists insist upon the human requirements for meaning, subjective connectedess, and a sense of order. These requirements may be fulfilled within existent or emancipative realities (Murphy 1986).

The phenomenological influence upon contemporary sociology can be seen in the increased humanization of theoretical works, research methods, educational assessment procedures, and instructional modes (Aho 1998; Darroch and Silvers 1982; O'Neill 1985; Potter 1996). Phenomenological thought has influenced the work of postmodernist, poststructuralist, critical, and neo-functional theory (Ritzer 1996). Notions such as constructionism, situationalism and reflexivity that are at the core of phenomenology also provide the grounds for these recent formulations. For example, the premise of poststructuralism that language is socially constituted denying the possibility of objective meaning is clearly rooted in phenomenology. The procedure known as *deconstruction* essentially reverses the reification process highlighted in phenomenology (Dickens and Fontana 1994). The postmodernist argument that knowledge and reality do not exist apart from discourse is

also clearly rooted in phenomenology. Postmodernism's emphasis on the representational world as reality constructor further exemplifies the phenomenological bent toward reflexivity (Bourdieu 1992). On the other hand, phenomenology has been used to reverse nihilistic excesses of postmodernism and poststructuralism (O'Neil 1994). The emphases of the critical school on the constitution of the liberative lifeworld by the autonomous, creative agent via the transcendence of linguistic constraint echoes a theme of phenomenological thought (Bowring 1996). Neo-functionalism, a looser and more inclusive version of its predecessor, finds room for a micro-social foundation focusing on the actor as a constructive agent (Layder 1997).

Phenomenology, while remaining an identifiable movement within the discipline of sociology, has influenced mainstream research. Inclusion of qualitative research approaches in conventional research generally expresses this accommodation (Bentz and Shapiro 1998). The greater acceptance of intensive interviewing, participant observation and focus groups reflect the willingness of non-phenomenological sociologists to integrate subjectivist approaches into their work. The study of constructive consciousness as a method of research has broadened and strengthened the standing of sociology in the community of scholars (Aho 1998).

Phenomenology has made a particular mark in the area of educational policy on a number of levels. The flaws of objective testing have been addressed using phenomenological tools. The issue of construct validity, the link between observation and measurement, has been studied ethnographically as a discursive activity to clarify the practices employed by education researchers to establish validity (Cherryholmes 1988). Testing of children has increasingly respected the subjectivity of the test taker (Gilliatt and Hayward 1996: Hwang 1996). Educators are more alert to the need for understanding the learner's

social and cognitive processes, for taking into account the constraining parameters of consciousness, and for encouraging self-conscious reflection. Instructional practices that emphasize constructivist approaches have gained great support among professionals and have been broadly implemented to the benefit of learners (Marlowe and Page 1997).

The future impact of phenomenology will depend on its resonance with the needs and aspirations of the rising generations of sociologists. The drive of some among this emerging generation is to examine the obvious with the infinite patience and endurance that is required to come up with penetrating insight. The arena of discourse analysis perhaps holds the greatest promise of this achievement and will likely elicit substantial effort. The phenomenology of emotions also appears to entice young scholars. The reflexive analyses of popular and mediated culture in relation to identity formation will likely draw further interest as will the study of virtuality, cyberspace, and computer simulcra. The study of children, the family and education will increasingly be informed by an emphasis on constructive consciousness. Due its lack of presumption and openness the phenomenological movement in sociology has proven hardy during the closing decades of the twentieth century and is well situated to encounter the new millennium.