

Functionalism

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Social Research for Social Science

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Dedicated to

My Guru Dr. H. N. Jagtap

And

My Family Members

Acknowledgement

I am using this opportunity to express my gratitude to everyone who supported me throughout the completion of this book. I am thankful for their aspiring guidance, invaluable constructive criticism and friendly advice during the written work. I am sincerely grateful to them for sharing their truthful and illuminating views on a number of issues related to the project.

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Dr. Ashok S. Yakkaldevi

Functionalism

The functionalist perspective attempts to explain social institutions as collective means to meet individual and social needs.


- In the functionalist perspective, societies are thought to function like organisms, with various social institutions working together like organs to maintain and reproduce societies.
- According to functionalist theories, institutions come about and persist because they play a function in society, promoting stability and integration.
- Functionalism has been criticized for its failure to account for social change and individual agency; some consider it conservatively biased.
- Functionalism has been criticized for attributing human-like needs to society.
- Emile Durkheim's work is considered the foundation of functionalist theory in sociology.

Functionalism

Structural functionalism, or basically functionalism, is a skeleton for building hypothesis that sees society as an issue framework whose parts cooperate to promote solidarity and strength.

Social institutions

In the social sciences, institutions are the structures and mechanisms of social order and cooperation governing the behavior of a set of individuals within a given human collectivity. Institutions include the family, religion, peer group, economic systems, legal systems, penal systems, language, and the media.



Concepts of Functionalism

A number of key concepts underpin Functionalism. The primary concepts within Functionalism are collective conscience, value consensus, social order, education, family, crime and deviance and the media.

The concept of function:

Functionalist sociologists like Parsons and Durkheim have been concerned with the quest for capacities that establishments may have in the public arena. Be that as it may, an alternate functionalist humanist R. Merton has received an idea of brokenness - this alludes to the impacts of any foundation which cheapens the preservation of society. An illustration of a capacity which aides keep up society is that of the family, its capacity is to guarantee the congruity of society by recreating and standardizing new parts. An alternate organization which performs an imperative capacity is religion functionalist sociologists accept that it aides attain social solidarity and imparted standards and qualities, in any case it could be contended that it neglects to do this as an issue of expanding secularization lately and accordingly it makes a partition between parts of society instead of tying them together (good paste).

Collective conscience and value consensus:

Functionalists accept that without aggregate heart/ imparted qualities and convictions, accomplishing social request is outlandish and social request is critical for the prosperity of society. They accept that esteem agreement structures the fundamental coordinating rule in the

public eye. Also if parts of society have imparted qualities they subsequently likewise have comparative personalities, this helps collaboration and evades clash. Esteem accord likewise guarantees that individuals have imparted: - Goals, Roles and Norms. Standards can be portrayed as particular rules of fitting conduct; for instance, lining when purchasing things.

Functional alternatives:

R. Merton suggested that institutions like religion and the family can be replaced with alternatives such as ideologies like communism and he argued that they would still be able to perform the same functions in society.

Social Order:

Functionalists accept that there are four primary essential needs that an individual requires to exist in the public eye. They likewise accept that these four fundamental needs are vital for keeping up social request. They are: sustenance, haven, cash and garments.

Functionalism and Education: Durkheim accepts that training transmits society's standards and qualities. Instruction unites a mass, and transforms them into an united entire which prompts social solidarity. Parsons (1961) accepts that instruction prompts universalistic qualities and that training performs a connection in the middle of family and the more extensive society which thusly prompts auxiliary socialization. Instruction likewise permits individuals to prepare for their future parts in the public eye. Schools ingrain the estimation of accomplishment and the estimation of correspondence of chance. Instruction helps match individuals with occupations suited to them.

Functionalism and Family: George Peter Murdock accepts that the family gives four indispensable capacities to society: sexual, regenerative, monetary and instructive.

The family is the essential purpose of socialization in that it gives youngsters qualities and standards. Family likewise settles grown-up identities. A family unit gives enthusiastic security to every individual in the relationship.

Functionalism and Media: The media work in the general population enthusiasm by reflecting the diversions of the crowd. It depicts general assessment. The media comprehends that society has a wide assorted qualities of society and this is demonstrated by the distinctive measures of stories it covers.

Functionalism and Crime and Deviance: Durkheim shows us that there is such a thing as society, and that it is this entity called society that creates crime and deviance. Crime and deviance are socially constructed - they are not natural, obvious, or theologically inspired categories. They are concepts that were brought into the world solely by humankind. Moreover, Durkheim goes beyond this and shows us how socially constructed definitions of crime and deviance are linked into a wider social structure.

Functionalism and Religion: Religion helps the social structure and prosperity of society. It does this by showing qualities and agreement. Emile Durkheim contended that all general public's partition into the consecrated and the profane (non-religious). Durkheim found that totemism was the most fundamental type of religion with little gatherings utilizing images, for example, plants or creatures. Durkheim saw social life as difficult to attain without the imparted qualities and standards accomplished through aggregate still, small voice. Religion accompanies values and standards that are imparted between

gatherings. This aids fortify the joining of society. Parsons contended that religious convictions give rules and that these rules create general standards and good convictions which give steadiness and request to society.

Functionalism and Politics: Talcott Parsons put stock in quality agreement. Force is utilized to attain aggregate objectives, e.g. material success. Everyone profits from force (a variable entirety of force). Power is typically acknowledged as authentic by the greater part as it serves to accomplish aggregate objectives.

Functionalism (or structural functionalism) is the point of view in human science as per which society comprises of distinctive however related parts, each of which fills a specific need. As indicated by functionalism, sociologists can clarify social structures and social conduct as far as the segments of a general public and their capacities. Auguste Comte helped create functionalism in the nineteenth century, and functionalist Emile Durkheim later contrasted society with the human body. Pretty much as the body comprises of diverse, interrelated organs that empower it to survive, society comprises of distinctive parts that empower it to survive and which rely on upon one another. Case in point, legal frameworks help keep up request, and schools instruct kids. Issues in a solitary piece of society can upset the entirety.

The functionalist point of view, likewise called functionalism, is one of the major hypothetical viewpoints in social science. It has its birthplaces in the works of Emile Durkheim, who was particularly intrigued by how social request is conceivable or how society remains generally steady.

Functionalism deciphers each one piece of society as far as how it helps the steadiness of the entire society. Society is more than the whole of its parts; rather, each one piece of society is useful for the steadiness of the entire society. The diverse parts are principally the organizations of society, each of which is sorted out to fill distinctive

needs and each of which has specific results for the structure and state of society. The parts all rely on upon one another.

For instance, the administration, or state, gives instruction to the offspring of the family, which thusly pays assesses on which the state depends to keep itself running. The family is needy upon the school to help youngsters grow up to have great occupations so they can raise and help their own particular families. Simultaneously, the youngsters get to be honest, taxpaying nationals, who thus help the state. In the event that all goes well, the parts of society produce request, dependability, and gainfulness. In the event that all does not go well, the parts of society then must adjust to recover another request, dependability, and profit.

Functionalism underscores the agreement and request that exist in the public eye, concentrating on social solidness and imparted open qualities. From this point of view, disorder in the framework, for example, freak conduct, prompts change on the grounds that societal segments must conform to accomplish steadiness. At the point when one piece of the framework is not living up to expectations or is useless, it influences all different parts and makes social issues, which prompts social change.

The functionalist viewpoint attained its most noteworthy notoriety among American sociologists in the 1940s and 1950s. While European functionalists initially centered around clarifying the internal workings of social request, American functionalists concentrated on finding the capacities of human conduct. Among these American functionalist sociologists is Robert K. Merton, who separated human capacities into two sorts: show capacities, which are purposeful and self-evident, and dormant capacities, which are unintentional and not self-evident. The show capacity of going to a congregation or synagogue, case in point, is to love as a component of a religious group, however its idle capacity may be to help parts figure out how to

recognize individual from institutional qualities. With an ability to think, show capacities get to be effortlessly clear. Yet this is not so much the situation for idle capacities, which regularly request a sociological methodology to be uncovered.

Functionalism has gotten feedback for disregarding the negative capacities of an occasion, for example, separation. Commentators likewise assert that the point of view supports existing conditions and jadedness from society's parts. Functionalism does not sway individuals to take a dynamic part in changing their social surroundings, actually when such change may advantage them. Rather, functiona

Structural functionalism

Structural functionalism, or basically functionalism, is a schema for building hypothesis that sees society as an issue framework whose parts cooperate to advance solidarity and stability. This methodology takes a gander at society through a macro-level introduction, which is a wide concentrate on the social structures that shape society as an issue, and accepts that society has advanced like organisms. This methodology takes a gander at both social structure and social capacities. Functionalism addresses society as an issue as far as the capacity of its constituent components; to be specific standards, traditions, conventions, and foundations. A typical similarity, promoted by Herbert Spencer, shows these parts of society as "organs" that move in the direction of the correct working of the "body" as an issue. In the most fundamental terms, it essentially underlines "the push to ascribe, as thoroughly as could be allowed, to each one peculiarity, custom, or practice, its impact on the working of an as far as anyone knows steady, binding framework". For Talcott Parsons, "structural-functionalism" came to depict a specific stage in the methodological improvement of social science, as opposed to a particular school of thought. The structural functionalism methodology is a macro sociological

investigation, with an expansive concentrate on social structures that shape society as an issue.


Theory

established hypotheses are characterized by an inclination towards organic similarity and ideas of social evolutionism:

Functionalist thought, from Comte onwards, has looked especially towards science as the science giving the closest and most good model for social science. Science has been taken to give a manual for conceptualizing the structure and the capacity of social frameworks and to examining courses of action of advancement through instruments of adjustment ... functionalism unequivocally accentuates the prevalence of the social world over its individual parts (i.e. its constituent on-screen characters, human subjects).

—Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* 1984

Whilst one may see functionalism as an issue augmentation of the natural analogies for society introduced by political savants, for example, Rousseau, humanism attracts firmer regard for those foundations one of a kind to industrialized industrialist society (or advancement). Functionalism additionally has an anthropological premise in the work of scholars, for example, Marcel Mauss, Bronisław Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. It is in Radcliffe-Brown's particular use that the prefix "structural" developed



Émile Durkheim

Radcliffe-Brown suggested that most stateless, "primitive" social orders, needing solid incorporated establishments, are focused around a relationship of corporate-plummet bunches. Structural functionalism likewise tackled Malinowski's contention

that the fundamental building square of society is the atomic family, and that the group is an outgrowth, not the other way around. Émile Durkheim was concerned with the inquiry of how certain social orders keep up inside dependability and make due about whether. He recommended that such social orders have a tendency to be portioned, with proportional parts held together by imparted qualities, basic images or, as his nephew Marcel Mauss held, frameworks of trades. Durkheim utilized the term 'mechanical solidarity' to allude to these sorts of "social bonds, in light of basic suppositions & imparted good values, that are solid among parts of preindustrial social orders". In cutting edge, convoluted social orders, parts perform altogether different assignments, bringing about a solid reliance. In view of the similitude above of a living being in which numerous parts work together to manage the entire, Durkheim contended that confounded social orders are held together by natural solidarity, i.e. "social bonds, in view of specialization and relationship, that are solid among parts of mechanical social orders".

These perspectives were maintained by Durkheim, who, after Comte, accepted that society constitutes a different "level" of reality, unique from both natural and inorganic matter. Clarifications of social phenomena had accordingly to be built inside this level, people being simply transient inhabitants of nearly steady social parts. The focal concern of structural functionalism is a continuation of the Durkheimian errand of clarifying the obvious solidness and interior attachment required by social orders to persist about whether. Social orders are seen as cognizant, limited and generally social develops that capacity like living beings, with their different (or social establishments) cooperating in an oblivious, semi programmed style to attaining a general social harmony. All social and social phenomena are in this manner seen as utilitarian in the feeling of cooperating, and are viably considered to have "lives" of their own. They are principally dissected regarding this capacity. The individual is huge not all by himself, yet

rather regarding his status, his position in examples of social relations, and the practices connected with his status. In this manner, the social structure is the system of statuses joined by related parts.

It is shortsighted to compare the viewpoint straightforwardly with political conservatism. The propensity to underscore "binding frameworks", nonetheless, heads functionalist hypotheses to be diverged from "clash speculations" which rather underline social issues and disparities

Prominent theorists

Auguste Comte


Auguste Comte, the "Father of Positivism", pointed out the need to keep society unified as many traditions were diminishing. He was the first person to coin the term sociology. Auguste Comte suggests that sociology is the product of a three-stage development.

1. Theological Stage: From the earliest starting point of mankind's history until the end of the European Middle Ages, individuals took a religious view that society communicated God's will. In the philosophical state, the human personality, looking for the fundamental nature of creatures, the first and only causes (the cause and reason) of all impacts in short, supreme information assumes all phenomena to be delivered by the prompt activity of otherworldly creatures.

2. Metaphysical Stage: People started seeing society as an issue framework rather than the extraordinary. Started with the Enlightenment and the thoughts of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Reflected the failings of a childish liberated intelligence instead of the flawlessness of God.

3. Scientific Stage: Describing society through the application of the scientific approach, which draws on the work of scientists.

Herbert Spencer



Herbert Spencer

Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), a British scholar celebrated for applying the hypothesis of regular choice to society. He was from various perspectives the first genuine sociological functionalist. actually, while Durkheim is broadly viewed as the most critical functionalist among positivist scholars, it is well realized that much of his investigation was selected from perusing Spencer's work, particularly his *Principles of Sociology* (1874–96). Spencer suggest society to the similarity of human body. Generally as the structural parts of the human body - the skeleton, muscles, and different inward organs - work autonomously to help the whole organic entity survive, social structures cooperate to save society.

While most maintain a strategic distance from the dreary undertakings of perusing Spencer's gigantic volumes (filled as they are with long entries elucidating the natural relationship, with reference to cells, straightforward organic entities, creatures, people and society), there are some critical bits of knowledge that have quietly affected numerous contemporary scholars, including Talcott Parsons, in his initial work "The Structure of Social Action" (1937).cultural humanities additionally reliably utilizes functionalism.

This evolutionary model, dissimilar to most nineteenth century evolutionary hypotheses, is cyclical, starting with the separation and expanding intricacy of a natural or "super-natural" (Spencer's term for asocial framework) body, emulated by a fluctuating condition of balance and disequilibrium (or a condition of modification and adjustment), and, at last, the phase of deterioration or disintegration. Emulating Thomas Malthus' populace standards, Spencer reasoned that society is

continually confronting determination weights (inward and outside) that drive it to adjust its inner structure through separation.

Each arrangement, be that as it may, causes another set of choice weights that undermine society's practicality. It ought to be noted that

Spencer was not a determinist as in he never said

1. Selection pressures will be felt in time to change them;
2. They will be felt and reacted to; or
3. The solutions will always work.

Actually, he was from multiple points of view a political humanist, and perceived that the level of unified and merged power in a shown commonwealth could make or a bit of mercy its capacity to adjust. At the end of the day, he saw a general pattern towards the centralization of force as prompting stagnation and eventually, weights to decentralize.


All the more particularly, Spencer perceived three utilitarian needs or essentials that create determination weights: they are administrative, agent (creation) and distributive. He contended that everything social orders need to take care of issues of control and coordination, creation of products, administrations and thoughts, and, at long last, to discover methods for disseminating these assets.

At first, in tribal social orders, these three needs are conjoined, and the connection framework is the prevailing structure that fulfills them. As numerous researchers have noted, all foundations are subsumed under connection association, at the same time, with expanding populace (both regarding sheer numbers and thickness), issues develop concerning encouraging people, making new manifestations of association — consider the emanant division of work —, arranging and controlling different separated social units, and creating frameworks of asset conveyance.

The arrangement, as Spencer sees it, is to separate structures to satisfy more particular capacities; hence a boss or "enormous man" rises, soon emulated by a gathering of lieutenants, and later lords and managers. The structural parts of society (ex. families, work) work reliantly to help society capacity. Hence, social structures cooperate to safeguard society.

Perhaps Spencer's most critical impediment that is in actuality by and large analyzed in developed humanism is the way that much of his social thinking is made in the social and true association of Ancient Egypt. He created the representation "survival of the fittest" in discussing the direct conviction that little tribes or social requests tend to be vanquished or beat by greater ones. Clearly, various sociologists still use him (intentionally or something else) in their examinations, especially in view of the late re-improvement of evolutionary theory.

Talcott Parsons



Talcott Parsons

Talcott Parsons was vigorously affected by Émile Durkheim and Max Weber, blending much of their work into his activity hypothesis, which he focused around the framework hypothetical idea and the methodological guideline of intentional activity. He held that "the social framework is made up of the activities of people." His beginning stage, likewise, is the cooperation between two people confronted with a mixed bag of decisions about how they may act, decisions that are affected and obliged by various physical and social elements.

Parsons established that every individual has desires of the other's activity and response to his conduct, and that these desires would (if fruitful) be "determined" from the acknowledged norms and

estimations of the general public they occupy. As Parsons himself underlined, in a general setting there would never exist any flawless "fit" in the middle of practices and standards, so such a connection is never finish or "great."

Social standards were constantly hazardous for Parsons, who never asserted (as has regularly been charged) that social standards were by and large acknowledged and settled upon, ought to this keep a widespread law. Whether social standards were acknowledged or not was for Parsons just a verifiable inquiry.

As practices are rehashed in more cooperations, and these desires are dug in or standardized, a part is made. Parsons characterizes a "part" as the normatively-managed interest "of an individual in a solid procedure of social communication with particular, solid part partners." Although any individual, hypothetically, can satisfy any part, the individual is relied upon to adjust to the standards representing the way of the part they fulfill.

Besides, one individual can and does satisfy numerous distinctive parts in the meantime. In one sense, an individual can be seen to be an "arrangement" of the parts he occupies. Surely, today, when asked to portray themselves, the vast majority would reply with reference to their societal parts.

Parsons later created the thought of parts into collectivities of parts that supplement one another in satisfying capacities for society. A few parts are bound up in organizations and social structures (financial, instructive, legitimate and much sexual orientation based). These are useful as in they aid society in working and satisfying its utilitarian needs with the goal that society runs easily.

As opposed to predominating myth, Parsons never talked around a general public where there was no clash or an "impeccable" harmony. A general public's social quality framework was in the regular case never totally incorporated, never static and more often than not, as on account of the American culture in a complex condition of change

in respect to its authentic purpose of takeoff. To achieve a "flawless" harmony was not any genuine hypothetical question in Parsons examination of social frameworks, for sure, the most dynamic social orders had by and large social frameworks with paramount inward strains like the US and India. These strains were (frequently) a wellspring of their quality as per Parsons instead of the inverse. Parsons never contemplated framework systematization and the level of strains (pressures, clash) in the framework as inverse powers fundamentally. The key courses of action for Parsons for framework proliferation are socialization and social control. Socialization is paramount in light of the fact that it is the system for exchanging the acknowledged standards and estimations of society to the people inside the framework. Parsons never talked about "immaculate socialization" in any general public socialization was just halfway and "fragmented" from an essential perspective.

Parsons expresses that "this point is autonomous of the sense in which individual is solidly self-governing or innovative instead of "aloof" or 'acclimating', for distinction and imagination, are to a significant degree, phenomena of the organization of desires"; they are socially built.

Socialization is upheld by the positive and negative endorsing of part practices that do or don't meet these expectations. A discipline could be casual, in the same way as a snigger or tattle, or more formalized, through foundations, for example, detainment facilities and mental homes. On the off chance that these two methodologies were flawless, society would get to be static and constant, yet actually this is unrealistic to happen for long.

Parsons perceives this, expressing that he treats "the structure of the framework as tricky and subject to change," and that his idea of the inclination towards harmony "does not suggest the exact strength of soundness over transform." He does, then again, accept that these progressions happen in a generally smooth manner.

People in communication with changing circumstances adjust through a procedure of "part bartering." Once the parts are secured, they make standards that guide further activity and are in this way systematized, making soundness crosswise over social communications. Where the adjustment process can't change, because of sharp stuns or prompt radical change, structural disintegration happens and either new structures (or along these lines another framework) are shaped, or society kicks the bucket. This model of social change has been depicted as an issue "equilibrium," and stresses a yearning for social request

Davis and Moore

Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore (1945) gave a contention for social stratification focused around the thought of "practical need" (otherwise called the Davis-Moore theory). They contend that the most troublesome employments in any general public have the most elevated salaries so as to inspire people to fill the parts required by the division of work. Along these lines disparity serves social security.

This contention has been scrutinized as fraudulent from various distinctive plot: the contention is both that the people who are the most meriting are the most elevated remunerated, and that an arrangement of unequal prizes is fundamental, generally no people would execute as required for the general public to capacity. The issue is that these prizes should be based upon target merit, instead of subjective "inspirations." The contention additionally does not plainly make why a few positions are worth more than others, actually when they advantage more individuals in the public arena, e.g., educators contrasted with players and film stars. Faultfinders have proposed that structural disparity (inherited riches, family influence, and so forth.) is itself a reason for individual achievement or disappointment, not a result of it.

Robert Merton

Robert K. Merton made critical refinements to functionalist thought. He in a broad sense concurred with Parsons' hypothesis. Be

that as it may, he recognized that it was dangerous, accepting that it was over summed up. Merton had a tendency to accentuate center reach hypothesis instead of a terrific hypothesis, implying that he found himself able to arrangement particularly with a percentage of the impediments in Parsons' hypothesis. Merton accepted that any social structure presumably has numerous capacities, some a larger number of clear than others. He recognized 3 fundamental restrictions: utilitarian solidarity, general functionalism and essentialness. He likewise created the idea of aberrance and made the refinement in the middle of show and idle capacities. Show capacities alluded to the perceived and planned outcomes of any social example. Inactive capacities alluded to unrecognized and unintended results of any social example.

Merton censured utilitarian solidarity, saying that not all parts of a cutting edge complex society work for the useful solidarity of society. Therefore, there is a social brokenness alluded to as any social example that may upset the operation of society. Some organizations and structures may have different capacities, and some may even be for the most part useless, or be useful for some while being broken for others. This is on the grounds that not all structures are utilitarian for society as an issue. A few practices are useful for a prevailing individual or a gathering. There are two sorts of capacities that Merton examines the "show capacities" in that a social example can trigger a perceived and expected outcome. The show capacity of training incorporates get ready for a profession by getting decent evaluations, graduation and discovering great employment. The second sort of capacity is "idle capacities", where a social example brings about an unrecognized or unintended outcome. The idle capacities of training incorporate gathering new individuals, additional curricular exercises, school excursions. An alternate sort of social capacity is "social brokenness" which is any undesirable outcomes that upsets the operation of society. The social brokenness of instruction incorporates not getting decent

evaluations, a vocation. Merton expresses that by perceiving and analyzing the useless parts of society we can clarify the advancement and constancy of plan B. In this way, as Holmwood states, "Merton unequivocally made power and clash focal issues for exploration inside a functionalist standard".

Merton additionally noted that there may be practical choices to the establishments and structures presently satisfying the capacities of society. This implies that the establishments that as of now exist are not imperative to society. Merton states "pretty much as the same thing may have various capacities, so might the same capacity be differently satisfied by option things". This idea of useful plan B is imperative in light of the fact that it lessens the propensity of functionalism to suggest regard of business as usual.

Merton's theory of deviance is derived from Durkheim's idea of anomie. It is central in explaining how internal changes can occur in a system. For Merton, anomie means a discontinuity between cultural goals and the accepted methods available for reaching them.

Merton believes that there are 5 situations facing an actor.

- **Conformity** occurs when an individual has the means and desire to achieve the cultural goals socialised into him.
- **Innovation** occurs when an individual strives to attain the accepted cultural goals but chooses to do so in novel or unaccepted method.
- **Ritualism** occurs when an individual continues to do things as proscribed by society but forfeits the achievement of the goals.
- **Retreatism** is the rejection of both the means and the goals of society.
- **Rebellion** is a combination of the rejection of societal goals and means and a substitution of other goals and means.

Thus it can be seen that change can occur internally in society through either innovation or rebellion. It is true that society will attempt to control these individuals and negate the changes, but as the

innovation or rebellion builds momentum, society will eventually adapt or face dissolution.

Almond and Powell

In the 1970s, political researchers Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell acquainted a structural functionalist approach with looking at political frameworks. They contended that, with a specific end goal to comprehend a political framework, it is important to see its establishments (or structures) as well as their individual capacities. They additionally demanded that these establishments, to be appropriately comprehended, must be set in a compelling and element authentic setting.

This thought remained in stamped complexity to common methodologies in the field of near legislative issues the state-society hypothesis and the reliance hypothesis. These were the relatives of David Easton's framework hypothesis in global relations, a robotic view that saw all political frameworks as basically the same, subject to the same laws of "jolt and reaction" or inputs and yields while giving careful consideration to extraordinary attributes. The structural-utilitarian methodology is focused around the view that a political framework is made up of a few key segments, including vested parties, political gatherings and extensions of government.

Notwithstanding structures, Almond and Powell demonstrated that a political framework comprises of different capacities, boss among them political socialization, recruitment and correspondence: socialization alludes to the path in which social orders pass along their qualities and convictions to succeeding eras, and in political terms depict the methodology by which a general public instills urban ideals, or the propensities for compelling citizenship; recruitment indicates the procedure by which a political framework produces investment, engagement and support from residents; and correspondence alludes to the way that a framework proclaims its values and data.

Structural functionalism and unilineal descent

In their endeavor to clarify the social security of African "primitive" stateless social orders where they embraced their hands on work, Evans-Pritchard (1940) and Meyer Fortes (1945) contended that the Tallensi and the Nuer were basically sorted out around unilineal plummet bunches. Such gatherings are described by basic purposes, for example, overseeing property or safeguarding against assaults; they structure a changeless social structure that perseveres well past the lifespan of their parts. On account of the Tallensi and the Nuer, these corporate gatherings were focused around connection which thus fitted into the bigger structures of unilineal plummet; thusly Evans-Pritchard's and Fortes' model is called "plunge hypothesis". Additionally, in this African connection regional divisions were adjusted to ancestries; plunge hypothesis accordingly integrated both blood and soil as two sides of one coin (cf. Kuper, 1988:195). Affinal ties with the guardian through whom plummet is not figured, in any case, are thought to be simply integral or optional (Fortes made the idea of "reciprocal filiation"), with the retribution of family relationship through plunge being viewed as the essential arranging energy of social frameworks. In view of its solid attention on unilineal plummet, this new family relationship hypothesis came to be called "drop hypothesis".

With no postponement, drop hypothesis had thought that it was' pundits. Numerous African tribal social orders appeared to fit this flawless model rather well, despite the fact that Africanists, for example, Richards, likewise contended that Fortes and Evans-Pritchard had deliberately downplayed inward inconsistencies and overemphasized the strength of the neighborhood genealogy frameworks and their hugeness for the association of society. Notwithstanding, in numerous Asian settings the issues were significantly more self-evident. In Papua New Guinea, the nearby patrilineal plunge gatherings were divided and contained a lot of non-

agnates. Status refinements did not rely on upon drop, and family histories were so short it would have been impossible record for social solidarity through ID with a typical progenitor. Specifically, the marvel of cognatic (or two-sided) family relationship represented a genuine issue to the recommendation that drop gatherings are the essential component behind the social structures of "primitive" social orders.

Filter's (1966) evaluate came as the established Malinowskian contention, calling attention to that "in Evans-Pritchard's investigations of the Nuer furthermore in Fortes' investigations of the Tallensi unilineal plummet ends up being generally a perfect idea to which the exact certainties are just adjusted by method for fictions." (1966:8). Individuals' eagerness toward oneself, moving, control and rivalry had been disregarded. In addition, drop hypothesis disregarded the criticalness of marriage and affinal ties, which were accentuated by Levi-Strauss' structural human studies, at the cost of overemphasizing the part of plunge. To quote Leach: "The apparent significance connected to matrilineal and affinal family relationship associations is less clarified but rather more clarified away."

Decline of functionalism

Structural functionalism reached the peak of its influence in the 1940s and 1950s, and by the 1960s was in rapid decline. By the 1980s, its place was taken in Europe by more conflict-oriented approaches, and more recently by 'structuralism'. While some of the critical approaches also gained popularity in the United States, the mainstream of the discipline has instead shifted to a myriad of empirically-oriented middle-range theories with no overarching theoretical orientation. To most sociologists, functionalism is now "as dead as a dodo".

As the influence of both functionalism and Marxism in the 1960s began to wane, the linguistic and cultural turns led to a myriad of new movements in the social sciences: "According to Giddens, the orthodox consensus terminated in the late 1960s and 1970s as the

middle ground shared by otherwise competing perspectives gave way and was replaced by a baffling variety of competing perspectives. This third 'generation' of social theory includes phenomenologically inspired approaches, critical theory, ethno-methodology, symbolic interactionism, structuralism, post-structuralism, and theories written in the tradition of hermeneutics and ordinary language philosophy."

While absent from empirical sociology, functionalist themes remained detectable in sociological theory, most notably in the works of Luhmann and Giddens. There are, however, signs of an incipient revival, as functionalist claims have recently been bolstered by developments in multilevel selection theory and in empirical research on how groups solve social dilemmas. Recent developments in evolutionary theory especially by biologist David Sloan Wilson and anthropologists Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson — have provided strong support for structural functionalism in the form of multilevel selection theory. In this theory, culture and social structure are seen as a Darwinian (biological or cultural) adaptation at the group level.

Criticisms

In the 1960s, functionalism was censured for being not able to record for social change, or for structural disagreements and clash (and hence was regularly called "agreement hypothesis"). Likewise, it disregards imbalances including race, sexual orientation, class, which causes pressure and clash. The nullification of the second feedback of functionalism, that it is static and has no understanding of progress, has as of now been verbalized above, inferring that while Parsons' hypothesis takes into consideration transform, it is a methodical methodology of progress [parsons, 1961:38], a moving balance. In this manner alluding to Parsons' hypothesis of society as static is mistaken. Truly it does place attention on harmony and the upkeep or speedy come back to social request, however this is a result of the time in which Parsons was composing (post-World War II, and the begin of the

cool war). Society was in change and alarm proliferated. At the time social request was essential, and this is reflected in Parsons' propensity to advance balance and social request instead of social change.

Besides, Durkheim favored a radical type of society communism alongside functionalist clarifications. Additionally, Marxism, while recognizing social inconsistencies, still uses functionalist clarifications. Parsons' evolutionary hypothesis portrays the separation and reintegration frameworks and subsystems and in this manner in any event provisional clash before reintegration (on the same page). "The way that utilitarian examination can be seen by a few as characteristically preservationist and by others as naturally radical recommends that it might be intrinsically not one or the other." (Merton 1957: 39)

Stronger reactions incorporate the epistemological contention that functionalism is tautologous, that is it endeavors to record for the advancement of social organizations exclusively through response to the impacts that are credited to them and in this manner clarifies the two circularly. Be that as it may, Parsons drew specifically on a large number of Durkheim's ideas in making his hypothesis. Unquestionably Durkheim was one of the first scholars to clarify a marvel with reference to the capacity it served for society. He said, "the determination of capacity is... vital for the complete clarification of the phenomena" [cited in Coser, 1977:140]. However Durkheim made an acceptable qualification in the middle of authentic and utilitarian examination, saying, "When... the clarification of a social wonder is attempted, we must look for independently the productive reason which delivers it and the capacity it satisfies" [cited in Coser, 1977:140]. On the off chance that Durkheim made this refinement, then it is unrealistic that Parsons did not. However Merton does unequivocally express that practical examination does not look to clarify why the activity happened in the first occasion, yet why it proceeds with or is repeated. He says that "idle capacities ... go far towards clarifying the continuation of the example"

[cited in Elster, 1990:130, stress added]. Along these lines it can be contended that functionalism does not clarify the first reason for a sensation with reference to its impact, and is subsequently, not teleological.

An alternate feedback depicts the ontological contention that society can't have "needs" as an issue being does, and regardless of the possibility that society has needs they require not be met. Anthony Giddens contends that functionalist clarifications might all be revamped as authentic records of individual human activities and results (see Structuration.)

A further criticism directed at functionalism is that it contains no sense of agency, that individuals are seen as puppets, acting as their role requires. Yet Holmwood states that the most sophisticated forms of functionalism are based on "a highly developed concept of action" [2005:107], and as was explained above, Parsons took as his starting point the individual and their actions. His theory did not however articulate how these actors exercise their agency in opposition to the socialization and inculcation of accepted norms. As has been shown above, Merton addressed this limitation through his concept of deviance, and so it can be seen that functionalism allows for agency. It cannot, however, explain why individuals choose to accept or reject the accepted norms, why and in what circumstances they choose to exercise their agency, and this does remain a considerable limitation of the theory.

Further criticisms have been leveled at functionalism by proponents of other social theories, particularly conflict theorists, Marxists, feminists and postmodernists. Conflict theorists criticised functionalism's concept of systems as giving far too much weight to integration and consensus, and neglecting independence and conflict [Holmwood, 2005:100]. Lockwood [in Holmwood, 2005:101], in line with conflict theory, suggested that Parsons' theory missed the concept of system contradiction. He did not account for those parts of

the system that might have tendencies to Mal-integration. According to Lockwood, it was these tendencies that come to the surface as opposition and conflict among actors. However Parsons thought that the issues of conflict and cooperation were very much intertwined and sought to account for both in his model [Holmwood, 2005:103]. In this however he was limited by his analysis of an 'ideal type' of society which was characterized by consensus. Merton, through his critique of functional unity, introduced into functionalism an explicit analysis of tension and conflict.

Marxism which was revived soon after the emergence of conflict theory, criticized professional sociology (functionalism and conflict theory alike) for being partisan to advanced welfare capitalism [Holmwood, 2005:103]. Gouldner [in Holmwood, 2005:103] thought that Parsons' theory specifically was an expression of the dominant interests of welfare capitalism, that it justified institutions with reference to the function they fulfill for society. It may be that Parsons' work implied or articulated that certain institutions were necessary to fulfill the functional prerequisites of society, but whether or not this is the case, Merton explicitly states that institutions are not indispensable and that there are functional alternatives. That he does not identify any alternatives to the current institutions does reflect a conservative bias, which as has been stated before is a product of the specific time that he was writing in.

As functionalism's prominence was ending, feminism was on the rise, and it attempted a radical criticism of functionalism. It believed that functionalism neglected the suppression of women within the family structure. Holmwood [2005:103] shows, however, that Parsons did in fact describe the situations where tensions and conflict existed or were about to take place, even if he did not articulate those conflicts. Some feminists agree, suggesting that Parsons' provided accurate descriptions of these situations. [Johnson in Holmwood, 2005:103]. On the other hand, Parsons recognized that he had oversimplified his

functional analysis of women in relation to work and the family, and focused on the positive functions of the family for society and not on its dysfunctions for women. Merton, too, although addressing situations where function and dysfunction occurred simultaneously, lacked a “feminist sensibility” [Holmwood, 2005:103].

Postmodernism, as a theory, is critical of claims of objectivity. Therefore the idea of grand theory that can explain society in all its forms is treated with skepticism at the very least. This critique is important because it exposes the danger that grand theory can pose, when not seen as a limited perspective, as one way of understanding society.

Jeffrey Alexander (1985) sees functionalism as a broad school rather than a specific method or system, such as Parsons, who is capable of taking equilibrium (stability) as a reference-point rather than assumption and treats structural differentiation as a major form of social change. "The name 'functionalism' implies a difference of method or interpretation that does not exist." (Davis 1967: 401) This removes the determinism criticized above. Cohen argues that rather than needs a society has dispositional facts: features of the social environment that support the existence of particular social institutions but do not cause them.

Influential theorists

- Kingsley Davis
- Michael Denton
- Émile Durkheim
- David Keen
- Niklas Luhmann
- Bronisław Malinowski
- Robert K. Merton
- Wilbert E. Moore
- George Murdock

- Talcott Parsons
- Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown
- Herbert Spencer
- Fei Xiaotong

Functionalism is the most seasoned, and still the predominant, hypothetical point of view in humanism and numerous other social sciences. This viewpoint is based upon twin accentuations: application of the logical strategy to the target social world and utilization of a similarity between the individual organic entity and society.

The attention on exploratory system prompts the affirmation that one can consider the social world in the same courses as one studies the physical world. Along these lines, Functionalists see the social world as "equitably genuine," as detectable with such procedures as social studies and meetings. Besides, their positivistic perspective of social science accept that investigation of the social world can be esteem free, in that the agent's qualities won't essentially meddle with the impartial quest for social laws administering the conduct of social frameworks. A significant number of these thoughts retreat to Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), the incredible French humanist whose works structure the premise for functionalist hypothesis (see Durkheim 1915, 1964); Durkheim was himself one of the first sociologists to make utilization of logical and measurable methods in sociological examination (1951).

The second emphasis, on the organic unity of society, leads functionalists to speculate about needs which must be met for a **social system** to exist, as well as the ways in which social institutions satisfy those needs. A functionalist might argue, for instance, that every society will have a religion, because religious institutions have certain functions which contribute to the survival of the social system as a whole, just as the organs of the body have functions which are necessary for the body's survival.

This similarity in the middle of society and an organic entity centers consideration on the homeostatic nature of social frameworks: social frameworks work to keep up harmony and to come back to it after outer stuns aggravate the parity among social foundations. Such social harmony is attained, above all, through the socialization of parts of the general public into the essential qualities and standards of that society, so that accord is arrived at. Where socialization is inadequate for reasons unknown to make adjustment to socially fitting parts and socially upheld standards, different social control systems exist to restore congruity or to isolate the nonconforming people from whatever is left of society. These social control instruments range from approvals forced casually -jeering and tattle, for instance -to the exercises of certain formal associations, in the same way as schools, penitentiaries, and mental organizations.

You may recognize a few likenesses between the dialect utilized by functionalists and the language of "frameworks scholars" in software engineering or science. Society is seen as an issue of interrelated parts, a change in any part influencing all the others. Inside the limits of the framework, input circles and trades among the parts customarily prompt homeostasis. Most changes are the aftereffect of regular development or of evolution, yet different changes happen when outside powers encroach upon the framework. An exhaustive going functionalist, for example, Talcott Parsons, the best-known American humanist of the 1950s and 60s, conceptualizes society as an issue of frameworks inside frameworks: the identity framework inside the little gathering framework inside the group framework inside society (Parsons 1951). Parsons (1971) even saw the entire world as an issue of social orders.

Functionalist analyses often focus on the individual, usually with the intent to show how individual behavior is molded by broader social forces. Functionalists tend to talk about individual actors as decision-makers, although some critics have suggested that functionalist

theorists are, in effect, treating individuals either as puppets, whose decisions are a predictable result of their location in the **social structure** and of the norms and **expectations** they have internalized, or sometimes as virtual prisoners of the explicit social control techniques society imposes. In any case, functionalists have tended to be less concerned with the ways in which individuals can control their own destiny than with the ways in which the limits imposed by society make individual behavior scientifically predictable.

Robert Merton, another prominent functionalist, has proposed a number of important distinctions to avoid potential weaknesses and clarify ambiguities in the basic perspective (see Merton 1968). First, he distinguishes between **manifest** and **latent** functions: respectively, those which are recognized and intended by actors in the social system and hence may represent motives for their actions, and those which are unrecognized and, thus, unintended by the actors. Second, he distinguishes between consequences which are positively functional for a society, those which are **dysfunctional** for the society, and those which are neither. Third, he distinguishes between levels of society, that is, the specific social units for which regularized patterns of behavior are functional or dysfunctional. Finally, he concedes that the particular social structures which satisfy functional needs of society are not indispensable, but that **structural alternatives** may exist which can also satisfy the same functional needs.

Functionalist theories have very often been criticized as **teleological**, that is, reversing the usual order of cause and effect by explaining things in terms of what happens afterward, not what went before. A strict functionalist might explain certain religious practices, for instance, as being functional by contributing to a society's survival; however, such religious traditions will usually have been firmly established long before the question is finally settled of whether the society as a whole will actually survive. Bowing to this kind of criticism of the basic logic of functionalist theory, most current sociologists have

stopped using any explicitly functionalistic explanations of social phenomena, and the extreme version of functionalism expounded by Talcott Parsons has gone out of fashion. Nevertheless, many sociologists continue to expect that by careful, objective scrutiny of social phenomena they will eventually be able to discover the general laws of social behavior, and this hope still serves as the motivation for a great deal of sociological thinking and research.

Functionalism

As an issue hypothesis, Functionalism sees social structure or the association of society as more imperative than the single person. Functionalism is a top down hypothesis. People are naturally introduced to society and turn into the result of all the social impacts around them as they are standardized by different foundations, for example, the family, instruction, media and religion.

Functionalism sees society as an issue; a set of interconnected parts which together structure an entirety. There is a relationship between all these parts and operators of socialization and together they all help the support of society as an issue.

Social accord, request and coordination are key convictions of functionalism as this permits society to proceed with and advance on the grounds that there are imparted standards and values that mean all people have a typical objective and have a personal stake in acclimating and accordingly clash is negligible.

Talcott Parsons viewed society as a system. He argued that any social system has four basic functional prerequisites: adaptation, goal attainment, integration and pattern maintenance. These can be seen as problems that society must solve if it is to survive. The function of any part of the social system is understood as its contribution to meeting the functional prerequisites.

Adjustment alludes to the relationship between the framework and its surroundings. To survive, social frameworks must have some level of control over their surroundings. Sustenance and sanctuary must

be given to meet the physical needs of parts. The economy is the organization fundamentally concerned with this capacity.

Objective fulfillment alludes to the requirement for all social orders to set objectives towards which social action is regulated. Systems for making objectives and settling on needs between objectives are organized as political frameworks. Governments set objectives as well as allot assets to accomplish them. Indeed in an alleged free venture framework, the economy is directed and coordinated by laws passed by governments.

Joining alludes basically to the 'modification of clash'. It is concerned with the coordination and common change of the parts of the social framework. Legitimate standards characterize and institutionalize relations in the middle of people and in the middle of organizations, thus lessen the potential for clash. At the point when clash does emerge, it is settled by the legal framework and does not accordingly prompt the crumbling of the social framework.

Pattern maintenance refers to the 'maintenance of the basic pattern of values, institutionalized in the society'. Institutions that perform this function include the family, the educational system and religion. In Parsons view 'the values of society are rooted in religion'.

Talcott Parsons maintained that any social system can be analysed in terms of the functional prerequisites he identified. Thus, all parts of society can be understood with reference to the functions they perform.

A main supporter of Functionalism is **Emile Durkheim** who believes that sociology is a science. He is a structuralist and positivist and thus disagrees with empathy, meanings and the social action theory.

Functionalists believe that society is based around a value consensus and social solidarity, which is achieved by socialisation and social control.

These are two types of social solidarity Durkheim believed in:

1. **Mechanical Solidarity** – These societies have people involved in similar roles so labour division is simple. Therefore, a similar lifestyle is lived with common shared norms and values and beliefs. They have a consensus of opinion on moral issues giving society a social solidarity to guide behaviour. As there is a societal agreement, there is pressure to follow the value consensus, so therefore most do.
2. **Organic Solidarity** – Industrialization meant population grew rapidly with urbanization occurring. As society develops, a division of labour occurs. This is when work becomes separate from the home and the state organises the education, health care and criminal justice systems. A parent back then would be the teacher, doctor, judge and jury as well as a parent.

Today people have such diverse and specialist roles that moral codes have weakened and anomie has occurred (a lack of norms and values and self-control). Social order is no-longer based on having a common set of values but rather is enshrined in the law and highlighted by deviance.

Another in support of Functionalism is **Talcott Parsons**. Parsons claims that society is the way it is as social structures are interconnected and dependant on each other. Functionalists therefore see change as evolutionary – change in one part of society will eventually occur in another. Social ills e.g. crime and deviance, have disabling effects on society and gradually effect other parts. They recognise interconnections between various parts of society occur due to a value consensus. Parsons believes that as society changes, it develops and the pattern variables within it will become more complex. Change, therefore, trickles throughout society. Parsons summed this up as the 'Organic Analogy'.

Functionalists believe that sociological matters should be explained with scientific facts. This is otherwise known as Positivism.

The founder of Positivism, Auguste Comte, describes it as a method of study based primary facts, objectively measured, from which makes it possible to identify issues in society that effect individuals and leaves room for innovation in law and establishing new legislation. An example of this would be statistics. Positivists believe that sociology should adopt the methodology of the natural sciences and focus only on directly observable social facts and correlate them with other observable social facts.

Sociological Theory/Structural Functionalism

Structural Functionalism is a sociological theory that attempts to explain why society functions the way it does by focusing on the relationships between the various social institutions that make up society (e.g., government, law, education, religion, etc).

Detailed Description

Structural Functionalism is a mature theoretical understanding of society that posits social systems are collective means to fill social needs. In order for social life to survive and develop in society there are a number of activities that need to be carried out to ensure that certain needs are fulfilled. In the structural functionalist model, individuals produce necessary goods and services in various institutions and roles that correlate with the norms of the society.

Consequently, one of the key thoughts in Structural Functionalism is that society is made-up of gatherings or organizations, which are firm, impart normal standards, and have a conclusive society. Robert K. Merton contended that functionalism is about the more static or cement parts of society,[2] foundations like government or religions. Nonetheless, any gathering sufficiently substantial to be a social organization is incorporated in Structural Functionalism considering, from religious groups to games clubs and everything in the middle.

Structural Functionalism affirms that the way society is sorted out is the most common and productive route for it to be composed.

Sexual orientation disparity offers a decent outline. As indicated by Structural Functionalist thought, ladies being subordinate to men permits the sprockets of society to capacity easily as everybody in the general public knows his or her particular position in the chain of command. The suggestion, obviously, is that, in light of the fact that society is working easily with sex stratification, such stratification is satisfactory and exertions ought not be rolled out to improvement the plan. This sample outlines that Structural Functionalism is for the most part seen as being strong of existing conditions.

An alternate key normal for Structural Functionalism is that it sees society as always striving to be at a condition of harmony, which proposes there is a natural drive inside human social orders to connect or stick together. This is known as the attachment issue. Societies strive to balance, not through authoritarian command by the pioneers of society but instead in light of the fact that the social structure of social orders supports harmony.

For example, Jim Crow laws in the southern United States were a formalized version of informal structural advantages that empowered whites. Because of the history of slavery in the southern United States, whites had amassed more wealth than blacks. During slavery, whites controlled the government and all of the major institutions in the South. After slavery ended, whites continued to control many of these institutions, but because they were outnumbered in some areas by blacks, threatening their dominance, they instituted formal laws, Jim Crow laws, that allowed them to maintain their structural advantages. And whites were able to pass these laws because they already controlled many of the social institutions instrumental in the passage of laws (e.g., courts, government, businesses, etc.). Thus, the advantages whites had prior to a change in society allowed them to maintain their

advantages after the change through both informal and formal means because of the structure of society.

Structural Functionalism does much to clarify why certain parts of society proceed as they generally have, in spite of some phenomena being unmistakably less gainful for society as an issue (e.g., Jim Crow laws). On the other hand, Structural Functionalism misses the mark in clarifying restriction to social organizations and social structure by those being persecuted.

Assumptions

There are various key presumptions in Structural Functionalist hypothesis. One of these, that social orders strives to balance, was itemized previously. An alternate supposition is that establishments are different and ought to be considered exclusively. Numerous Structural Functionalists take a gander at establishments exclusively just as they are separated from different organizations. This is an error, as establishments are interlinked in the public eye and those utilizing a structural functionalist methodology ought to be mull over the system of connections that exist between these foundations.

Definitions of Concepts

Social cohesion describes the bonds that bring people together in a society. In order for groups to be cohesive in a social context, positive membership attitudes and behaviors have to be produced and maintained. Social cohesion can be looked at on both an individual and group level. Individual-levels include: an individual's desire or intention to remain a part of a group, her attitudes and beliefs about the group, the individuals' intention to sever, weaken, maintain, or strengthen her membership or participation in a groups, and her susceptibility to group influence. Social cohesion at a group level is directly affected by the individual members.

Social inequality refers to any scenario in which individuals in a society do not have equal social status. Areas of potential inequality include voting rights, freedom of speech and assembly, the extent of property rights and access to education, health care, quality housing and other social goods. Social inequality is an important characteristic of Structural Functionalism as the theory assumes, since inequality exists, there needs to be a certain level of inequality in order for a society to operate. One possible function of inequality is to motivate people, as people are motivated to carry out work through a rewards system. Rewards may include income, status, prestige, or power.

Interdependence is a central theme in structural functionalism; it refers to the parts of society sharing a common set of principles. Institutions, organizations, and individuals are all interdependent with one another.

Equilibrium, in a social context, is the internal and external balance in a society. While temporary disturbances may upset the equilibrium of society, because of social structure, society will eventually return to a balanced, orderly state. That society strives toward equilibrium also means that changes happen slowly.

Propositions

Propositions are proposed relationships between two concepts. This section explores some of the propositions of structural functionalism.


One proposition derived from Structural Functionalist theory is that people have social capital, and that greater amounts of social capital translate into benefits. Well integrated members of an institution (those with substantial social capital) will remain members of the institution in order to maximize the potential of their social capital. Schepens found support for this proposition by examining religious switching; less than 5% of church members in the Netherlands shift their church associations during their lifetime, conserving and maximizing their social capital.^[3]

One of the assumptions of Structural Functionalism is that a society is cohesive if it consists of various intermediate groups which share the same norms. This assumption leads to another proposition: The higher the level of integration between these intermediate groups, the more cohesive society will be as a whole. The absence of social cohesion can result in greater violence toward others and one's self.^[2]

General Conceptual Diagram

The diagram below is a general conceptual diagram of Structural functionalism. It shows that all of the different organizations and institutions in society are interdependent. When one institution in society changes, other institutions accommodate that change by changing as well, though the ultimate effect is to slow overall change.

A General Diagram of Structural Functionalism




Specific Conceptual Diagram

The following is an outline portraying how aberrance is utilitarian for society and how society reacts to abnormality. A "degenerate" individual perpetrates a demonstration that is considered by whatever remains of society as criminal, in light of the fact that it

prompts open shock and disciplines. Since a substantial part of society react to the activity just as it is freak, this draws a limit between what is and is not degenerate. In this way, aberrance really serves to show what is not degenerate, or, the capacity of naming practices or thoughts as abnormality is to guarantee that the vast majority don't take part in those practices.

A Structural-Functionalist Understanding of Deviance.



History of Structural functionalism

Functionalism created gradually about whether with the assistance of numerous sociologists in diverse parts of the world. Maybe the most noteworthy benefactors to the starting advancement of this hypothesis are Émile Durkheim and A.r. Radcliffe-Brown. In any case, we start with Herbert Spencer.

Herbert Spencer, an English humanist, was a precursor of formalized Structural Functionism. He is best known for authoring the saying "survival of the fittest" in his book *Principles of Sociology* (1896).

Spencer's proposition was to help a societal type of common determination. One of the essential focii in Spencer's work was societal harmony. Spencer contended that there is a regular propensity in the public arena towards harmony. Accordingly, actually when the states of the general public are adjusted, the ensuing changes to the social structure will offset, giving back where its due to balance.

In the late nineteenth century French Sociologist Émile Durkheim established the essential frameworks of Structural Functionalism. Durkheim's hypothesis was, in any event to a limited extent, a reaction to evolutionary theories of scholars, for example, E.b. Taylor. Durkheim initially needed to clarify social foundations as an issue route for people in the public eye to meet their natural needs. He needed to comprehend the estimation of social and social characteristics by clarifying them concerning their commitment to the operation of the general arrangement of society and life. Later the center for structural functionalism changed to be all the more about the ways that social establishments in the public arena meet the social needs of people inside that society

Durkheim was interested in four main aspects of society:

1. why societies formed and what holds them together,
2. religion,
3. suicide, and
4. deviance and crime.

Durkheim tended to his first concentrate in his book, *The Division of Labor in Society*. Durkheim perceived that the division of work was apparent over all social orders and needed to know why. Durkheim's response to this inquiry can be found in his concept of "solidarity". In more seasoned, more primitive social orders Durkheim contended that "mechanical solidarity kept everybody together. Technician Solidarity here alludes to everybody doing generally comparable undertakings. Case in point, in chasing and get-together

social orders there was not a considerable division of work; individuals chased or accumulated. Durkheim estimated that imparted qualities, basic images, and frameworks of trade worked as the devices of attachment in these social orders. Basically, parts of society performed comparable errands to keep the group running. In more advanced and complex social orders people are very diverse and they don't perform the same undertakings. Nonetheless, the differences really prompts an alternate type of solidarity - relationship. Durkheim alluded to this as "natural solidarity." [9]. Natural solidarity prompts a solid feeling of people being reliant on each other. For example, while a development laborer may have the capacity to fabricate homes for individuals, in the event that he is harmed at work, he will turn to a specialist for treatment (and most likely a legal advisor to sue his executive). The division of work in the public eye obliges specialization, and the result is natural solidarity.

Durkheim's work on suicide was likewise fixed to structural functionalism. In his book, *Suicide*, Durkheim speculated that social connections lessened the probability of suicide. By gathering information crosswise over vast gatherings in Europe, Durkheim had the capacity recognize designs in suicide rates and interface those examples with different variables. All through the book, Durkheim clarified that the weaker social ties a general public had the more probable they were to confer suicide. Conversely, the more prominent the firm bond between people the more outlandish one was to submit suicide. One solid sample Durkheim investigated was the distinction in solidarity in the middle of Protestants and Catholics. Because of a mixture of elements, Durkheim contended that Protestants had lower social solidarity than Catholics, and their weaker securities brought about higher rates of suicide. Accordingly, solidarity helped keep up societal request.

Another thread in the development of Structural Functionalism comes from England, where it emerged from the study of anthropology

in the early twentieth century in the theorizing of Bronislaw Malinowski and A.R. Radcliffe-Brown. Malinowski argued that cultural practices had physiological and psychological functions, such as the satisfaction of desires.

Radcliffe-Brown's structural functionalism focused on social structure. He argued that the social world constituted a separate "level" of reality, distinct from those of biological forms (people) and inorganic forms. Radcliffe-Brown argued that explanations of social phenomena had to be constructed at the social level.^[6] To Radcliffe-Brown this meant that people were merely replaceable, temporary occupants of social roles, that were of no inherent worth. To Radcliffe-Brown, individuals were only significant in relation to their positions in the overall structure of social roles in society.

In the United States, functionalism was formalized in sociological thinking by Talcott Parsons, who presented the thought that there are steady structural classes that make up the related frameworks of a general public and worked to keep up society. He contended that this homeostasis is the basic normal for social orders. Parsons backed individual incorporation into social structures, implying that people ought to discover how they fit into the distinctive parts of society all alone, instead of being relegated parts. Parsons saw social frameworks as "a majority of individual performers communicating with one another in a circumstance which has at any rate a physical or ecological angle, performing artists who are persuaded as far as an inclination to the "improvement of satisfaction" and whose connection to their circumstances, including one another, is characterized and interceded as far as an arrangement of socially organized and imparted images." The establishment of Parsons' social framework is the status-part perplexing, which comprises of structural components or positions that people hold in a framework. These positions are alluded to as statuses and are possessed by people who must complete the parts with a specific end goal to keep up the request of the framework. In this way,

inside this social framework people perform certain parts to satisfy the framework's capacities; these parts are a capacity of their statuses. As society advances there are new parts and statuses that happen, permitting people to express their novel identities bringing about independence.

An alternate critical part of Parsons' social frameworks contention is his hypothesis of activity. Parsons created the hypothesis of activity focused around the thought that the choice making of a single person in a social framework has motivational centrality to himself. The individual is continually helped to remember the standards and estimations of society, which ties him to society. The individual is, hence, persuaded to achieve individual objectives that are characterized by their social framework and all the while these objectives advantage society as an issue.

Structural functionalism was the prevailing methodology of human science between World War II and the Vietnam War.

In the 1960's Structural Functionalism was very famous and utilized widely as a part of examination. It was "...maybe the predominant hypothetical introduction in humanism and human sciences". Nonetheless, by the 1970's, it was no more so generally credited. "Structural Functionalism has lost much essentialness, yet altered it administers much sociological request.

Modern Examples of Structural Functionalist Oriented Research September 11, 2001

On September 11, 2001 current American society was muddled because of an assault . This occasion influenced both American travel traditions, reflecting the Structural Functionalist thought that a change in one component of society brings about changes in different parts of society. Prior to the assaults air terminal security in the U.s. existed, yet they changed considerably as an issue of the assaults. Examination of voyagers was uplifted and included new conventions, in the same way

as the evacuation of shoes, cinchs, and in the long run fluids, and in addition irregular, more itemized screenings. Accordingly, a change in the social feeling that all is well with the world brought about a relating change in travel convention."

Increase in Technology

Current engineering has brought about generous changes to the economy and the military. Prior to the appearance of phones, the web, and feature conferencing, most business gatherings happened vis-à-vis. In the event that an individual had a business proposal for an organization in San Francisco yet existed in New York, she would need to set out to San Francisco. Present day innovation has changed this, decreasing the need of business travel. As an issue, the capacity of vis-à-vis gatherings in business have transformed; they are no more a vital piece of social cooperations and have consequently started to lose their structural part.

In like manner, The conventional methodology to war between two countries was a full scale intrusion including many thousands if not a huge number of troops. Amid WWI, America sent in excess of two million men to battle. Amid WWII, American sent in excess of eleven million fighters to battle. Amid the Korean War America sent roughly 1.5 million troops. Lastly in 1990, a little more than 700,000 warriors battled in Operation Desert Storm. Because of the increment in military engineering and new military strategic standards the quantity of military work force exhibit in battle areas has drastically diminished. At the point when America attacked Iraq in 2001, they sent 150,000. Current engineering, including progressed, long-go weapons and unmanned automatons, have changed the capacity of mass intrusion.

Functionalist view of education:

Transmission	of	culture	through	(socialization)
Prepares	adults	for	adulthood	(social integration)

Provides pathways into the structure of society (social placement)
Increases the number of educated individuals in society (cultural innovation)

Functionalist view of social stratification:

Inequality is inevitable and necessary for society as a whole
Society is ranked by order of importance.

Functionalist view of politics:

Government enforces norms, and regulates conflict
Government plans and coordinates activity
Government conducts dealings with other societies.

Neo-Marxism

Marxism Sociology is a theory which basically states that all of society is based on conflict between classes. The working class, which is the majority and is called the proletariat, is always in disagreement or quarrel with the ruling class which has fewer people and is known as the bourgeoisie. The conflict is about control of wealth and resources.

Neo Marxism is defined as various twentieth-century approaches that bring changes to Marxism. It was a relaxation of the economic determinism and positivism of classical Marxist theories. It usually incorporates elements from other intellectual traditions like critical theory, psychoanalysis and Existentialism.

Neo-Marxism was a 20th century school that harkened back to the early writings of Marx before the influence of Engels which focused on dialectical idealism rather than dialectical

A significant group of sociologists entering graduate school in the late 1960's and 1970's embraced Marxism as the foundation for a critical challenge to reigning orthodoxies in the discipline. In this review, we ask what impact this cohort of scholars and their students had on the mainstream of American sociology. More generally, how and in

what ways did the resurgence of neo-Marxist thought within the discipline lead to new theoretical and empirical research and findings? Using two models of Marxism as science as our guide, we examine the impact of sociological Marxism on research on the state, inequality, the labor process, and global political economy. We conclude with some thoughts about the future of sociological Marxism.

Neo-Marxism is a loose term for various twentieth-century approaches that amend or extend Marxism and Marxist theory, usually by incorporating elements from other intellectual traditions, such as: critical theory, psychoanalysis or Existentialism (in the case of Sartre). Erik Olin Wright's theory of contradictory class locations, which incorporates Weberian sociology, critical criminology, and anarchism, is an example of the syncretism in neo-Marxist theory.^[1] As with many uses of the prefix neo-, many theorists and groups designated as neo-Marxist have attempted to supplement the perceived deficiencies of orthodox Marxism or dialectical materialism. Many prominent neo-Marxists, such as Herbert Marcuse and other members of the Frankfurt School, were sociologists and psychologists.

Neo-Marxism comes under the broader framework of the New Left. In a sociological sense, neo-Marxism adds Max Weber's broader understanding of social inequality, such as status and power, to Marxist philosophy. Strains of neo-Marxism include: critical theory, analytical Marxism and French structural Marxism.

The concept arose as a way to explain questions which were not explained in Karl Marx's works. There are many different "branches" of Neo-Marxism often not in agreement with each other and their theories.

Limitations within orthodox Marxism

The development of Neo-Marxism came forth through several political and social problems which traditional Marxist thought was unable to answer. Examples to this were: Why did socialist and social-

democratic political parties not band together against WWI, but instead supported their own nations' entrance into the Great War? Why, although the timing seemed to be right for a workers' revolution in the West, had no large-scale revolution occurred? Also how at this time could the rise of Fascism occur in Europe?

All these questions led to internal problems within Marxist theory, which caused renewed study and reanalysis of Marx's works to begin.

Expansion of Marxist critiques

One idea that many "branches" of Neo-Marxism share is the desire to move away from the idea of open, bloody revolution to one of a more peaceful nature. Moving away from the violence of the Red revolutions of the past while keeping the revolutionary message. Neo-Marxist concepts can also follow an economic theory that attempts to move away from the traditional accusations of class warfare and create new economic theory models, such as Hans-Jürgen Krahel did.

Several important advances to Neo-Marxism came after World War I from Georg Lukács, Karl Korsch and Antonio Gramsci. From the Institute for Social Research founded in 1923 at the University of Frankfurt am Main grew one of the most important schools of neo-Marxist interdisciplinary social theory, The Frankfurt School. Its founders were Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno whose critical theories had great influence on Marxist theory especially after their exile to New York (Columbia University) after the rise of National Socialism in Germany in 1933.

Neo-Marxist theories

Neo-marxist theories of development

The Neo-Marxist approach to development economics is connected with dependency and world systems theories. Here the "exploitation" which defines it as a marxist approach is an external

exploitation rather than the normal "internal" exploitation of orthodox/classical marxism.

Neo-Marxism is built upon the Marxist idea that the superstructure of the state determines who has the power. However, the neo-Marxists Gramsci said that the superstructure is divided into two distinct sections, the civil and political societies.

The political society is made up of institutions that rule by force such as the police and the army, whilst the civil society consists of institutions that rule by consent, like the church, trade unions and the mass media. Under Gramsci's definition, the state branches much further in public life than other perspectives say. For example, by 'using' the church or the mass media, the political society can persuade and influence the working class into believing their ideas and morals. Because of this, the superstructure allows hegemony to form, whereby the ideology of the ruling class is completely dominant.

Neo Marxism is a new form of Marxism, they seek to develop theories which look at the individual as well as structural factors, Traditional marxists simply look at external social laws (capitalism) as governing all social action. Neo Marxists however combine approaches from interactionalists and New Left Realists.

In terms of crime for example they see the working class as driven by a political motive to re-distribute wealth from the rich to the poor (Taylor et al), they don't see deviance as simply driven by economic necessity, or as simply as automatic response to capitalism-as Marxists argue capitalism is criminogenic, in that by its very nature it causes crime. Neo Marxists argue that Traditional marxism is too deterministic. Neo Marxists see social actors as having free will in their actions, and not simply governed by external structures.

Neo-Marxism

The "neo-Marxisms" include analytical Marxism, Hegelian Marxism, Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony, Marxist feminism,

ecological Marxism, post-Marxism, the various critical social theories (the original Frankfurt School, new critical theory, etc.), critical pedagogy, and many others. [note by Mark A. Foster, Ph.D.]

Neo-Marxism

A term loosely applied to any social theory or sociological analysis which draws on the ideas of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, but amends or extends these, usually by incorporating elements from other intellectual traditions—such as, for example, psychoanalysis (as in the case of critical theory), Weberian sociology (as in Erik Olin Wright's theory of contradictory class locations), or anarchism (as in the example of critical criminology).

Marshall, Gordon and Scott, John. *A Dictionary of Sociology*. New York. Oxford University Press. 2005. Retrieved on April 28, 2009.

Neo-Marxism

The Frankfurt School has turned into one of the basically broadly embraced manifestations of neo-Marxism. It developed out of the Institute of Social Research at the University of Frankfurt, Germany. It is frequently alluded to as discriminating hypothesis, importance an uncommon sort of social rationality. It assembled individuals who were extreme pundits of free enterprise yet accepted that Marxism had gotten to be so close it is not possible socialism. They accepted Karl Marx's adherents were supporting just a thin choice of his thoughts.

Neo-Marxists perspective class divisions under free enterprise as more vital than sex/sex divisions or issues of race and ethnicity. Neo-Marxism incorporates a gathering of convictions that have in like manner dismissal of financial or class determinism and a faith in at any rate the semiautonomy of the social circle. They additionally assert that most social science, history, and artistic examination lives up to expectations from inside industrialist classifications and say neo-

Marxism is focused around the aggregate political-monetary social framework.

During the Nazi regime, the members of the school fled first to Geneva, Switzerland, then to the United States. They became attached to the department of sociology at Columbia University in 1935. In 1941, they relocated to California. In 1949, some of them—Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Friedrich Pollock—returned to Germany and 2 years later reestablished the Institute for Social Research. Horkheimer served as director and believed in a holistic approach, combining theory and practice.

The neo-Marxists, after seeing the failure of working-class revolutions in Western Europe after World War I, chose the parts of Marx's thought that might clarify social conditions that were not present when Marx was alive. They filled in what they perceived to be omissions in Marxism with ideas from other schools of thought.

McCarthy, Pat, "Neo-Marxism." H. James Birx (ed.). *Encyclopedia of Anthropology*. Volume 4. Thousand Oaks, California. Sage Reference. 2006. Page 1546.

The Neo-Marxian Schools ("Radical Political Economy")

There have been various "branch" Neo-Marxist schools which have tackled a large portion of the topics and finishes of the Marxian school, in spite of the fact that they ought not be viewed as thorough applications of established Marxian hypothesis. We note just the related "Reliance School" of advancement connected with Raul Prébisch and Andre Gunder Frank, the "World Systems" school connected with Immanuel Wallerstein and the work on radical political economy of David M. Gordon, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis and others. A different (and irrelevant) school is the "Expository Marxian" school, ordinarily connected with the work of John E. Roemer and John Elster, which endeavors to diminish a percentage of the Marxian recommendations

to customary, methodological independence (i.e. with utility-expanding normal specialists, and so forth.)

The New School. *The Neo-Marxian Schools ("Radical Political Economy")*. Retrieved on May 1, 2009.

Barry Smart (1985) makes the antagonistic point that Michel Foucault's hypothetical experiences can be named as 'neo-Marxist' in highlighting how observation is a basic peculiarity of cutting edge training arrangement and schools. Whilst customary Marxist grant has a familiarity with matters of trade and profit and philosophy in the connection of social connections in instruction; a neo-Marxist point of view grounded in Foucault's work can delineate how reconnaissance and talks of force effect the situating of youngsters as instructive objects of control, mastery and subordination. It would not be right to preclude the effect from claiming "subjectivity" as an issue idea at the present time training (Ball, 1990; Powell and Edwards, 2003). Notwithstanding, in offering an option and basic investigation of ERA we can address C.w. Wright Mills (1959) capable contention that sociological guessing must concentrate on how singular accounts are formed by the more extensive social drives inside a specific period in history and society. Essentially, Fairclough (1992) recommends that a basic viewpoint opens up 'sound judgment suppositions' that lie at the heart of western society about social organizations. Fairclough (1992) further proposes that Foucault's (1967) work on "talk" has likenesses with the Gramscian idea of "dominion". This affirmation is confirm by Foucault (1984:110) himself, when he states, "Talk in not just that which interprets battles or frameworks of command, however is the thing for which there is battle. Talk is the ability to be seized."

By and by, there are surely strains between Foucault's neo-Marxism and variations of structuralist Marxism. Foucault avoids the parallel relationship set up by the Marxist instructive hypothesis of Bowles and Gintis (1976) for instance, in the middle of genuine and false substances, methods for knowing and political awareness. Foucault has

the hypothetical reflexivity of slackening information, thoughts and subject positions from classes of social totality, for example, social development, the mode of creation, history, economy and society (Ball, 1990). Accordingly suspended from their apparent associations, social thoughts are re-explained in Foucault's thought to chronicled and societal gimmicks overlooked in Marxist models of social reality focused around the work procedure and modes of financial abuse. Thus, Foucault's neo-Marxist viewpoint on talk, influence and observation gives a rich crease of conjecturing as an expansion to Marxist grant (Smart, 1985). Surely, though Marxism has concentrated on the 'macrophysics of force' (Powell and Edwards, 2002), Foucault's (1977) work supplements such a methodology by concentrating on the 'microphysics of force'; connections between social performing artists and organizations. Coupled with this, Granovetter (1985) focused on the significance of connected socially implanted systems as an issue of guessing relations in the middle of macrostructures and microlevels of activity.

Powell¹, Jason L. and Edwards, Margaret, "Surveillance and Morality: Revisiting the Education Reform Act (1988) in the United Kingdom." *Surveillance & Society: The International, Interdisciplinary, Open Access, Peer-Reviewed Journal of Surveillance Studies*. 3(1): 96-106.

The introductory significance of the term basic hypothesis was that characterized by Max Horkheimer of the Frankfurt School of social science in his 1937 article Traditional and Critical Theory: Critical hypothesis is a social hypothesis arranged to investigating and changing society as an issue, rather than conventional hypothesis situated just to understanding or clarifying it. Horkheimer needed to recognize discriminating hypothesis as an issue, emancipatory type of Marxian hypothesis, studying both the model of science set forward by coherent positivism and what he and his partners saw as the secret positivism and dictatorship of conventional Marxism and socialism. Center ideas

are: That basic social hypothesis ought to be controlled at the totality of society in its verifiable specificity (i.e. how it came to be arranged at a particular point in time), and (2) That Critical Theory ought to enhance understanding of society by incorporating all the significant social sciences, including topography, money making concerns, humanism, history, political science, human studies, and brain research. In spite of the fact that this origination of basic hypothesis began with the Frankfurt School, it additionally wins among other late social researchers, for example, Pierre Bourdieu, Louis Althusser and apparently Michel Foucault, and in addition certain women's activist scholars and social researchers.

The Praxis school was a Marxist humanist philosophical development. It began in Zagreb and Belgrade in the SFR Yugoslavia, amid the 1960s that from various perspectives nearly connected to Frankfurt School and Critical hypothesis. Unmistakable figures among the school's originators incorporate Gajo Petrovic' and Milan Kangrga of Zagreb and Mihailo Markovic' of Belgrade. From 1964 to 1974 they distributed the Marxist diary Praxis, which was eminent as one of the main worldwide diaries in Marxist hypothesis.

This form of "basic" hypothesis gets from Kant's (eighteenth century) and Marx's (nineteenth Century) utilization of the expression "investigate", as in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Marx's idea that his work Das Kapital (Capital) structures a "study of political economy". For Kant's supernatural optimism, "scrutinize" means analyzing and making the points of confinement of the legitimacy of a personnel, sort, or collection of learning, particularly through representing the impediments forced by the crucial, irreducible ideas being used in that information framework. At an opportune time, Kant's thought related investigate with the disestablishment of false, unprovable, or fanatical philosophical, social, and political convictions, in light of the fact that Kant's study of reason included the scrutinize of obstinate religious and supernatural thoughts and was interlaced with the improvement of

moral self-sufficiency and the Enlightenment evaluate of superstition and unreasonable power. Marx unequivocally formed this thought into the scrutinize of belief system and connected it with the act of social transformation, as in the well known eleventh of his "Proposals on Feuerbach," "Logicians have just deciphered the world in specific ways; the fact is to transform it".

In the 1960s, Jürgen Habermas raised the epistemological dialog to another level in his Knowledge and Human Interests, by recognizing basic learning as focused around standards that separated it either from the characteristic sciences or the humanities, through its introduction to reflection toward oneself and liberation.

The term basic hypothesis, in the sociological or philosophical and non-artistic sense, now approximately bunches various types of work, including that of the Frankfurt School, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, handicap studies and women's activist hypothesis, that has in like manner the study of command, an emancipatory interest, and the combination of social/social examination, clarification, and understanding with social/social investigate.

"Critical Theory." Wikipedia. Retrieved on June 11, 2009.

Alinsky adapted the Marxist methodology to clash as an arranging apparatus, however without utilizing the unequivocal Marxist methodology to class battle. This was fulfilled by solidifying backing in minority and low-salary groups by assaulting the nearby group force structure and making requests on them for things, for example, employments. Was this viewed as impudent, as well as typically done by expressly making it clear who the people in the nearby power structure were. Case in point, rather than simply picketing a critical nearby organization at its processing plant doors, Alinsky would sort out pickets at the manager's home, humiliating the individual in his own particular neighborhood. Strategies, for example, these were viewed as preposterous yet generally helped characterize a "we" (of the minority

and low-wage populace) versus a "they" (of the nearby power structure). Amid the social equality developments of the 1960s, Alinsky's methodology to getting sorted out was well known in Chicago; in Buffalo, Syracuse, and Rochester in New York State; in St. Louis, Missouri; and in different places in California....

The Alinsky methodology had its most sensational appearance when the coordinator Cesar Chavez (1927-1993) received it in arranging the United Farm Workers (UFW) union.

Friedland, William H. and Rotkin, Michael, "Community Organizing." *Encyclopedia of Community*. Thousand Oaks, California. Sage Publications. 2003

Tactics mean doing what you can with what you have.

Strategies are those cognizant purposeful acts by which individuals live with one another and manage their general surroundings. In the realm of give and take, strategies is the specialty of how to take and how to give. Here our worry is with the strategy of taking; how the Have-Nots can detract power from the Haves.

For a rudimentary outline of strategies, take parts of your face as the perspective; your eyes, your ears, and your nose. First and foremost the eyes; on the off chance that you have composed a boundless, mass-based individuals' association, you can parade it unmistakably before the foe and straightforwardly demonstrate your energy. Second the ears; if your association is little in numbers, then...conceal the parts oblivious however raise a clamor and racket that will make the audience accept that your association numbers a lot of people more than it does. Third, the nose; if your association is excessively modest actually for clamor, stink up the spot.

Never forget the first control of force strategies: Power is the thing that you have as well as what the adversary supposes you have.

Second: Never go outside the knowledge of your kin. At the point when an activity is outside the knowledge of the individuals, the result is perplexity, fear, and retreat.

Wherever possible go outside of the experience of the enemy. Here you want to cause confusion, fear, and retreat.

The fourth rule is: *Make the enemy live up to their own book of rules.* You can kill them with this, for they can no more obey their own rules than the Christian church can live up to Christianity.

The fourth rule carries within it the fifth rule: *Ridicule is man's most potent weapon.* It is almost impossible to counterattack ridicule. Also it infuriates the opposition, who then react to your advantage.

Sixth rule: *A good tactic is one that your people enjoy.* If your people are not having a ball doing it, there is something very wrong with the tactic.

A tactic that drags on too long becomes a drag. Man can sustain militant interest in any issue for only a limited time, after which it becomes a ritualistic commitment.

Keep the pressure on, with different tactics and actions, and utilize all events of the period for your purpose.

The threat is usually more terrifying than the thing itself.

The real commence for strategies is the improvement of operations that will keep up a consistent weight upon the restriction. On the off chance that you push a negative hard and profound enough it will get through into its counterside; this is focused around the guideline that each positive has its negative.

The cost of an effective assault is a useful option. you can't hazard being caught by the foe in his all of a sudden concurring with your interest and saying "You're correct – we don't recognize what to do about this issue. Presently you let us know"

Pick the target, freeze it, personalize it, and polarize it.

In clash strategies there are sure decides that the coordinator ought to dependably see as universalities. One is that the resistance must be singled out as the target and "solidified." By this I imply that in an intricate, interrelated, urban culture, it gets to be progressively hard to single out who is at fault for any specific abhorrence. There is a steady, and to a degree genuine, passing of the buck. The target is continually attempting to move obligation to escape from being the target.

One of the criteria in picking your target is the target's defenselessness where do you have the ability to begin? Moreover, the target can simply say, "Why do you focus on me when there are others to be faulted too?" When you "solidify the target," you dismiss these contentions and, for the minute, all others at fault.

At that point, as you zero in and solidify your target and do your assault, the greater part of the "others" leave the woodwork soon. They get to be obvious by their backing of the target.

The other critical point in the picking of a target is that it must be an exemplification, not something general and unique, for example, a group's isolated practices or a significant partnership or City Hall. It is unrealistic to create the essential threatening vibe against, say, City Hall, which after all is a solid, physical, lifeless structure, or against an enterprise, which has no spirit or personality, or a government funded school organization, which again is a soulless framework.

Contemporary usage of the term *Marxist sociology* varies considerably. In the United States, for example, the term Marxist is often used rather loosely, to designate virtually any type of radical or critical approach influenced by Marxian concepts

Neo-Marxian Economic Sociology

Noting that the period in which Marx figured his investigate of a free market system was a particular period in the advancement of

private enterprise, various scholars have endeavored to create work that all the more precisely depicts the workings of the entrepreneur framework as it exists today. This can be seen as an issue far from concentrating on the period of aggressive free enterprise and towards taking a gander at what has been called syndication free enterprise. Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy are the significant benefactors to this line of work, especially in their book *Monopoly Capitalism*. Restraining infrastructure free enterprise includes a change in the routes in which organizations work. Under imposing business model private enterprise, firms contend on the premise of publicizing and advertising instead of cost. Further, markets are ruled by a little number of extensive firms. Ultimately, there are numerous holders, as stockholders, and administrators assume a much bigger part in the operation of the industrialist firms.

Comparative work has been carried out by Harry Braverman. Braverman took a tiny view and took a gander at changes in the work process. He underscored that the control of specialists obliged errand specialization, the partition of learning and execution, and exploratory administration strategies. The general impact of these techniques is to build gainfulness while diminishing the expense of work. Hardware additionally assumes a part in this methodology. Braverman was one of the first neo-Marxists to manage cushy administrative specialists, as he attempted to demonstrate that they confronted a set of methodologies of control very much alike to that confronted by unskilled workers.

One paramount line of exploration encompasses the move from Fordism to post-Fordism. Fordism is described by the mechanical production system and large scale manufacturing methods, though post-Fordism includes little, adaptable creation runs and high engineering. The vitality of the Fordism/post-Fordism civil argument is identified with the contention of whether our current society is cutting edge or postmodern. While some have contended that post-Fordism is a change over Fordism, this neglects the way that both exist at the same

time over the world and that observational studies have indicated expanded anxiety levels for those working in post-Fordist situations.

One path in which it varies from Marxism is that it accepts the naming hypothesis proposed by interactionists has some truth in it. Neo-Marxists say that the decision class name certain parts of the working people with a specific end goal to increase advantages themselves, this is known as a "completely social hypothesis of abnormality". The work of neo-Marxists in the region of naming was encapsulated by Stuart Hall's 'Policing the emergency's whereby he took a gander at good frenzy over "mugging" in the 1970's in Britain. Amid the 1970's few daily papers more than once reported occurrences of mugging; Hall said this ethical frenzy was based upon the thought of aggregate trepidation of 'a foe inside'. He said this was on the grounds that in the 1970's Britain accomplished a monetary decrease – an 'emergency of private enterprise' and the administration required somebody for everybody at fault and rally against, uniting the individuals and permitting us to disregard the financial issues. By making the Black mugger somebody to fear, it cemented a cracked UK society around the state. Neo-Marxists say that this is only one of numerous cases of how social foundation (in this example you're ethnicity and class) can bring about you being freak, however it is simply because of the naming from the decision class that you turn into deviant

So neo-Marxists say the ruling-class used labelling of certain people to sustain their control over the working class; in this case it was used to solve a "crisis of capitalism"

Karl Marx (b. 1818–d. 1883) and his deep rooted partner Friedrich Engels (b. 1820–d. 1895) created a group of imagined that would rouse real social developments, launch progressive social change over the globe, and give the establishment to numerous communist or socialist governments. All the more as of late, Marxism's political impact has disappeared, with the greater part of the earlier comrade administrations experiencing noteworthy change. It is vital, in any case,

to particular out Marxism as an issue of thoughts in the social sciences from Marxism as an issue belief system and the establishment for progressive social developments and as an issue theory. Marxist thoughts have affected numerous fields of thought and in fact have assumed an especially imperative part in the advancement of the order of human science. Traditional sociological scholars, for example, Émile Durkheim (b. 1858–d. 1917) and Max Weber (b. 1864–d. 1920), for instance, created their speculations of society in discussion with the works of Karl Marx. On the other hand, as it developed in the United States and western Europe in the center parts of the twentieth century, humanism's dialog with Marxian suggestions

For example, the widely influential norm-oriented functionalist sociology of Talcott Parsons (b. 1902–d. 1979) had little engagement with Marxist thought. In the aftermath of the large-scale social struggles of the 1960s and 1970s, however, sociologists around the world increasingly embraced a historically oriented approach to knowledge and in many cases found in the classics of Marxism a source of inspiration. Debates and controversies over Marxism continue to shape the development of sociology up to the present time, although “neo-Marxism” is less influential today than it was twenty-five years ago. Nonetheless, serious students of sociology have to have some familiarity with some of the classical ideas and theorists of Marxism, and Marxist theories continue to influence some parts of the discipline today.

General Overviews

It is barely astounding, provided for its authentic hugeness, that many general diagrams of Marxism have been composed. As an issue of thought and a political development, Marxism can be integrated from numerous perspectives. McLellan 1974 offers a perfect presentation through an examination of the life and thoughts of Marx himself. Draper 1977 and Draper 1978 concentrate all the more unequivocally on the

relationship in the middle of Marxism and legislative issues. On account of Marxist sociology, bottomore 1984 gives an authentic investigation of the relationship in the middle of Marxism and sociology. lefebvre 1968's commitment gives a more developed presentation. Mandel 1970 is a decent place to begin for understudies keen on Marxist financial hypothesis (which is formed by sociological bits of knowledge much more than its neoclassical rivals). Foley 1986 creates more formalized models for comprehension the essential commitments of Marx's political economy. At last, Ollman 1976 offers a superb review of Marx's philosophical idea of distance.

Neo-Marxism is basically Marxism but without the class determinism. They look at much more reasons for why there could be inequality in society like (Weber) power and status or classless societies and how inequality has changed over history. It aims to explain or critique Marx' ideas in the face of a changing society.

The two things most connected with NM hypothesis is the Frankfurt School (and scholars, for example, Horkheimer and Adorno, Marcuse and Habermas). Additionally something to take a gander at is Critical Theory which is a kind of Neo-Marxist hypothesis. (N.b. Discriminating Theory is not a strict sociological hypothesis, (for example, Functionalism or Marxism) however is somewhat an approach to "do" social science). It kind of takes a gander at Marxist Theory through different hypotheses not regularly connected with Marxism to clarify the reactions Marxism has gotten, which is something that Marx himself never truly did.

Neo-Marxism was a twentieth century school that harkened again to the early compositions of Marx before the impact of Engels which concentrated on argumentative vision instead of rationalistic realism, and along these lines dismisses the apparent monetary determinism of the late Marx, concentrating rather on a non-physical, mental transformation. It was so far more libertarian and identified with strains of disorder. It likewise put a greater amount of an accentuation

on the indecencies of worldwide free enterprise. Numerous unmistakable Neo-Marxists, for example, Marcuse were sociologists and analysts. It was bound up with the understudy developments of the 1960s. Neo-Marxism goes under the more extensive heading of New Left considering. Neo-Marxism is additionally utilized as often as possible to portray the resistance to disparities accomplished by Lesser Developed Countries in the New Economic International Order. In a sociological sense, neo-Marxism includes Max Weber's more extensive understanding of social disparity, for example, status and force, to Marxist rationality.

Marxism: Some General Points of Criticism...

1. The "over-concentration" on economic relationships (considered by Marxists to be the most important basic relationships in society) has lead to a number of criticisms:

a. Marxism is accused of being "economically determinist". That is, the idea that Marxists over-exaggerate the importance of economic relationships; relationships that are seen to determine the shape taken by all other relationships (family, education, friendship, religious and so forth).

b. By concentrating upon economic relationships and conflicts Marxists tend to either overlook other forms of (non-economic) conflict or attempt to explain these conflicts as ultimately having economic roots. Radical feminists, for example, argue that the roots of male - female conflict are not simply economic (to do with social class) but patriarchal.

1. The subjective interpretations of individuals is under-emphasised when looking at the way in which people see and act in the social world. A person's subjective interpretation of their class, for example, might be quite different to their objective class position.
2. Capitalism, as an economic and political system, has proven to be more durable and flexible than Marx maintained. In modern

social systems, for example, the advent of Communism does not appear imminent.

3. Many forms of Neo-Marxism have been criticised (usually by other Marxists) as being little more than a "left-wing" variety of Functionalism ("Left Functionalism" as Jock Young has termed it). In place of society existing for "the benefit of all", Young argues that many Marxists simply substitute the idea that society exists for "benefit of a ruling class").
4. Some forms of Neo-Marxism resemble little more than a giant "conspiracy theory", whereby a Capitalist Ruling Class are able to manipulate other classes in society for their own ends / benefits.
5. Critics like Sir Karl Popper have claimed that Marxism is unscientific in its methodology. In particular, he argues that Marxism is not a theory that can be tested and possibly falsified, mainly because it sees the replacement of Capitalism by Communism as "historically inevitable". In this respect, Popper classifies Marxism as a "faith".
6. The Marxist perspective lends itself to always examining social relationships in terms of their conflictual basis (just as the Functionalist perspective tends to look at those same relationships in terms of their consensual basis). This emphasis might be misplaced.
7. Much Marxism - both old and modern - has tended to ignore the role and position of women in society. Women tend to be marginalized to the periphery of much Marxist theorising, possibly because of the focus upon work relationships. This criticism is probably not as valid now as it once was.

Neo-Marxist view of media owners

Neo-Marxists' create the customary Marxist perspective of media possession by belligerence media holders don't have regulate

however backhanded control of impact on media content. This backhanded impact is more unpretentious as any decision class philosophy is imparted by the columnists and media directors – this methodology fits well with Lukes third face of force. By officially imparting decision class ideological qualities, neo-Marxists contend the media has the capacity make an overwhelming philosophy (dominion) over issues. A few sociologists have explored how this media force aides make an ethical frenzy over chose issues by launching a deviancy intensification windin.

Neo-Marxists identify several key features:

- owners don't get actively involved in controlling content on a day-to-day basis. Instead control and content is left in the hands of journalists and managers
- as managers and journalists want to protect their jobs they seek to attract advertisers and audiences by publishing suitable content. Sometimes audiences are attracted by media criticism of ruling-class, but such criticism is never threatening or damaging
- journalists and managers don't tend to criticise dominant ideology because of their background. Journalists tend to be white, well-educated, middle-class and male therefore they've already been socialised to accept and value the ruling-class ideology, thus their media messages tend to support the established social consensus.
- this common-sense consensus is promoted within the range of view and opinions transmitted in media products
- the cultural effects model best explains this effect on audiences

Neo-Marxism is a wide-ranging term referring to the critical renaissance of Marxist theory in the post-war period, most often used to denote work in radical political economy which tried to combine the revolutionary aspirations and orienting concepts of Marxism with some

of the tools provided by non-Marxist economics, especially the work of Keynes. Though the label “neo-Marxist” is sometimes applied to figures (e.g., the members of the Frankfurt School) who combined a fidelity to Marx's critical and political aims with a sense of the limitations of Marxism in the face of phenomena like fascism or mass culture, it seems to have been first introduced to describe thinkers – such as Joan Robinson, Paul A. Baran, and Paul M. Sweezy – who sought to renew the critique of political economy in a situation marked by the rise of global corporations, anti-colonial struggles for national liberation, and the politics of American imperialism. Whereas, following the distinction proposed by Perry Anderson, the post-World War I Marxist concern with the cultural sphere and political subjectivity can be put under the aegis of “western Marxism” (as opposed to “classical Marxism”), neo-Marxism is a useful designation for the attempt, during and after World War II, to reflect on the pertinence of Marxist categories for an understanding of the changed conditions of capital accumulation and the political .

Neo-Functionalism And Neo-Marxism J Alexanders

Jeffrey Charles Alexander (born May 30, 1947) is an American sociologist, one of the main proponents of Neofunctionalism, and a central figure in contemporary Cultural Sociology. In sociology, neofunctionalism represents a revival of the thought of Talcott Parsons by Jeffrey C. Alexander, who sees neofunctionalism as having 5 central tendencies:

- to create a form of functionalism that is multidimensional and includes micro as well as macro levels of analysis
- to push functionalism to the left and reject Parsons's optimism about modernity
- to argue for an implicit democratic thrust in functional analysis
- to incorporate a conflict orientation, and
- to emphasize uncertainty and interactional creativity.

While Parsons consistently viewed actors as analytical concepts, Alexander defines action as the movement of concrete, living, breathing persons as they make their way through time and space. In addition he argues that every action contains a dimension of free will, by which he is expanding functionalism to include some of the concerns of symbolic interactionism.^[5]

The Cultural turn and the strong program

Beginning in the late 1980s, Alexander's work turned to social human science. Key to this social turn was a shift in stress from an engagement with Parsonian structural functionalism to a rehashing of Emile Durkheim's later works, which emphasized a solid enthusiasm toward social frameworks. Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* was key to Alexander's thought, as in this work Durkheim dissects the routes by which aggregate representations develop and capacity, and additionally the part of ceremonies in keeping up solidarity and repeating society's standards and qualities to the assembly. Alexander gets particularly on Durkheim's recommendation that the religious methods saw in tribal social orders are as apropos in cutting edge social orders. Despite whether advanced social orders trust themselves to be normal and common, their common life and procedures, claims Alexander, are underpinned by aggregate representations, by compelling enthusiastic ties and by different accounts that much like tribal social orders tell society what it trusts it is and what values it holds sacrosanct.

Alexander recognizes the humanism of society and social human science. The humanism of society sees society as a ward variable that seems to be, a result of additional social components, for example, the economy or investment laden legislative issues though social human science sees society as having more self-governance and gives more weight to inward implications. As it were, in Alexander's origination of social humanism expect that thoughts and typical courses of action may

have a free impact on social establishments, on governmental issues, and on society itself. Alexander firmly recognizes this sociological point of view from the then-prevailing Bourdieusian sociological structure, which has a tendency to see social methodologies as implanted in force battles, and at last in material disparity.

Cultural trauma

Two of his prior articles can be seen as forerunners to his more straightforward engagement with the theme of injury. In one, he exhibits that the Holocaust was not quickly seen as all around implying all inclusive insidious for Western social orders. Instead of that, it was built accordingly by method for a long procedure of portrayal and signification. In the second, he demonstrates that the Watergate Crisis was initially not seen by American culture as a great deal more than a minor episode. Here, as well, the occurrence must be socially described and built as trading off the center estimations of American culture, turning what was first thought to be an ordinary blunder into an undeniable outrage. A key case of both studies is that even occasions that are as of now considered profoundly traumatic for common society are not inalienably wrecking however are somewhat built accordingly through social techniques.

All the more for the most part, Alexander separates "social injury" from what he calls "lay injury" in social thought. "Lay injury" alludes to the thought that certain occasions are characteristically traumatic to the people, who experience them for instance, the thought of injury in brain research. On the other hand, "social injury" approach can't expect that any occasion as terrible as it might be will transform into an injury for the aggregate who experiences it. As Alexander clarifies, "cultural injury happens when parts of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to an awful occasion that leaves permanent imprints upon their gathering awareness, denoting their memories

always and changing their future character in basic and unalterable ways".

Social performance

In the mid-2000's Alexander turned consideration around the ways performing artists make social or social exhibitions, which are "the social processes by which on-screen characters, exclusively or in show, show for others the importance of their social circumstance". Performers, claims Alexander, think profoundly about having others accept the implications they endeavor to pass on, and to this end they look to make an execution as real looking as could be allowed. To do along these lines, they take part in what Alexander calls "social pragmatics" and draw upon the different components of social execution: the frameworks of aggregate representation, method for typical creation, mise-en-scène game plans (much like a theater generation would).

Alexander guarantees that in tribal social orders the different components of social execution were hard melded, and were utilized in aggregate ceremonies in which the whole tribe shared and its parts accomplished direct. In present day social orders, these different components got to be de-combined (according to Weber's circle separation) and thus on-screen characters who wish to seem bona fide must draw upon different collections. "Combination", in Alexander's terms, is the minute in an execution when the different components click together, create a powerful execution, and eventually move the gathering of people to mental ID with the on-screen characters. A fizzled execution will be one that the crowd will see as inauthentic, and won't create the feeling of recognizable proof the performers wanted.

Iconic consciousness

In recent years, Alexander has turned attention towards the material aspects of culture, extending his specific strand of cultural

sociology towards aesthetics and particularly icons. As he defines it, iconic consciousness occurs “when an aesthetically shaped materiality signifies social value. Contact with this aesthetic surface, whether by sight, smell, taste, touch provides a sensual experience that transmits meaning...”. In contradistinction with various sociologies of culture that have tended to see the visual or the material as a form of falsity or degradation, Alexander draws on the Durkheimian notion of the symbolic collective representation to argue that the ways in which culture operates both in instilling and in recreating values is intrinsically tied to symbolic material forms.

Studies following Alexander’s approach have looked, for example, into the ways in which architecture is embedded in a deep meaning structure and have deep emotional resonance with the society that frequents them.^[16] Others have extended the idea of iconic consciousness into the realm of celebrities, and have explored the ways in which celebrities on one hand present an appealing aesthetic “surface” and on the other hand condense and convey a locus of “deep” meanings that resonate with the audience.

Performative revolutions

Following the Egyptian Revolution, Alexander conducted a study of the revolutionary months from a cultural sociological point of view, applying some of his previous theories in order to understand the ways in which the various protests voiced by demonstrators, journalists, bloggers, and public actors ultimately persuaded the Egyptian army to turn against the regime. The key to understanding the revolution, claims Alexander, is in the binary structure these various actors applied to the Mubarak regime, persuasively depicting it as corrupt and outdated and thereby convincing the wider public that it was a menace to Egyptian society.

Neo-functionalism is the perspective that all integration is the result of past integration. The term may also be used to literally describe a social theory that is 'post' traditional structural functionalism. Whereas theorists such as Jeffrey C. Alexander openly appropriated the term, others, such as the post-structuralist philosopher Michel Foucault, have been categorized as contemporary functionalists by their critics.

Althusser is commonly referred to as a structural Marxist, although his relationship to other schools of French structuralism is not a simple affiliation and he was critical of many aspects of structuralism. The Neo-Marxist Althusser sees education as part of the "ideological state apparatus". In other words, it's a tool of capitalism which is used to pass on the belief that society is fair. Althusser thinks education produces a docile and obedient workforce.

Simon Clarke

Introductory note

This paper has a long history. The first draft was composed in 1970 on the premise of an endeavor to relate Reading Capital to a perusing of Capital. This was an assignment that I started with a certain restricted sensitivity for Althusser's translation, in any event to the degree of concurring that Capital is Marx's focal work and of concurring that Capital is not just a work of trading and lending. Nonetheless it was an assignment that finished altogether dissatisfaction as an issue of a disappointment to discover any considerable association between Reading Capital (except for Rancière's commitment that was stifled in the second version and in the English interpretation) and Capital. Reaching such a negative determination, and gullibly envisioning that others would achieve the same conclusion, I put the draft in my base drawer.

As the years passed by it got to be clear that Althusserianism was not the passing favor of a couple of cutting edge scholarly people, yet that it was quickly turning into a significant erudite present, without

a doubt the overwhelming manifestation of marxism among the era of understudies and scholastics who experienced marxism after 1968. After a few years of proceeding with affectionately to envision that it would go away's without compulsion, I sat down in 1976 to take up my evaluate once more. The paper that takes after is the result.

It worked out that it was not a terrible time to take a seat to a study of Althusserian marxism. In 1976 Althusserianism appeared to be grinding away's most noteworthy point. Indeed marxists from non-Althusserian foundations were abandoning, either upholding Althusserianism or, implicitly or expressly, relinquishing trust for marxism. Be that as it may, the oppression of Althusserianism, communicated in its endeavor to broadcast itself the main genuine confidence, had additionally arrived at such a pitch, to the point that expanding quantities of marxists who had cheerfully disregarded Althusserianism started to scrutinize the Althusserian claims, bashfully right away, yet with becoming fearlessness in the course of the most recent three years. This counter-current was given included quality by the fracture of the Althusserian camp into conventional Althusserians, the adherents of Lacan, of Foucault, or of different brands of Hindess and Hirst. The case to speak to the main genuine confidence was debilitated, as dependably, by the dissident propensities that offered a quick multiplication of just genuine religions, satirized in its most great structure by Hindess and Hirst, whose numerous distributors couldn't stay aware of the progression of doctrinal inversions which they dispensed on their undeniably bemused group.

The introductory gathering of this paper was blended. I was extremely grati-field by the excitedly positive reaction of those friends with whom I was working and the individuals who imparted my dismissal of Althusserianism, yet from the start these were few and far between. The most widely recognized reaction was one of astound that anybody ought to reject the Althusserian venture in all, as I was doing. This appeared to reflect the adequacy with which Althusserianism has

secured its claim to speak to the main genuine, exploratory, against economist marxism, and to transfer all different understandings of Marx to the dustbin of history. Numerous who did not take after Althusser, or had minimal enthusiasm toward doctrinal inquiries, still felt that Althusser was asking the right inquiries, regardless of the fact that his answers were deficient or inadequate. Numerous disdained Althusser's own particular legislative issues, or particular Althusserian cases, while as of now distinguishing the Althusserian venture with that of Marx. The reaction from Althusserians was one of shock, and newcomers to the verbal confrontation ought to be cautioned that my translation of Althusser is in no way, shape or form uncontentious. The paper was portrayed in the accompanying terms by unacknowledged perusers: "practically totally insufficient ... drearily expressed ... garbled... a bare arrangement of declarations ... unrefined mutilations ... deceptions ... abnormal misreading ... a type of scholarly untrustworthiness ... terrible". A somewhat less thoughtful Althusserian peruser thought of it as "the most noticeably awful article I have ever perused on Althusser ... the most noticeably awful sort of narrow minded, poorly educated questioning ... completely horrifying ... a sloganising and opinionated way ... a nonappearance of investigation . . .an arrangement of completely unconfirmed assaults ... the article is useless ... downright shameful ... rubbish ... the most philistine and rationally innocent epistemology . . . completely amazing . . ." Since 1976 the paper has coursed generally in copied structure, and has inspired progressively ideal reactions that appear to demonstrate that the positions of the deceptive sloganising philistines are becoming quick, and that more individuals are readied to reevaluate Althusserianism not in minor subtle elements however in its establishments. Nonetheless, regardless of this groundswell it remains the case that it is Althusserianism that commands the distributors' rundowns, and Althusserians who rule among publication counsels to those distributors readied to consider marxist meets expectations. In the most recent three years there have

been impressive improvements inside Althusserianism, prompting a multiplication of little factions. Albeit some of these groups dismiss the divine nature of Althusser, I keep on considering them Althusserian in light of the fact that their sins emerge out of the inward advancement of the confidence. Consequently the two-volume frolic by A. Cutler, B. Hindess, P. Hirst and A. Hussain, Marx's "Capital" and Capitalism Today, counterposes the most recent apostasy to something distinguished as "marxist conventionality" which is nothing other than the Althusserian confidence to which the creators initially followed. My paper was composed before the rise of the later Althusserian sins, thus considered just the prior work of Hindess and Hirst, Precapitalist Modes of Production, and that just in footnoted asides. In remarking on that work I must now concede that I periodically exaggerated it and credited to Hindess and Hirst positions that they were not to embrace unequivocally until their criticism toward oneself. At the time this was a polemical gadget, drawing out the ramifications of their contention to demonstrate the absurdities they were headed into. The power of this gadget was debilitated when, surprisingly, Hindess and Hirst emulated the rationale of their contentions through to such absurdities. In any case, this paper is not concerned with the better purposes of Althusserian teaching, nor is it concerned to give a complete record of Althusser's political and hypothetical improvement. It is concerned with the foundations of Althusserianism laid out in his most influential works, Reading Capital and For Marx. For this reason, and because the paper has already been quite widely quoted, I have not made major changes in it for publication here. Finally, a few words need to be said about the form of this paper. It is an elucidation of Althusser that, at the time it was composed, was over the top. It would be conceivable to help the between pretation by broad citation from Althusser's works, yet far reaching citation could just as well be utilized to invalidate this elucidation. Hence the type of the paper is that of a text based discourse on Althusser's significant works, and I have made next to no

utilization of immediate citation. This implies that the peruser ought to effortlessly have the capacity to assess my translation for him or herself by turning to the first messages that I examine. It is essential to make this point so as to counter the charges of contortion or of distortion. I don't envision that my perusers are unequipped for perusing Althusser for themselves and making up their own particular personalities, and I trust that the type of presentation that I have received will make this as simple as could be expected under the circumstances for them. No paper of this length can offer a thorough record of Althusserianism, nor an exhaustive record of option elucidations of Marx. In this paper I focus on offering a discriminating elucidation of Althusser's two essential and most compelling writings. In far reaching references, in any case, I likewise offer a more crude editorial that touches on later advancements in the work of Althusser and of his devotees, and on more extensive philosophical and hypothetical inclinations to which Althusserian-ism is connected. The individuals who are keen on the focal translation and study of Althusser can read the content without getting stalled in the more elusive focuses illustrated in the references. The individuals who are keen on attempting to arrange Althusser's work in a more extensive viewpoint, or in relating the work of later Althusserians to the authoritative writings, may discover a percentage of the commentary editorial suggestive or provocative, regardless of the fact that it doesn't give thorough investigation. The point of the references is to show the courses in which my understanding of Althusser's focal writings can likewise enlighten alternate parts of Althusserianism not touched on here.

In this paper I focus on Althusser's translation of Marx's hypothesis of society, and especially the Althusserian thought of the mode of generation. I commit generally little consideration regarding Althusser's methodological discourses, or to his hypothesis of philosophy, both of which have been persuasive. Althusser's strategy, conflicting as it may be, appears to me to be very predictable, offering

commonplace renditions of a scope of the more recondite variants of neo-positivism whose fundamental position of a detachment of thought and reality ("hypothesis" and "perception") heads in both cases to phonetic vision of one structure or an alternate. This systemology has been widely talked about somewhere else. In this connection would like especially to prescribe Edward Thompson's vivacious protection of the observational phrase in *The Poverty of Theory*. The imperativeness of this work is that it addresses the methodological issues defied by the act of chronicled realism along these lines fulfills the Althusserian assertion that theory can't enact for "science", however that every "science" needs to characterize its routines, a request efficiently overlooked in the ruminations of the Althusserian epistemological edits. I offer just concise commentary remarks on the hypothesis of philosophy, however I trust that this hole is abundantly made up for by the papers by Terry Lovell and by Kevin Robins and Kevin McDonnell in this volume. At last, I have composed somewhere else on the improvement of the Althusserian show by Poulantzas and by the "foul Poulantzians", and on the establishments of structuralism in the work of Levi-Strauss.

Subsequently this paper is limited in its extension and ought to be perused not in disconnection, however as an issue of a becoming development of intelligent and political imperviousness to Althusserianism that can't be garrulously rejected as the moralistic droolings of shocked average humanists to which the Althusserians (like their political coaches) would decrease all restriction.

The translation of Marx that I offer contrary to the Althusserians is portrayed as extensively as could be allowed with the expectation that I can abstain from counterposing one inflexible universality to an alternate. Marxism has been tormented subsequent to its commencement by the way that the authority of marxist political developments has not believed its adherents to peruse Marx for themselves, yet has demanded offering predigested variants of Marx. I would prefer not to offer such a substitute in this paper. Along these

lines the paper is on occasion exceptionally thick, on the grounds that it is attempting to arrangement compactly with real inquiries, and now and again suggestive, on the grounds that it is attempting to open up dialog of Marx's work and not to force another conclusion. In the event that now and again the tone of the paper is self-assured and unyielding this is on account of there are a few focuses on which I think it is vital to make a stand, regardless of the possibility that they can't be explained in a concise space. Notwithstanding, I have no power for my perspectives past the messages that Marx has abandoned and the mass of clashing understandings that have been a piece of the living reality of the common laborers development. In this manner I am more than upbeat for the peruser to deviate, and if my tone invigorates contradiction and actuates the peruser to make up his or her psyche, then my point would have been accomplished. This paper is a questioning and not an encyclical, the point of which is to ask individuals not to take Althusserianism at face quality; to approach them to peruse Marx before For Marx, Capital before Reading Capital, and to peruse it not as the fossil type of the Logos yet as the result of a lifetime's contribution in political and ideological battle in which Marx tried to produce a weapon for the working class in the fight for communism, a communism which for Marx could just have a human face.

The argument

The improvement of industrialist emergency and of working people militancy in the mid-1960s made the connection in which left erudite people in Britain, as somewhere else, created an enthusiasm toward the Marx of the common laborers development, dismissing from the different endeavors to decipher Marx as far as a logic of the subject. This was the setting in which Althusser supplanted Sartre and Lukács as the "network" through which Marx was perused. At the time it appeared that Althusserianism was just a passing stage, a stop on the

best approach to Marx himself. However the Althusserian eagerness had endured sufficiently long to leave an era who had come to peruse Marx through Althusser, to substitute For Marx for Marx, Reading Capital for perusing Capital. The legacy of this stage is not an Althusserian development, as satirized quickly by Theoretical Practice, which fail to offer any political base. The legacy is found in another universality in the elucidation of Marx, exemplified in an arrangement of ideas and suspicions whose Althusserian birthplaces have been generally destroyed. This is the new setting in which it appears to me that a restored evaluate of Althusserianism is vital, an investigate which concentrates on the point which prior studies deliberately and particularly precluded, the inquiry of the amplex of Althusser's translation of Marx

Keeping in mind the end goal to compose such an investigate it is important to discover a few premise on which the scrutinize may be intelligibly exhibited. The most noteworthy endeavor to force an absolutely hypothetical reasonability on Althusser's work is that of Glucksmann, who sees Althusserianism as an issue of average magical logic.

One could construct equally convincing accounts of Althusserianism as a variant of the Lacanian interpretation of Freud, in which the economic plays the role of Freudian unconscious, the political the role of the conscious, and the theorist that of the analyst.

One could add other structuralist influences to the Lacanian inspiration and see Althusserianism as an "overdetermined" system: the philosophy of the concept derived from Cavaillès, the Lévi-Straussian conception of society as an "order of orders".

One could follow Poulantzas in seeing Althusserianism alternatively as an attempt to transcend the opposition between structure and history represented by the opposition between Sartre and Lévi-Strauss, attempting to historise Lévi-Strauss's structures by structuring Sartre's practice. All these constructions could be

convincing, but all have to impose a coherence on Althusser, and none give him a marxist pedigree. Examination of theoretical antecedents can reveal a host of contradictory influences on Althusser's work, but cannot reveal its specific foundations. However much Althusser may borrow from bourgeois theorists, his starting point is marxist, and, specifically, the marxism of the orthodox communist movement. There is no doubt that Althusser's work begins as a reconsideration of Stalinist "dogmatism" in the light of developments subsequent to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, and represents an attempt to develop a critique of the "economism" of that dogmatism that does not fall into the twin "deviations" of "humanism" and "historicism".

These have generally been the terms which have been connected to the restriction to stubbornness from the right and from the left, manifestations of resistance that re-rose in the socialist development in the wake of destalinisation. Consequently Althusser looks for basically to sustain socialist universality, yet to set that conventionality on another establishment, and this clarifies his preparation to draw on sources which have until now been unconventional for a comrade. His whole work is portrayed by the pressure between the standard and the irregular, the two being united around the assumed center of Althusser's work, the reinterpretation of marxist hypothesis. This reinterpretation includes the summon of a true, however heretofore obscure, Marx, who must be recouped from the marxist messages through the matrix of a "perusing", which has truth be told included the deserting of the majority of Marx's act as non-marxist, and the substitution of the greater part of Marx's own ideas by others presented by Althusser. In this paper I need to make that the translation of Marx proposed by Althusser in no sense speaks to a restoration of marxism. Rather I need to demonstrate that Althusser's endeavor to refound an unsettled conventionality heads him inflexibly to the appropriation of hypothetical and philosophical positions which can be thoroughly portrayed as "common".

Consequently Althusserianism offers commonplace, if rather exclusive, middle class belief systems wrapped, regularly unreliably, in marxist talk, which serves to give both common philosophies and Stalinist legislative issues a legitimately marxist appearance. It is this guile which makes Althusserianism so risky, for it impels numerous earnest marxists to enter a maze in which expanding dissatisfaction can lead them to relinquish marxism itself. In the first segment I might attempt to demonstrate hypothetically the course which headed Althusser from an endeavor to discover another establishment for the power of the savvy inside the gathering, and of the gathering inside the working people, to the reception of a common hypothesis of society and related average reasoning. I might then attempt to create the common establishments of Althusser's work by looking at his and Balibar's primary commitments. Althusserianism, Stalinism and average human science

The connection of Althusser's undertaking is the time of destalinisation after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. For Althusser, as an issue, destalinisation implied the end of Zhdanovism, of subordination of theory to the gathering, along these lines the likelihood both of recuperating the expert admiration of partners and of interceding in political action on an autonomous premise, as an educated person. The undertaking which the Althusserians set themselves was the political rebuilding of the French Communist Party (PCF) through the reclamation of the prospect of Marx, looking for in the progressive knowledge of the Soviet Union in 1917, and of China in 1937, the lessons which, interceded by hypothesis, could underpin a judicious governmental issues in France in the 1960s. This venture rested on a conviction, additionally communicated in the prologue to *For Marx*, that the political blunders of the PCF were to be clarified by its absence of hypothesis, an absence of hypothesis which made the Party exceptionally defenseless against hypothetical and useful "advantage" in the occasion of its deserting of Stalinist obstinacy.

This project apparently begins, therefore, with an innocent return to the texts of Marx. The innocence of this return is, however, only superficial. Althusser does not approach the works of Marx, Lenin or Mao as a disinterested student of the texts. These works provide only an authority to which he, as an intellectual, can refer to support an ambition which is already inscribed in his political project. The starting point of Althusser's project is the critique of the crude economism and evolutionism of Stalinist dogmatism, while avoiding those interpretations dubbed "humanist", which Althusser sees as being simply the other face of economic interpretations, the two united in their "historicist" understanding of the marxist dialectic. Althusser's initial project is therefore to purge marxism of all traces of "historicism". Rancière argues very convincingly that whatever original political ambition the critique of Stalinist dogmatism may have had, the project soon became its own justification. Since Althusser was committed to the transformation of the PCF from within, it was necessary for him to find an authority for his theory higher than that of the party, which had hitherto ruled in such matters. His work, therefore, soon comes to be dominated by the need to find in Marx the justification not directly for his politics, but for his project of intellectual subversion. The basis of his "anti-historicism" is therefore the need to establish the autonomy of theory and the authority of the theorist. This underpins the early insistence on the separation of marxist philosophy from historical materialism, the defence of the autonomy of "theoretical practice", the insistence on the priority of dialectical over historical materialism and so of philosophy over politics, as well as the later transformation of the definition of philosophy which altered these relationships, but left the position of theory and the theorist unchanged.

Rancière argues that Althusser's project soon finds itself in a hopelessly contradictory position. In order to subvert the PCF from within on the basis of the authority of theory and in the absence of a significant political base, it is necessary to have the confidence of the

leadership of the party. Until theory has achieved the transformation of the party, it is necessary to subordinate oneself to the leadership of the party in order to be able to continue the process of theoretical subversion. The long-term strategy of theoretical subversion of the dogmatism which continued to dominate the PCF demanded a short-term tactic of accommodation to, if not defence of, the theses of the leadership of the PCF. It is this contradiction which, as Rancière shows, illuminates another series of fundamental Althusserian distinctions: the separation of ideology, within which politics is fought out, from science, of an empirical from a theoretical rhetoric.

These distinctions make it possible for Althusser to dissociate his theoretically subversive formulations from their apparent political implications, a technique which is apparent in his essay "Marxism and Humanism", in *For Marx*, and which was used to counter the accusation of Maoist tendencies on the appearance of the essay "On the Materialist Dialectic".

Rancière outlines the dynamic reversal of strategic and key contemplations in Althusser's work from 1963 onwards. It was in 1963 that Althusser made his just run political mediation, dispassionately for the benefit of the administration of the PCF, assaulting the beginning understudy development for its test to the honesty of science. This assault had genuine results for the resulting improvement of the understudy development in its making of a "dictator left" current which remained over the rebellion of the understudies and youthful laborers. From this time the assault on "economism" was hidden, all Althusser's polemics being gone for "humanism" and "historicism", hypothetical inclinations which the cognoscenti knew to be correlative to "economism", yet which likewise happened to speak to the inward resistance to the PCF initiative from the right and from the left." The subversive components of Althusserianism got to be progressively obscure, while the assaults on "humanism" and "historicism" reinforced the authority they should undermine, giving a method for restoring the

power of that administration among the educated people by assaulting its political adversaries for the sake of the writings of Marx and Lenin and not specifically of the power of the gathering. The crunch came in 1965, with the distribution of *Reading Capital*. This work went under sharp assault from the PCF administration not for the assault on "historicism", which was the elusive radical component in the work (however which, as we might see, can just as have reactionary ramifications), yet for the self-rule which was credited to hypothesis, correctly Althusser's barrier against the subordination of his erudite venture to the directs of the political authority of the gathering. The last was concerned on the grounds that the left administration of the Communist understudies' association, the UEC, was utilizing comparable contentions to guard its entitlement to political self-governance. It couldn't in this manner endure a contending power in the understanding of Marx, regardless of the fact that that power was Marx himself. In light of simply feedback, Althusser reissued *Reading Capital* with the exclusion of the more outrageous writings, and made his input toward oneself in *Lenin and Philosophy*

I don't plot this shameful history as the premise of a name-calling investigate, but since it is important to an understanding of the causes of Althusserianism. At the point when Althusser attempted the errand of recovery in the early 1960s, to counterpose Marx to the gathering as a power was an extremely radical move. Althusser just about promptly felt obligated from inside the gathering, the consequence of which was that Althusser's undertaking came to be concentrated altogether on creating it probability by building the self-sufficiency of hypothesis. With Althusser's input toward oneself the self-sufficiency of hypothesis in connection to the gathering, and with it the endeavor to advance an unique understanding of Marx, was adequately deserted. His genuine work is accordingly to a great extent kept to his time of freedom from 1960 to 1965. In this period the endeavor to create the self-governance of hypothesis through the reinterpretation

of Marx prompted the burden of a specific origination of society on Marx's work. Henceforth the specific, and rather parochial, aspiration of Althusser's reinterpretation procured a much more extensive criticalness. The awfulness of Althusserianism is that the origination of society being referred to is that which overwhelms both Stalinist opinion and average social science.

Rancière centers his evaluate on the partiality between Althusser's origination of the connection in the middle of hypothesis and legislative issues and the mechanical realist origination which Marx wrecked in his "Postulations on Feuerbach". However the natural inclination between Althusser's work and the predominant manifestations of middle class belief system is both more extensive and more principal than this. The connection between Althusser's specific desire and his reception of a middle class ideological origination of society is extremely immediate. Althusser's specific desire is to create the self-rule and power of mental over physical work. This relationship between the mental and the manual is, be that as it may, an unconventional normal for industrialist generation relations. To show, thusly, that this curious normal for free enterprise is socially vital, Althusser has response to a hypothesis which secures the social need of industrialist generation relations themselves, and this "eternisation" of entrepreneur relations of creation is correctly the characterizing normal for common belief system. Accordingly it is that Althusser takes after mechanical realism in befuddling the social and specialized divisions of work: in recognizing the detachment of mental from difficult work, and the subordination of one to the next, with the specialized necessities of creation with a progressed division of work, and not with the command of capital over work and the related assignment of the imaginative forces of work by capital. This perplexity is the premise of an arrangement of belief systems which serve to legitimize the subordination of work: to capital in common philosophy, to the reformer in Utopian communism, to the gathering and to the state in

Stalinism. It is the ideological establishment of the eternisation of average relations of generation, constituted in its traditional structure by the political economy whose authoritative evaluate was made by Marx and whose renunciation is the essential premise of any valid marxism

Let us look more closely at this ideology. Classical political economy bases itself on a distinction between production, which is seen in technical terms as the realm in which labour sets to work means of production to make products, and distribution, in which the product is transformed into revenues which accrue to the various classes in society. Relations of distribution are therefore superimposed on production as the social framework within which material production takes place. In the capitalist mode of production the superimposition of relations of distribution on relations of production is achieved simply by ascribing revenues to factors of production and assigning classes to these factors as "owners". It is therefore ownership of the means of production which provides the foundation for the major distributive classes of which society is composed. This conception of society is based on the "trinity formula", the form of appearance of bourgeois relations of production according to which the "factors of production" are the sources of the revenues of the component classes of society. It is a form of appearance which eternises bourgeois relations of production, because it makes them appear as relations already inscribed in the technical structure of the material production process. It is an ideology because it postulates as eternal that which is historically specific, it is a bourgeois ideology because what it postulates as eternal is the bourgeois production relation. In so far as such eternisation of bourgeois relations of production is the sine qua non of bourgeois ideology, in the rigorous sense of that term, it is this conception of society which is the foundation of all bourgeois ideology. This conception of society, although it is fundamentally bour-geois, can also be found underlying certain ideologies which have played a major role

in the working-class movement. The relation between Ricardianism and Utopian socialism is well known. Utopian socialism is characterised by the above bourgeois conception of society, basing itself on a moral critique of bourgeois relations of distribution, and so aiming at the transformation of relations of distribution without any transformation of bourgeois relations of production, the revolution being introduced from outside because of the necessarily moral basis of the Utopian critique. At a later stage of capitalist development "economism" gave this bourgeois conception a new radical twist. Bourgeois relations of distribution continue to be founded on the technical relations of bourgeois production, but the socialisation of production, conceived as an increasing technical scale of production, leads progressively and naturally from competitive capitalism through monopoly capitalism to state capitalism, which is equated with socialism. Economism has a more scientific appearance than utopianism had. In reality, however, it has no scientific foundation at all, for it is simply not the case that the socialisation of production can be reduced to technical concentration, nor that the latter increases without limit. Hence the adoption of this "economistic" version of socialism, by basing itself on a conception of society which is in turn founded on the eternisation of capitalist relations of production, has the perpetuation of such relations as its practical consequence. This economism entered the Russian working-class movement through Plekhanov and Menshevism, and was criticised, though not unambiguously, by Lenin. In the wake of the revolution and the NEP, this economism crept back into the CPSU in the form of Stalinist dogmatism, providing the means within the Soviet Union to establish the identification of development of the productive forces with the development of socialism and to establish the authority of the state, as representative of the social character of the process of production, over the isolated workers who are only its technical agents.

Marx's most prolific years were committed to the elaboration of the investigation of established political economy. In this investigation Marx

demonstrates that the lapses of political economy get from its origination of creation. For Marx the relations of creation are not divided from and appeared differently in relation to material generation as a remotely inferred structure forced on a previous substance. Generation is seen as an issue which is constantly social and material, creation both of material items and of social relations. Additionally this solidarity is not a congruous solidarity, at any rate in a class society, however is an opposing solidarity: the conflicting solidarity of the powers and relations of creation. In an entrepreneur society this opposing solidarity exists in the particular authentic manifestation of the inconsistency between creation as the generation of quality and as the generation of utilization qualities. It is this disagreement which Marx recognizes toward the start of Capital, in the "Hegelian" first section, where it is placed at the heart of the ware. The acceptable refinement in the middle of quality and use-worth, found in the "primary structure" of entrepreneur riches, makes it feasible for Marx to create surprisingly the difference between cement valuable work and dynamic quality making work, the point which "is significant to an understanding of political economy" in light of the fact that it underpins such ideas as "work influence", "consistent and variable capital", and "surplus worth". The last idea, is, for instance, changed. It is no more seen as the income which accumulates to a distributive class as its impart of the material item. It is currently seen as the result of the work handle as an issue of generation of quality, of the impulse forced on the laborer inside the work methodology to work past the time important to recreate the estimation of his or her work power: We now see that the distinction between work, considered from one perspective as creating utilities, and then again as making esteem, a distinction which we found by our examination of an item, determines itself into a qualification between two parts of the creation process.

The creation procedure, considered as the solidarity of the work methodology and the methodology of making quality, is the

methodology of generation of items; considered as the solidarity of the work methodology and the procedure of valorisation, it is the entrepreneur procedure of generation, or the industrialist manifestation of the creation of wares. This understanding of generation accordingly makes conceivable a hypothesis which gives misuse and class relations a target establishment in creation rather than a subjective establishment in a specific good assessment of the equity of relations of dispersion.

The opposing establishment of generation is the way to the marxist hypothesis of history and to the marxist idea of the totality. In the first place, the "law of movement" of private enterprise, communicated (maybe misleadingly) in the tendential "law" of the falling rate of benefit and the countervailing propensities it calls forward, communicates the cement recorded improvement of the central disagreement. Also, the relations of creation are from the earliest starting point social relations, "the relations of generation in their totality constitute what are known as the social relations, society, and particularly, a general public at an unmistakable phase of chronicled advancement."

The determination of social relations as relations of creation is the particular and determinate authentic process by which social relations are subsumed under the overwhelming connection of generation thus are resolved as created types of that connection. The premise of this methodology is the opposing establishment of generation which continually constrains capital past the prompt procedure of creation keeping in mind the end goal to achieve its valorisation. In Capital Marx demonstrates this thoroughly for dispersion, dissemination and even utilization as snippets of the aggregate methodology of social generation which are subsumed generally in the relations constituted around the quick procedure of creation, subordinated to the generation of worth as snippets of the methodology of valorisation of capital. Correspondingly, the social

relations of generation show up in particular financial, political and ideological structures, and their determination as snippets of the "relations of creation in their totality" must be through their verifiable subsumption under the predominant connection of creation in the advancement of the disagreement on which that connection is based, the investigation of which can create solidly both the types of command of social relations by the capital connection and the particular furthest reaches of that mastery. It is critical to stretch the way that Marx is concerned with the cement authentic improvement of the basic inconsistency, with particular and determinate recorded courses of action, and not with the fundamental advancement of the idea, whether this is translated in the Hegelian feeling of the rationalistic improvement of the Idea or in the positivist feeling of the deductive illustration of the central proposes of the hypothesis. Marx is creating a hypothesis of true mankind's history, he is not endeavoring to enact for history, to direct hypothetically what history can and can't be. It is in this feeling that marxism is not a historicism: it doesn't look to define either logical or persuasive laws of chronicled advancement. Thus the conflicting establishment of generation underlies the verifiable advancement of a general public focused around that manifestation of creation, yet the disagreement can't focus it conclusion. In this way even "irrefutably the general law of entrepreneur gathering" is quickly qualified: "like all different laws, it is adjusted in its working by numerous circumstances."

For example, the "law" of the falling rate of profit does not determine that the rate of profit will fall. What it does determine is that an increase in the organic composition of capital, effected by, for example, the concentration or centralisation of capital, will lead to a fall in the rate of profit unless it is compensated by an increase in the rate of exploitation. Hence the law tells us to expect that the concentration and centralisation of capital will be associated not with a necessary fall in the rate of profit, but with the most strenuous efforts on the part of

capital to increase the rate of exploitation by increasing the productivity of labour, by intensifying labour or by lengthening the working day. This law is not the logical elaboration of the concept, it is the theoretical formulation of a fundamental aspect of the everyday experience of the working class. In exactly the same way social relations are subsumed under the dominant relation of production not in a logical reduction which dissolves the specific characteristics of those relations, but in a specific historical process through which capital, institutionalised (it must be added) in the capitalist enterprise, seeks to overcome the social barriers set to its valorisation and in so doing tends to seek to turn the whole of society into a machine for the production of surplus value. This is a specific historical process, it is a tendency that is resisted, and it is a contradictory process in which the barriers are never finally overcome. Hence the domination of capital in any particular society has specific limits, those limits being historical limits that are established through struggle and that cannot be defined in advance. It is to the extent that any particular social relation has been historically subsumed under the capital relation that it can be considered as a form of that relation, and only to that extent. This subsumption is never determined in advance, it is always contested, and it has constantly to be reimposed if it is to be maintained. Thus Marx is not trying to develop a predictive theory that can reduce the world to a set of formulae, he is trying to develop a deeper understanding of the forces in play in order to intervene more effectively to change the world: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, the point, however is to change it" wrote Marx in the last of his "Theses on Feuerbach", and presumably he meant it. The errors of economism derive directly from its failure to grasp the significance of Marx's critique of classical political economy, and so from its retention of the bourgeois conception of production which characterises the latter. On the one hand, the separation of the forces and relations of production abolishes the dialectical relation between the two aspects of the process of production, so that the primacy of

production takes the form of a technological determinism which necessarily rests on the meta-physical foundation of dogmatic claims about the nature of the world. On the other hand, because the "forces and relations of production" are seen as technical relations of production on which are superimposed social relations (of distribution), the contradictory foundation of production, and so the basis of the marxist theory of history, is abolished. Instead we have a relation between the "forces and relations of production" which is alternately one of correspondence and dislocation, and the theory of history is replaced by a metaphysical law of history, the "dialectic", seen as a mechanical, extra-historical law which determines history as a succession of modes of production by governing the progressive, and exogenous, development of the forces of production which underlies it, each mode being defined a historically by the specific form of appropriation of the surplus (rather than form of production) appropriate to a particular level of development of the productive forces. The Stalinist theory of modes of production, its separation of dialectical from historical materialism, and its evolutionism are all consequences of the adoption of the bourgeois conception of production.

There can definitely be most likely the beginning stage of any endeavor to restore marxism must be the investigate of this opinionated rendition of marxism. To this degree Althusser's task does at any rate start toward the starting, regardless of the fact that it doesn't make its actual goal unequivocal. Althusser is likewise right to bring up that not every scrutinize of economism is a marxist evaluate. Specifically, regardless of the fact that we may question the political intentions and the more extensive hypothetical ramifications of his assault, Althusser is right to bring up the complementarity of the "humanist" scrutinize to the "economist" deviation it tried to rise above. To this degree Althusser is right to assault the "historicism", that is to say the supernatural reasoning of history, normal for both "economism"

and "humanism". However the inquiry we need to ask of Althusser is whether he really gets to the foundation of these "deviations", whether he offers a basic evaluate which will empower us to restore its legitimately progressive character to marxism, or whether he rather offers us a reestablished variant of unyieldingness, denied of its most "outrageous" measurements, to go hand in hand with the end of the most "shocking" parts of Stalinism in the restoration of the revisionism of the PCF. In his Reply to John Lewis Althusser spells out shockingly his understanding of the "Stalinist deviation". He sees Stalinism as an issue of the economism of the Second International, "the after death vengeance of the Second International". He likewise sees this economism as an issue deviation, decided as an issue of the economism-humanism couple which is evidently character-istic of common belief system. At last, he notes that this philosophy is common in light of the fact that it disposes of the relations of creation and the class battle. Althusser shows these discoveries, which have, in one structure or an alternate, long been just about an ordinary among marxist commentators of Stalinism, as an unique and provisional disclosure ("this is just a theory"). On the other hand, we must give Althusser kudos for perceiving the economism of Stalinism, regardless of the possibility that he did so rather late. But we now come to the heart of the matter. We have to ask whether Althusser offers us a marxist critique of this ideology. The answer is that he does not. To see this we must look at the way Althusser appears to understand this couple. Althusser does not provide a theoretical critique of the couple at all. He argues that the complementarity of the elements of the couple is based on the complementarity of the "economism" of the capitalist's ideology and the "humanism" of legal ideology, the law being the point at which the two are joined as a pair. The "economism", in the sense of the concept of the economic on which economism is based, is not questioned at all by Althusser. As I shall argue in this paper, Althusser retains the bourgeois conception of production at the core of

his version of marxism. The implication of Althusser's critique is that his objection is to the reductionism of both economism and humanism, and not to the concept of production on which they are based. This is the sense in which he regards "historicism" as the foundation of both "economism" and "humanism". These two deviations are based on the illegitimate generalisation of their specific orientations to society of the lawyer and the capitalist. This is, correspondingly, why the focus of Althusser's interpretation of Marx is the nature of the marxist totality, for he is seeking a non-reductionist concept of the whole as a structured combination of elements which can, in a sense, reconcile "humanism" and "economism". The error of Stalinism is not, therefore, founded in its conception of production, but in its conception of the totality, not in its understanding of the economic, but in its attempt to reduce the "relative autonomy" of other "instances" of the whole. Althusser is trying to develop a non-metaphysical conception of the whole in which the bourgeois (metaphysical) concept of production can continue to find a place. It is not surprising that Althusser is unable to provide a theoretical critique of the "economism-humanism couple", for in the course of his critique he rejects as "ideological" precisely the theory which Marx developed to provide this critique, the theory of commodity fetishism. The few is not constituted at the level of the law, on the premise of the complementarity of the industrialist and the legal counselor, yet at a significantly more principal level, that of the item. The hypothesis of merchandise fetishism reveals to us decisively how, in the trade of wares, social relations show up as relations of subjects to things. To put the point "rationally": Circulation is the development in which the general estrangement shows up as general appointment and general allocation as general distance. As much, then, as the entire of this development shows up as an issue process, and as much as the individual snippets of this development emerge from the cognizant will and specific purposes of people, so much does the totality of the methodology show up as a target interrelation, which emerges

spontaneously from nature;... flow, in light of the fact that a totality of the social procedure, is likewise the first structure in which the social connection shows up as something free of the people, yet not just as, say, in a coin or in return esteem, yet reaching out to the entire of the social development itself. The social connection of people to each other as an issue over the people which has ended up independent... is a fundamental aftereffect of the way that the purpose of flight is not the free social single person.

It is the hypothesis of merchandise fetishism that makes it conceivable to comprehend the ideological essentialness of the law, and it is the hypothesis of product fetishism that empowers us to infiltrate the ideological "humanism-economism couple" thus to condemn it by changing our origination of social relations, and not by essentially improving them into another sort of entirety. Rancière's study of Althusser brings out unmistakably the political noteworthiness of Althusser's methodology to Stalinist economism. In a broad sense Althusser's hypothetical connection to economism recreated the connection of customary socialism to the governmental issues of Stalinism. From the perspective of the customary comrade parties in the 1960s destalinisation included a break with the systems for the Stalinist period, without a crucial break with its legislative issues. The "overabundances" of the Stalinist period discovered their avocation in contentions which rested on reductionism and evolutionism, which made it conceivable to shield any strategy as fundamental intends to a certain end. Destalinisation included a relinquishment of the reductionist evolutionism of Stalinism, so making it honest to goodness to scrutinize the methods utilized (and this is exactly how Althusser represents the inquiry in his Reply to John Lewis — Stalinism included the appropriation of unjustified means in quest for obvious closures). This restricted flexibility of move, then again, couldn't toss into inquiry the power of the gathering and the inescapability of communism. Althusserianism offered the gathering one method for safeguarding its

position, by legitimizing the power of the gathering on the premise of its logical understanding of the "conjuncture" instead of its favored connection to a certain future, and by basing the unavoidability of communism on political and not "financial" components along these lines separating the advancing upset from the emergency of private enterprise. This last separation of financial from political battle and of monetary from political emergency must demonstrate exceptionally alluring for a gathering which is looking for unequivocally to hold control of becoming common laborers militancy on the shop floor and to make its political balance in a time of entrepreneur emergency." It would be preposterous to lessen the claim of Althusser's work to a limited concern of the administration of the French Communist Party. The real bid of Althusserianism has been to youthful scholarly people, especially in scholastic establishments, the majority of whom have no connection with the Communist Party, and the greater part of whom would undoubtedly look to separate Althusser's governmental issues from his hypothetical "accomplishments". We subsequently need to comprehend the premise of the request of Althusserianism to these savvy people. Absolutely it has a shallow claim in reacting to the most silly parts of Stalinist stubbornness, in having an externally progressive and complex character, in offering a focal place in the progressive procedure to the intelligent person, while cheapening those ("financial") average workers battles from which the scholarly is avoided, and in having a logical "ultra-radical" measurement in declaring the omnipresence of a "class battle" which is connected just in the "last case" to the "monetary battle". Then again, it is troublesome not to accept that genuine marxists would feel notably uneasy that the deeper claim of Althusserianism is not to their political, however to their average erudite senses. From one viewpoint, Althusserianism thoroughly imitates both the division into scholarly "teaches" and the relations of power of the common scholastic foundation. Then again, Althusserianism thoroughly duplicates the recognizable teachings of

common social science and logic, and specifically the overwhelming manifestations of every, structural-functionalism and neo-positivism. The reasons for this convergence are not hard to find, for bourgeois sociology is based precisely on the rejection of the "evolutionist economism" of marxism, and so is preoccupied with the articulation of the levels of a complex whole, while bourgeois philosophy is based on the rejection of the "historicism" of marxism, and so is preoccupied with the eternal status of scientific truths. (I am not reducing sociology and philosophy to their central ideological preoccupations. It is in so far as these are their concerns that they are bourgeois.) Bourgeois sociology follows classical political economy in being based on a conception of production as a technical process which underpins the eternisation of capitalist relations of production and so characterises this sociology rigorously as a form of bourgeois ideology. Contemporary structural functionalism, like Althusser-ianism, rejects a crude technological determinism. It follows classical political economy in basing itself on the distinction between the technical relations combining factors in material production and social relations of distribution, constituted by ownership of the means of production, which are mapped on to the relations of production. The former cannot, however, be reduced to the latter, for they involve the relation of "ownership" which is defined politically and/or ideologically. Social relations cannot therefore be reduced to technical relations. The starting point of sociology cannot therefore be the "economy", the relations of production, for this only exists within society. The starting point can only be the pre-given whole, "society". On this basis structural-functionalism defines a variety of different levels according to the functions they fulfil in relation to the whole. The identity of functions and levels varies from one account to another, but the basic principle is unchanged. The differentiation of functions determines that each level should have its own specificity and its own autonomy relative to other levels. The different functions are hierarchically ordered, the technical requirements of material

production normally being primary because of the supposed primary requisite of physical reproduction. The hierarchy takes the form of limits imposed by one level on the variation of other levels. Within these limits of variation the different levels are themselves structured under the dominance of their relative functions in the whole, and not under the dominance of other levels. They are therefore determined as levels of the complex whole, and not as expressions of other levels.

Average logic rests on comparative ideological establishments. I have effectively noted the recorded establishment of the subject-object connection in merchandise fetishism. All the more particularly, with its secularization, rationality gets the essential part of shield of the experimental cases of average belief system (that is to say, of underwriter of those "truths" of middle class science which are "held to act naturally obvious" thus which can't be secured by those sciences themselves). The thoughtful character of common science, which is focused around the middle class detachment of mental from physical work, turns into the premise on which the power of science is secured ideologically. The chronicled character of the ideas of science is deliberately destroyed and they are given an everlasting reality of their own. Subsequently the middle class rationality of science is concentrated absolutely on legitimating the as far as anyone knows widespread character of authentic classes and of giving specific truths an interminable status. This is as much the case with nominalism or conventionalism, for which no reality relates to the classes of science, as it is with positivism, for the classifications whose legitimacy is relative remain themselves just as, or significantly all the more safely, supreme. Thus middle class theory is honorably suited to Althusser's assignment, which is exactly to secure the power of his own variant of science. In different controls, as I might show in passing in this paper, Althusser replicates the most cutting edge positions of middle class philosophy. In this paper I should focus on Althusser's hypothesis of society, since others have examined his reasoning finally. The significance of Althusser

in different fields ought not, in any case, be overlooked. Specifically, in political science Althusserianism, as translated by Poulantzas, offers a stamped union with the methodology of frameworks hypothesis.

In the study of cultural phenomena

Althusserianism legitimates the most vanguard types of neo-Freudianism, as far as the assumed widespread capacity of belief system, the "interpellation of the subject". This multiplication of the most cutting edge hypothetical positions of the contemporary middle class social sciences must go far to clarifying the claim of Althusserianism to youthful scholarly people, for a considerable lot of the last come to marxism in light of the powerlessness of the average orders to adapt to the radicalisation of the intelligent people which has underlain the contemporary "emergencies" in those controls. It is simple for Althusserianism to catch these savvy people, for it offers a simple nature inserted in a radical talk which guarantees commonplace topics for marxism. This is the incredible threat which Althusserianism postures, for it is additionally portrayed by the same deadlocks, and the same void rounds as the hypotheses that have been rejected. In the event that Althusserianism is taken for marxism, the reactions of numerous will be a dismissal of marxism alongside middle class hypotheses, and a turn to the more amiable recognition of observation. On the off chance that marxism is to gain by the "emergencies" in the social sciences it is key that Althusserian marxism be uncovered for what it is an externally radical talk inside which the undermined precepts of the bourgeoisie discover their last (most recent?) resting spot.

In this paper I shall look at Althusser's most important works, *For Marx* and *Reading Capital*, in order to establish that Althusser's work is consistently underpinned by a conception of the relations of production which is, in the strict sense, bourgeois. As a result of this Althusserianism reproduces the arguments of bourgeois ideology. My

critical comments on Althusser will largely be directed to establishing this connection between the conception of production and the reproduction of bourgeois sociological and philosophical positions, and with showing schematically that the marxist concept of production, developed in Marx's critique of classical political economy, has quite different implications for the theory of society and for philosophy. Limitations of space dictate that the latter arguments are necessarily only indicative. In the last analysis it is not my formulation of Marx's critique of political economy that I would like to counterpose to Althusserianism, but that of Marx himself. This critique was the quite self-conscious product of ten years of work in which Marx knew precisely what he was doing. Its recovery does not require a "symptomatic" reading, but a naive one, a reading which pays attention to what Marx says, and what Marx says he is saying, without reading Marx through the grid of bourgeois ideology.

Théories of Surplus Value, forgetting about his "absences" and "silences" until they have mastered the clear and insistent arguments that are present in his work, Althusserianism would become no more than a bad memory.

In looking at *For Marx* and *Reading Capital* I shall show how the attempt to establish the autonomy of theory leads to a bourgeois interpretation of Marx. *For Marx* reproduces the anti-reductionist arguments of bourgeois sociology, *Reading Capital* reproduces the anti-historicist arguments of bourgeois philosophy, before attempting to "dehistoricise" the Stalinist concept of the mode of production. I shall begin with a brief look at the displaced anticipation of future positions in Althusser's essay on Montesquieu.

The project defined

In retrospect we can already see Althusser's project at work in his essay on Montesquieu. This essay broaches the subject of Marx's dialectic obliquely, by attributing to Montesquieu himself the

discoveries which are later seen as marking Marx's scientific revolution. In this essay we learn that Montesquieu did not have a circular expressive totality, but a totality in which there was determination in the last instance by the "principle", but in which the reverse effectivity of the "nature" on the "principle" was possible within certain limits.

This conception is then compared to that of Marx: "In both cases it is a matter of a unity which may be harmonious or contradictory, in both cases this determination does nevertheless cede to the determined element a whole region of effectivity, but subordinate effectivity." This essay also discovers a way of breaking with historicism that was later adopted by Balibar in *Reading Capital*. The unity of nature and principle of the state may be either adequate or contradictory. In the latter case the state form will change. Hence we have a dynamic but non-teleological totality.

This essay leads us already to question the marxist character of Althusser's most fundamental concepts, when he can find these concepts in the work of the mechanical materialist Montesquieu. The concept of determination in the last instance is particularly illuminated by this essay, for it is clearly given a mechanical interpretation here: the last instance limits the free variation of the other instances, but within these limits it has no privileged effectivity. The last instance is therefore seen in essence as an external restriction on the range of possible forms, but in no way as determining within this range. Thus the concept of "relative autonomy", as autonomy within limits, is already prefigured in this essay. The essay strikingly confirms Rancière's argument that Althusser assimilates Marx to mechanical materialism. We can deal very briefly with the first two essays in *For Marx* which mark the tentative and exploratory beginnings of Althusser's return to Marx. The first essay introduces the discussion by noting the Feuerbachian problematic embedded in Marx's early works.

The second essay, "On the Young Marx", explicitly attacks the economistic foundation of Stalinism for the first time. However, the

attack is focused on modes of understanding Marx's work, rather than on Marx's work itself. The essay introduces the concepts of the "problematic" and the "epistemological break". The essay attacks "historicist" interpretations of Marx's work, introducing a caricature of Hegel as a surrogate for "economism", and affirms the scientific character of Marx's work as well as the political need to return to that work. However, the project is defined in terms of the renunciation of ideological problematics in favour of a return to reality: it is the idealist character of the historicist interpretation which is challenged here, in its belief in the coherence of the world of ideology. This idealist historicism is criticised in terms of a materialist historicism, a logic of the irruption of real history in ideology itself: according to Althusser Marx did not change problematics, but broke with ideological problematics as such, to found science directly on an encounter with reality.

This formulation may be closer to Marx than later versions, but it was inadequate for Althusser's purposes for several reasons. First, the historicist conception of ideology will always threaten to swamp a positivist conception of science and so threaten the autonomy and the integrity of theory because there is no way of guaranteeing the break with ideology, and so history, in any particular case. Secondly, the conception of science, which comes "within a hairsbreadth of 'positivism'", leaves no place for the philosopher to play an independent role as theoretically (later politically) informed arbiter of scientificity. Thirdly, the mode of attack on Stalinism, which is to reduce Stalinism to "historicism" and to assimilate "historicism" to "Hegel", dictates that Althusser complete the elimination of "historicism" from his interpretation. These preoccupations soon come to prevail in the Althusserian interpretation of Marx. In the essay "Contradiction and Overdetermination" Althusser develops his attack on economism, now coming into the open and attacking the vulgar notion of history as the simple expression of the basic contradiction between forces and relations of production. This latter notion is assimilated to Hegel

through the concept of inversion, so that the essay focuses on the relations between Marx's and Hegel's dialectics, the problem being that of the specificity of the marxist dialectic. Althusser's basic argument is that if Marx had simply inverted the Hegelian dialectic, he would have remained within the ideological problematic of Hegelian philosophy.

The specific properties of Marx's concept of dialectic are expressed in the concept of overdetermination. The Russian revolution did not take place because in Russia the contradiction between forces and relations of production had reached its highest point of development, but because of an "accumulation of circumstances and currents" which "fuse into a ruptural unity", making it possible for the general contradiction...to become active in the strongest sense, to become a ruptural principle". The contradiction is therefore very complex, this complexity being expressed in the concept of overdetermination: The unity they [the accumulation of "contradictions", "circumstances", "currents"] constitute in this "fusion" into a revolutionary rupture, is constituted by their own essence and effectivity, by what they are, and according to the specific modalities of their action. In constituting this unity, they reconstitute and complete their basic animating unity, but at the same time they also bring out its nature: the "contradiction" is inseparable from the total structure of the social body in which it is found, inseparable from its formal conditions of existence, and even from the instances it governs; it is radically affected by them, determining, but also determined in one and the same move-ment, and determined by the various levels and instances of the social formation it animates; it might be called over determined in its principle.

Returning to Marx, Althusser argues that Marx does not simply invert Hegel's dialectic, but changes both its terms and its relations. The terms civil society and state are replaced by the ideas of mode of production, social class and state. Instead of a dialectic in which the superstructure is an expression of the structure, Althusser introduces

the notions of "determination in the last instance by the (economic) mode of production" and "the relative autonomy of the superstructures and their specific effectivity." This essay is of central importance in establishing the framework within which discussion of the marxist dialectic will take place. It is therefore essential to isolate the basis of the critique of Stalinism in play here. It is worth pointing out initially that it is not based on any examination of the works of Marx or of Lenin. It is rather based on the observation that many different "circumstances" and "currents", sometimes referred to as "contradictions", were in play in the Russian revolution, and that these currents and circumstances cannot be reduced to the status of expressions of a basic contradiction. The problem is therefore that of the relation of the "contradictions" in play in a "current situation" to the basic contradiction. Economism is unable to explain the object with which Althusser has confronted it, so an alternative conception of the dialectic is called for.

The power of Althusser's argument hangs on the appropriateness of the problem he poses. This problem is not a theoretical problem: the series of currents each with its own essence and effectivity is presented to theory as a given, not itself subject to a critical examination which is reserved for the concept of the dialectic. The explanation of the revolution is already given. Russia was the weakest link because "it had accumulated the largest sum of historical contradictions then possible." This sum is explained by the fundamental contradiction of being "the most backward and the most advanced nation", which in turn alludes to the fact that Russia was "pregnant with two revolutions." Russia's revolutionary situation is therefore explained ultimately by her revolutionary situation — the perfect circle of empiricism. The explanation of the Russian revolution is not in question. We already know all the complex factors which act as "effective determinations". As marxists we also know that "of course the basic

contradiction dominating the period... is active in all these 'contradictions' and even in their 'fusion'".

The problem is to reconcile the two theoretically. But if the "effective determinations" are known independently of the dialectic, this dialectic can be no more than an empty rhetoric, a declaration of faith in the universal, but invisible, power of the marxist dialectic. For Althusser the account of the "effective determinations" is the given to which the dialectic must be moulded. The concept of overdetermination is therefore counterposed to the concept of expression on the basis of the principle of the irreducibility of the "real" (i.e. the world of appearances). Where does this principle come from? Far from being a marxist principle, it is the cardinal principle of bourgeois empiricism. In effect this principle asserts that the world is as it appears in bourgeois ideology, so that the object is already given in that ideology. Marx asserts that the world cannot be identified with this appearance, and so to understand the world is to offer a critique of its forms of appearance, forms expressed in the categories of bourgeois ideology. Althusser's objection to economism reproduces the objection of bourgeois empiricism and not that of marxism. In view of Althusser's arguments that marxism is not an empiricism it is important to be very clear what is meant here by bourgeois empiricism. The error of bourgeois empiricism is not, as Althusser would have us believe, that it seeks knowledge of reality. For most people this is not "empiricism", for it is virtually a tautology: the concept of knowledge implies a reality that is known (even if that reality is spiritual). The error of bourgeois empiricism is that it mistakes its own ideological preconceptions for reality, thus it gives us knowledge only of its ideological preconceptions: instead of taking reality for its object, it takes its given object for the real. For Marx, therefore, what appears at first as the "real" is reducible, not because Marx is a metaphysician who wants to find ideal essences beneath reality, that are in some sense more real than reality, but because the appearances must be subjected to critical examination to

discover whether or not they accord with reality. Thus the error of bourgeois empiricism is that it is insufficiently critical of its own preconceptions. Marx does not counterpose his own privileged vision of reality to the mystical illusions of bourgeois ideology, he counterposes the concept of the critique to the concept of the given, so it is through a critique of the preconceptions of bourgeois ideology that Marx arrives at a more adequate basis for knowledge, and more adequate can only mean more adequate to reality. Bourgeois ideology is not merely a particular point of view, it is a point of view that is false.

Althusser does not question the fundamental concepts of Stalinism, and in particular the economist conception of production which underlies its conception of the contradiction between forces and relations of production as the precondition of history. He rather seeks to develop an alternative concept of the whole which will relate the economic "relations of production" to history in a non-reductionist manner. Thus this critique focuses not on the concept of production, but on the question of the "complexity" of a whole which both is and is not subject to determination by the economic. The "complexity" of this whole expresses the contradictory requirements imposed on it. Althusser's critique of economism calls to mind the alternative approaches to Ricardianism of Marx and of vulgar economy. Ricardo's theory of value led him into a contradiction, for he sought to identify the forms of surplus value (profit and rent) immediately with surplus value itself, despite the fact that the two contradicted one another. Vulgar economy responded to Ricardo's "reductionism" by abandoning any attempt to develop the critique of immediate appearances, and so abandoned Ricardo's theory of value. Marx, on the other hand, offered a critique of Ricardianism's metaphysical concept of value, making value a social, historical, phenomenon, and rigorously relating the forms of appearance of surplus value to surplus value as transformed forms, founding the contradictory relation between the two in the development of the contradiction inherent in the commodity itself.

Althusser, faced with the contradictions of economism, follows vulgar economy in making the appearance the measure of all things, and so in effectively abandoning the law of value, which is the specifically capitalist form of the contradiction between forces and relations of production, by abandoning it to the last instance which never comes, instead of subjecting the metaphysical dogmatist formulation of the law to a marxist critique.

The point can be made by looking not at a superficial account of 1917, but looking at the specific features of leninism in that context. Lenin did not have the problem of discovering a formulation of the dialectic sufficiently "sophisticated" to relate an accumulation of already given "contradictions" to a fundamental contradiction. Lenin's problem was precisely the opposite, it was the problem of locating, in all their complexity, the conflicting social forces in play in Russia in 1917. The essential conflicts and their interrelations were not immediately apparent, but were only located on the basis of a rigorous marxist analysis which started from the fundamental contradiction introduced by the mode of domination of capital over Russian society. It was this analysis which enabled Lenin to locate the fundamental class divisions in Russia, most notably in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* and in *Imperialism*, and to locate the relation between the resulting conflicts, expressed in the objective (because founded in the relations of production) unity of the slogan "Bread, Peace and Land". Far from taking the "currents" and "circumstances" as given, Lenin subjected them to a rigorous examination. It was only to the extent that the Bolshevik Party located the fundamental cleavages in Russian society as different forms of the same fundamental contradiction that the "ruptural unity" created by the Bolsheviks was an objective rather than an opportunistic unity. Lenin's marxism consists not only in his faith in an ability to create a unity from the given currents and circumstances, but also in his understanding that a successful socialist revolution depends on the objective foundation of such a unity.

The next essay, "On the Materialist Dialectic", seeks to give some substance to the claims of "Contradiction and Overdetermination" while at the same time responding to criticism by seeking to establish the autonomy of theory. This dual aim makes the essay confusing. The essay starts with a conception of the "social formation" as being composed of a series of levels, the levels being defined as practices. The determinant practice is "material production". Practice itself is defined as "any process of transformation of a determinate given raw material into a determinate product, a transformation effected by a determinate human labour, using determinate means (of 'production')". In any practice thus conceived, the determinant moment (or element) is neither the raw material nor the product, but the practice in the narrow sense: the moment of the labour of transformation itself, which sets to work, in a specific structure, men, means and a technical method of utilising the means". The discussion of this conception of the social formation is actually centred on one pivotal practice, namely theoretical practice. Within theoretical practice "Theory" is central: the "Theory of practice in general", "in which is theoretically expressed the essence of theoretical practice in general, through it the essence of practice, and through it the essence of transformations, of the 'development' of things in general". Theory is the guardian of orthodoxy in both theoretical and political practice.

Having established the centrality of Theory, Althusser proceeds to establish its autonomy. This is achieved by insisting that the determinant moment of theoretical practice is the means of theoretical labour "theory and method", so that theoretical practice is not dominated by either its raw material or its product. Althusser further insists that the structure of practices within which theoretical practice is inserted is complex, bringing us back to the overdetermined complex whole. Althusser tells us no more about this whole, beyond the denial that his is a pluralist conception since the unity of the whole is not sacrificed. It is simply that the unity is "the unity of the complexity

itself", which sounds very like the contingent unity of the world of appearances. This unity also, we are assured, implies domination: "the complex whole has the unity of a structure articulated in dominance". The originality of this essay lies in its introduction of a particular concept of "practice" as a central concept of marxism. The concept is not, however, introduced on the basis on a reading of Marx, but quite explicitly in order to establish the autonomy of "theoretical practice". The reason for this is also clear the essay in question is a response to criticism from within the PCF. The response to criticism is not a defence of positions taken, but a defence of the autonomy of theory. This small fact is of enormous significance for understanding Althusser's marxism, for it is from this pragmatic origin that a completely new version of Marx is developed to provide the outer defences of the autonomy of theory. This version of Marx does not derive from a "reading" of Marx at all, but from the need to invent a Marx who can defend the isolation, autonomy, and authority, of theoretical activity. The link between the two is provided by the concept of practice, and the link is plain in this essay, for the interpretation of Marx is proposed very clearly on the basis of a discussion of "theoretical practice". In order to establish the autonomy of theory Althusser introduces a conception of practice in which practice is defined as concrete practical activity, which involves the abstraction of this practical activity from the social relations in which it is inserted, so that it becomes trivially the case that any and every practice in Althusser's sense is autonomous, for the connection between practices has been dissolved. Hence the apparently very concrete concept of practice offered by Althusser is in fact an ideological abstraction, for it abstracts from the social relations within which any practice must exist. In generalising this result to all other practices, Althusser generalises the ideological conception of production, and the associated conception of society, which is implicit within it: the conception of production as a concrete practical activity independent of the social relations within which it is inserted. In

adopting the liberal defence of the autonomy of science, Althusser adopts the liberal view of society which accompanies it.

The obviousness of the centrality in marxism of the concept of practice, as defined by Althusser, does not bear very close examination. This can be brought out most clearly if we look at what Althusser calls "material" production. The application of the general concept of practice to the practice of material production gives us a definition of the labour process in which men work up nature with means of production. In this process the labour of transformation is first said to be the determinant moment, but we soon find that we have to "abstract from men in the means of production", so that it is the means of labour which are determinant. This claim is asserted with respect to theoretical practice, and generalised to other practices. The term "determinant" is given no content, for we are never told what is determined by the means of labour. Far from being obvious that the labour process is determined by the means of labour, this is in general not the case, but is rather a specific historical achievement of the capitalist mode of production. In other modes the labour process is "determined" by labour, and not by the means of labour. In capitalist society the labour process is determined by capital and the domination of the means of labour is one form of this determination.

It is impossible to conceptualise this in the Althusserian framework, for the reduction of production to the labour process as a process of production of use-values implies the exclusion from society of the capitalist, who is conspicuous by his absence from the labour process, and so of the fundamental relation of production of capitalist society. In the obviousness of the bourgeois concept of practice there is no room for the relations of production, so that the process of production comes to be seen as a purely technical process. The identification of the dominance of capital with some supposedly natural domination by the means of production, inscribed in the "essence of practice in general", implies the eternisation of capitalist relations of

production, which is precisely why this conception of production is at the base of bourgeois social science.

The domination of Althusser's "marxism" by this bourgeois conception of society extends to his conception of the relation between the various practices which makes up the whole. The social whole comprises four fundamental practices: material production which transforms nature, political practice which transforms social relations, ideological practice which transforms consciousness, and scientific practice which transforms notions into knowledge. The latter three practices are related through their objects: they represent different modes of appropriation of the "current situation", which can make their differentiation rather difficult at times. Theoretical practice grasps the social whole in thought in order to inform political practice, which can then transform that whole in action. The product of theoretical practice therefore acts as means of production of political practice, whose product in turn provides raw material for theoretical practice. Political practice is therefore the "real condensation, the nodal strategic point, in which is reflected the complex whole (economic, political and ideological)".

In this whole material production is said to be determinant in the last instance. This is, at least initially, conceived in the mechanical way already identified in the essay on Montesquieu. The ("economic") mode of production dictates, with the force of natural necessity, certain modes of distribution, consumption and exchange, and certain relations between the economic, political and ideological. In other words the (economic) mode of production determines the limits of the autonomy of the political and the ideological by imposing certain constraints on the "political and ideological social relations", and by assigning certain functions indispensable to economic production to the political and ideological levels. In this conception the political and theoretical (whether scientific or ideological) represent the concrete acts in which the social world is practically and mentally appropriated.

It is the world of the social actor of sociology. The economic, by contrast, represents the appropriation of nature, the world of material production of the bourgeois economist. The "determination in the last instance by the economic" turns out to represent simply the bourgeois theory of functional pre-requisites, with the pre-requisites hierarchically ordered, material production and reproduction being the most fundamental. The Althusserian critique of the supposedly planar quality of the Hegelian theoretical space certainly leads us to a structural conception, but it is the conception of the bourgeois social sciences. Althusser's "practice" is simply the desocialised production of the classical political economists, or the ahistorical social action of contemporary sociology. Althusser follows bourgeois social science in divorcing capitalist social relations from their historical foundation and seeks instead to found them in an ahistorical concept of practice, just as political economy gave them an eternal foundation in the nature of production, and sociology in the nature of social action. It is the similarity of *The Structure of Social Action* to the structure of practice that explains the uncanny resemblance of the complex whole structured in dominance to *The Social System*.

The Althusserian conception of the social whole has important political implications. The separation of production, as the realm of necessity, from the "political" and "ideological", or distribution and exchange, as the social realm immediately implies that political intervention in the former is fruitless, while in the latter it is proper and possible. In exactly the same way bourgeois sociology regards production as non-problematic, confining its attention to "reproduction", itself seen in exclusively "social" terms. The "economic" struggle is necessarily defensive, confined by relations of production which it cannot challenge, concerning only the rate of exploitation. While the capital relation, according to this ideology, cannot be challenged directly, political action can act on and transform the whole. This "over-politicisation" of the theory means that it is always ultimately

"historicist", in the sense that in the explanation of history it always has ultimate recourse to the consciousness of a historical subject.

This is not a return to the left historicism of the self-conscious class subject. Class consciousness cannot be revolutionary for Althusser since ideology necessarily obscures the character of the social relations which a revolutionary practice must transform. Only a revolutionary scientific theory can guide revolutionary politics, the Party being the means by which theory takes command of proletarian politics. Guided by this theory, the Party can establish the political significance of a particular "current" or "circumstance", can identify it as a "displacement", a "condensation" or a "global condensation" of the fundamental contradiction (rather than a petty-bourgeois adventure). The revolution must therefore be entrusted to the immense theoretical labour of the scholar-hero, not to the supporting cast of millions, and must wait on the specific "temporality" of theoretical practice. This is precisely the bourgeois materialist conception, characteristic of Utopian socialism, which Marx criticised in the third thesis on Feuerbach. Althusser's "self-criticism", which removes Theory from its pedestal and gives it to the "proletariat", doesn't improve matters for the philosopher alone can extract it from the normal state in which it is contaminated by bourgeois ideology. Thus Althusser argues, against Vico, that history is "even more difficult to understand" than nature "because 'the masses' do not have the same direct practical relation with history as they have with nature (in productive work), because they are always separated from history by the illusion that they understand it . . . between real history and man there is always a screen, a separation, a class ideology of history". Hence marxist science can only be discovered by the philosopher who brings the class struggle into theory, and grasps the class struggle through theory. This is the "contribution of communists to science" (and to the "masses"), and it sounds very like a renewed form of Zhdanovism.

It is fundamentally because Althusser does not question the bourgeois conception of the "economic" that he does not break with economistic politics, for the marxist critique of the bourgeois conception of production transforms the associated conception of politics. If bourgeois relations of production are treated as technical relations, they cannot be challenged politically. The struggle of the working class at the level of production cannot affect the social relations within which production takes place, but can only limit the rate of exploitation. The political struggle is therefore dissociated from the struggle at the point of production, and concerns political and legal measures to transform class relations, which are supposedly constituted by "ownership" of the means of production. The marxist concept of production, by contrast, leads to a quite different understanding of politics. On the one hand, it sees in social production the foundation of the reproduction of the capital relation, and so the foundation of resistance to the capital relation. On the other hand, it sees the bourgeois state as a developed form of the capital relation, in the sense that the bourgeois state is seen as a mediated expression of the domination of capital, whose effectiveness is therefore subordinate to the dominant relation of production. A revolutionary, as opposed to a purely insurrectionary, politics has therefore to combine the struggle at the point of production with the struggle for state power in such a way that the domination of capital in all its forms can be overcome. Thus a marxist politics has to overcome in practice the separation of "economics" and "politics" which Marx overcame in theory. And it should go without saying that Marx could only overcome it in theory because the working class was already overcoming it in practice.

Marx rediscovered: Reading Capital

Reading Capital seeks to realise the project mapped out in For Marx of establishing an "anti- historicist" interpretation of Marx. The project is dominated by the need to defend the autonomy of scientific theoretical practice. It is therefore essential to show that the autonomy

of theory was the cornerstone of Marx's work. This is attempted in the first essay of the book. According to Althusser Marx's epistemological break consisted in his breaking with the empiricist conception of knowledge, defined as the identification of the "real object" and the "object of knowledge", which is also the foundation of "historicism".

Once the object of knowledge and the real object have been radically distinguished from one another, of course, it is a simple matter to keep historicism at bay. Althusser's argument is based on the trivial and insignificant observation that theoretical practice is an empirically distinct practice. Hence it is based once again on the principle of the "irreducibility of appearances". Althusser seeks to demonstrate that this radical distinction is found in Marx by distorting quotations from the 1857 Introduction and by insisting that Marx's own theoretical revolution took place entirely within thought. I shall deal with the latter point first.

Marx's epistemological break entailed a transformation of the "problematic" of classical political economy. What was the basis of this transformation, if it was effected purely within thought? The answer is that the new problematic is a mutation of the old, which is already implicit within the latter. The new problematic is produced, therefore, not by Marx, but by the old problematic itself.

The Hegelian autogenesis of the concept is replaced by the autogenesis of the problematic as subject of theoretical practice. Instead of the dialectical development of the contradiction we have its analytical elimination, giving a ruptural, rather than continuous, but no less teleological account of the history of theory.

Real and rational are divorced, the former only intervening in the latter in so far as scientific practice is subverted by the intrusion of extra-scientific "interests".

Marx freed the problematic of political economy from the intrusion of bourgeois interests, so making possible the autodevelopment of the problematic which had hitherto been blocked.

The political implication is clear and intentional: preserve the autonomy of science.

The specific argument is absurd. While it is true that classical political economy is inconsistent, it is not true that this inconsistency determines a particular direction of theoretical development: the same inconsistency led to the replacement of classical political economy not only by marxism, but also by neo-classical economics. There is no sense whatever in which the concept "labour power", nor any of the other fundamental concepts which Marx introduced, is implicit within the classical discourse. The specificity of Marx's concepts in relation to those of the classics is defined by the transformation of the concept of production from one in which social relations between classes were superimposed on technical relations between factors to one in which the two constitute a contradictory unity. In the classical conception exploitation concerns the distribution of a given product. In Marx's conception exploitation dominates the production of that product. In the classical conception there is no contradiction between the technical relations of production and the social relations of distribution, nor is there conflict within production, for production and distribution are separated from one another. In Marx's conception production of use-values is subordinated to the production of social relations, in the capitalist mode of production to the production of value, so that there is a contradiction within production, and the forces and relations of production constitute a contradictory unity, in the capitalist mode of production the contradictory unity of production as production of value and as production of use-values. There is no way in which Marx could have arrived at this conception of production had he been confined to speculative thinking, to the world of theory. Althusser's argument is based on the separation of thought and reality. This leads him to accept without question the basic formulation of the classical problem of knowledge, a formulation in terms of the confrontation of a knowing subject with the object to be known.

In the Althusserian variant the subject and object are known as "theoretical practice" and the "concrete-real". The fact that Althusser dissociates his "subject" from the empirical human subject which is its "support" in humanist philosophy does not prevent him from reproducing the bourgeois philosophy of the subject: the history of bourgeois philosophy for the last hundred years has been dominated by the attempt to achieve precisely this dissociation. The fundamental problem which Althusser's philosophy has to face is that of bourgeois philosophy, that of reuniting subject and object, real-concrete and concrete-in-thought. Within such a theoretical field the reunion can only be achieved metaphysically, by God, Nature or the Party. It makes no difference whether this metaphysical philosophy of guarantees is its own justification (original definition of philosophy) or is endorsed by the Party (revised definition). This philosophy of knowledge is bourgeois in the strict sense because of its connection with the eternisation of the bourgeois relations of production, which is the defining feature of bourgeois ideology. This eternisation is based on the extraction of these relations of production from historical reality and their fixation as the given presupposition of history. Relations of production are turned into a fixed metaphysical category whose objective foundation is no longer historical but must be established by philosophy as eternal. The bourgeois ideological conception of society therefore calls forth a philosophy whose task is to provide the a priori foundation for the fixed, eternal, and so ideal, categories of that ideology, a philosophy which must be analytical rather than dialectical, and based on the radical separation of thought and reality. It is in this sense that we can call such a philosophy a bourgeois philosophy. This philosophy will have its variants. A crude reductionism will call forth a crude positivism to justify its claims that the absolute, the technical relations of production, is also real. A more sophisticated theory which takes the "mode of production" of "society" for its starting point must reject such a crude positivism, for the starting point, "society" or the "mode of production" is an

abstraction to which no reality corresponds. In either case the relation between the abstract determinations and the concrete as the "concentration of many determinations" is not seen, as it is for Marx, as the historical relation between fundamental relations and their historically developed forms, but as the epistemological relation between theory and reality. The question of the materialist dialectic in this version of "marxism" has to be settled by philosophical and not by historical investigation because the basic concept of marxism has been plucked out of history and transformed into an eternal category of thought. Marx rejected the "theoretical field" of the classical philosophy of knowledge, the conception of the relation of men and women to the world in terms of a universal subject-object opposition. Hegel had first shown the way to overcome this opposition, but he did so only formalistically, identifying the two immediately and seeing the objective as the "immanentisation" of the subjective. In putting the Hegelian dialectic on a materialist foundation Marx overcame this opposition in a historical and a materialist way, not dissolving it in thought, but rather establishing the foundation of the opposition in a real historical process in which the subjective and objective moments are dissociated from one another. Specifically, the philosophical opposition of subject and object is the expression in philosophy of the contrast between the two moments of exchange which develops with the development of commodity relations. The theory of commodity fetishism provides the means by which the essential unity of subject and object can be recovered, while at the same time grasping the opposition between the two categories as a specific historical form of appearance of social relations. Marx's conception of the commodity as a "sensuous-supersensuous" unity perfectly captures this characteristic of the social, providing the means to reveal the ideological character of "the problem of knowledge". It is an idealist fiction to imagine that the world can be the direct object of the contemplation of some subject, and it is correspondingly an idealist fiction to conceive of ideology or knowledge

in terms of a vision of the world, whether that of the empirical subject or of the "problematic" which possesses him or her. The world can only be the direct object of practical engagement in the world, just as the subject can only exist in such engagement. Contemplation can only be the one-sided appropriation of a part of the social practice of a sensuous-supersensuous person, and so is marked by the character of that social practice. Thus the difference between bourgeois and marxist political economy is essentially a difference between two class practices. However, it is not fundamentally the difference between the criteria of science applied by different classes, nor the difference in class "interests". The difference is between the different practices in which different classes are engaged and from which the notions that form the starting point of theoretical reflection are abstracted. Bourgeois political economy takes as its starting point the notions in which the bourgeoisie thinks its own practice, which are the notions embedded in that practice. Its apologetic character is founded in the trinity formula on which it is based. Marxist political economy, by contrast, reflects on the practical activity of the proletariat under capitalism. Its superiority over bourgeois political economy does not lie in a claim to truth as against falsity, nor in its identification with the "negative moment" of the dialectic of history, nor in its renunciation of the intrusion of class interest, but in its ability to comprehend the class practice of the bourgeoisie as well as that of the proletariat, expressed in its ability to comprehend bourgeois political economy. These are the terms in which Marx conducted his critique of political economy. In order to establish that Marx renounced Hegelianism in separating the order of reality from the order of knowledge, Althusser takes the unusual step of looking at Marx's work, specifically the 1857 Introduction. This is a strange choice of text, since it is overwhelmingly, and quite self-consciously, Hegelian in inspiration. Marx is here trying to locate the implications of the materialist critique of the Hegelian dialectic before setting out on the project that would culminate in *Capital*. The text is therefore of

exceptional interest, but can hardly be used if one wants to distance Marx from Hegel. The importance of the text must be qualified by the observation that it does not represent a reflection on the accomplished marxist dialectic, but rather an "anticipation of results", whose achievement would take another ten years. We should not, therefore, regard this text as a substitute for the actual operation of the marxist dialectic in *Capital*. Althusser concentrates on the third section of the Introduction. In this section Marx is looking at the consequences of the abandonment of the Hegelian proposition that the real is the product of thought, a proposition based on the conflation of thought and reality. In the course of his argument Marx notes that it is a "tautology" to say that "the concrete totality is a totality of thoughts, concrete in thought, in fact a product of thinking and comprehending". Hegel's error lies not in this tautological observation, but in his seeing the "concrete in thought" as a "product of the concept which thinks and generates itself outside or above observation and conception" instead of seeing it as a "product, rather, of the working up of observation and conception into concepts". Since Marx has only just noted that the "real concrete" is the point of departure for observation and conception, it is quite clear that Marx does not intend to separate thought and the real, but taxes Hegel with effecting this separation on the basis of a tautology. In the same vein Marx notes that even for speculative thought which does not engage with the real world the subject, society, rather than the concept, remains the presupposition. Althusser defends his separation of "thought" and "reality" by picking up these Hegelian "tautologies" and attributing them to Marx. Althusser also picks up on Marx's discussion of the relationship between the order of categories in the development of the analysis and the order in which they appear historically in order to establish the "anti-historicist" character of Marx's conception of theory. Marx points out Hegel's confusion of "the way in which thought appropriates the concrete" with "the process by which the concrete itself comes into being". This confusion leads Hegel to seek to analyse

the relations between the elements of contemporary society in terms of "the historic position of the economic relations in the succession of different forms of society". This identification of the order of appearance of categories with their contemporary relationship is a double error. First, the order of historic appearance of the categories does not correspond to the order of their "historic position" (i.e. in which they were "historically decisive"). It is only retrospectively that we can use the abstract categories to understand previous forms of society. Secondly, the development of new relations is not necessarily subordinate to existing relations, but may subordinate the latter and so transform the structure of the totality and not simply develop it. For example money exists before capital, expressing the "dominant relations of a less developed whole", whereas it subsequently expresses "those subordinate relations of a more developed whole which already had a historic existence before this whole developed in the direction expressed by a more concrete category".

Althusser concludes from this section that "the production process of knowledge takes place entirely within knowledge", despite the fact that the whole section is quite explicitly concerned with the "historical existence" of the categories and not with their theoretical production, arguing not that their order is determined within knowledge, but that it is "determined, rather, by their relation to one another in modern bourgeois society". What Marx criticises in this passage is not Hegel's "historicism", his search for a relation between the historical and theoretical development of the categories. It is the ideological character of Hegel's solution, which projects on to history the dialectic of contemporary society, to which he objects because it makes contemporary society into the pinnacle of history: "the so-called historical presentation of development is founded, as a rule, on the fact that the latest form regards the previous ones as steps leading up to itself, and, since it is only rarely and under quite specific conditions able to criticise itself... it always conceives them one-sidedly". It is because

the dialectic is located solely in thought that Hegel can project the order of categories of contemporary society, which express their relation in contemporary society, on to history.

Hegel's errors which Marx locates in the 1857 Introduction do not derive from his identification of real and ideal, but from the specifically idealist form of this identification which leads him to see the dialectic as being located entirely in thought. The form of the dialectic cannot be constructed in theory, but requires a prodigious labour of historical investigation to uncover it. What Althusser identifies as Marx's breakthrough is precisely what Marx identifies as Hegel's error! The implications of the simple "inversion" of Hegel's dialectic, which Althusser derides, are far-reaching. Thus, while the mystical side of Hegel's dialectic was easily identified in principle, its practical criticism was "no trifle".

The extraction of the rational kernel did not consist in discovering a new "abstract and idealist" form, but in divesting the "real content" of any such form, for the materialist dialectic is the "real course of history itself". The form of the dialectic could not be discovered in theory, nor in "history" as the realisation, manifestation or representation (*Darstellung*) of a dialectic which lies outside it. It is the elimination of the idealist foundation of the Hegelian dialectic that is the immediate basis of the complexity of the marxist dialectic. The first part of the 1857 Introduction makes this clear, arguing that the Hegelian dialectic tends to reduce the complexity of the totality of moments of the process of social production, seeing these moments as unmediated identities. The materialist foundation of the marxist dialectic means that there is no possibility of discovering beneath the mediations of the process a more fundamental identity of its moments.

Marxist dialectic thus differs from the Hegelian in that its mediations are real, reality offering a resistance to the development of real contradictions which cannot be dissolved in thought but which must be overcome in reality. The Marxian dialectic is thus dissimulated,

not in the form of the presentation of the Lacanian unconscious, but in the mediated form of the historical development of the materialist dialectic. Elimination of the idealist foundation of the Hegelian dialectic implies the renunciation of the temptation to accomplish purely formal reductions of the complexity of the real. Because Althusser does not understand this, he does not understand the significance of Marx's critique of Ricardo. Ricardo did not simply forget to mention the word "surplus value", he insisted on seeing the forms of surplus value as simple manifestations of surplus value, without realising that these forms contradict the essence they are supposed to express. Marx's response was not to invoke some "relative autonomy" to accommodate this contradiction, but to develop the concrete mediations through which surplus value makes its appearance in the forms of profit, interest and rent. It is precisely to the extent that Hegel's dialectic remains entirely within knowledge that it is a simple, unmediated, idealist dialectic. In setting the dialectic on a materialist foundation Marx did not simply carry out a formal operation within knowledge, but transformed the relation between knowledge and the real by locating the dialectic in history. In *Capital*, as the result of intensive historical investigation as well as theoretical elaboration, Marx arrives at the materialist dialectic. In the development of the basic contradiction in the heart of the commodity between use value and value Marx is not describing a formal mechanism occurring within thought. As Engels noted: "As we are not considering here an abstract process of thought taking place solely in our heads, but a real process which actually took place at some particular time or is still taking place, these contradictions, too, will have developed in practice and will probably have found their solution. We shall trace the nature of this solution and shall discover that it has been brought about by the establishment of a new relation whose two opposite sides we shall now have to develop, and so on". The relation between thought and the real is clear to Marx: "the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the

human mind, and translated into forms of thought". Marx even warns us against Althusser: "If the life of the subject matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori construction".

Although rigorously empiricist in Althusser's sense, this couldn't be further from bourgeois empiricism, from the treatment of reality as a planar world of irreducible appearances. It is this bourgeois empiricism which dictates that the categories which are mobilised to explain these appearances can only be located in thought, on the basis that only the appearance is real. The radical separation of thought and reality is therefore the epistemological basis of the doctrine which seeks to translate the appearances of bourgeois society into absolutes, to dehistoricise bourgeois social relations and so give them an eternal character. Althusser's adoption of this philosophy has more than a hint of *déjà vu*. If the dialectic is torn from its materialist foundation and is relocated in theory, it reverts to the "wholly abstract, 'speculative' form in which Hegel had bequeathed it". In this form "the entire heritage of Hegel was limited to a sheer pattern by the help of which every theme was devised, and to a compilation of words and turns of speech which had no other purpose than to be at hand at the right time where thought and positive knowledge were lacking". This is precisely the dialectic of Stalinist *diamat*. But Althusser does not follow Marx in setting this mystified dialectic on its feet, in reversing the Stalinist subordination of "historical" to "dialectical" materialism. He rather sweeps away the dialectic altogether. Engels noted the consequence of this reaction to Hegelianism: "Only when Feuerbach declared speculative conceptions untenable did Hegelianism gradually fall asleep; and it seemed as if the reign of the old metaphysics, with its fixed categories, had begun anew in science Hegel fell into oblivion; and there developed the new natural-scientific materialism which is almost indistinguishable theoretically from that of the eighteenth century. . . . The lumbering cart-horse of bourgeois workaday understanding

naturally stops dead in confusion before the ditch which separates essence from appearance, cause from effect; but if one goes gaily hunting over such badly broken ground as that of abstract thinking, one must not ride cart-horses." It is its domination by such a metaphysical materialism, expressed in its articulation in terms of fixed categories, that explains the failure of classical economics. It is only the application of the dialectic taken from Hegel, but set on its feet, that enables Marx and Engels to see these categories not as fixed but as expressions of processes interacting in a contradictory, historical, totality. This is the revolutionary theoretical significance of Marx's "historicism", it comes from Hegel, and it is suppressed by Althusser. It is not surprising, then, that Althusser cannot understand Marx's true break, that with the metaphysical materialism of classical political economy.

Althusser's critique of the Hegelian dialectic is not original. It reproduces that of the revisionism of the Second International, and its ambition is the same: to divorce marxist science from marxist politics. For both, the revolutionary side of the marxist dialectic is eliminated by the separation of science and ideology, of fact and value, on the basis of the Kantian separation of thought and reality, resulting in the claim that marxism is not a "moral" theory. In both cases politics is taken out of the hands of the working class and put into those of the party. It is no coincidence that the neo-positivist philosophy of knowledge espoused by Althusser, whether in "theoreticist" or "politicist" variants, is precisely the modern version of the positivism employed by the earlier revisionists. "The Hegelian dialectic constitutes the perfidious element in the Marxian doctrine, the snare, the obstacle which bars the path to every logical appreciation of things . . .

What Marx and Engels achieved that was great was not achieved thanks to the Hegelian dialectic, but against it." Marx was undoubtedly right to revise one of Hegel's laws of the dialectic: "Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance

in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce."

In the second essay of *Reading Capital* Althusser turns back to the specificity of Marx's theoretical discovery. Since many of the main points anticipate Balibar's fuller discussion, I shall deal only briefly with this essay. Althusser starts with a very lengthy discussion of different conceptions of historical time, reducing "historicism" to the supposedly Hegelian conception of historical time characterised by a homogeneous continuity and contemporaneity. Althusser's conclusions can be briefly stated: the principle of the "irreducibility of the real" dictates that each level of the complex whole should have its own time, while the conception of knowledge as an autonomous practice dictates that the times cannot be related to a "single continuous reference time" because the complex whole is not a real object but an object of knowledge in which the relations between the levels are therefore functional and not temporal. The final conclusion is that "there is no history in general, but only specific structures of historicity". The argument is trivial and irrelevant, the conclusion depending on the double insulation of the real as irreducible and unknowable. Since there is no way of leaving theory, which knows nothing of time, it is difficult to see how a theory of history of any kind is possible. There is no way of getting from "the 'development of forms' of the concept in knowledge" to "the development of the real categories in concrete history" without encountering a single continuous reference time which readmits the possibility of "history in general".

After much polemicising against "historicism" Althusser eventually comes to pose the central question of his text: "what is the object of Capital?" This is discussed in terms of Marx's originality with respect to classical political economy. Althusser takes the definition of political economy found in Lalande's *Dictionnaire Philosophique* as the basis of his discussion. Since this relates essentially to vulgar and not to classical economy the discussion is very confused. Althusser regards the

key features of Marx's critique to be his critique of the anthropological conception of human needs and of the "empiricist-positivist" conception of economic facts as in essence measurable. This leads Althusser to interpret the first part of the 1857 Introduction, which establishes the priority of relations of production over those of consumption, distribution and exchange, as a critique of the supposed anthropological basis of classical political economy. If Althusser were right about Marx's critique of political economy, then Ricardo would have been a marxist. Althusser concedes that Ricardo's economics was based on production, even believes, wrongly, that he "gave every outward sign of recognising" the relations of production, only lacking the word. While Althusser notes that this absence is crucial, he doesn't seem to have any idea why. Ricardo did not ignore the relations of production because he saw them as being constituted by some anthropologically defined needs, but because he saw production in purely technological terms, so leading him to establish class relations at the level of distribution. Nor was Ricardo so naive as to ignore the fact that profit receivers own means of production, or that rent receivers own land. His error was to see the social aspect of relations of production as social relations of distribution superimposed on an eternal structure of production, and so to see the production of surplus value as a natural process, only its appropriation being socially determined. It is the realisation that production is the production of social relations and not simply of material products that enables Marx to examine the form of value as well as its magnitude, and so to uncover the fundamental contradiction between value and use-value which is the basis of the argument of Capital. It is this discovery that capitalist relations are not eternal but historic, a discovery which depends on the critique of metaphysical materialism by the dialectic derived from Hegel, that constitutes Marx's "historisation" of classical political economy. In renouncing the Hegelian heritage and returning to metaphysical materialism Althusser proves the point by his inability to

separate Marx from Ricardo. Althusser correctly argues that Marx sees production as being "characterised by two indissociable elements: the labour process . . . and the social relations of production beneath whose determination this labour process is executed". Having noted the indissociable character of the elements, Althusser goes on to discuss them quite separately! The argument is purely Ricardian: the process of production as a technological process determines certain functions. The "relations of production" assign agents to these functions by distributing these agents in relation to the means of production. The relations of production do not therefore determine the production of surplus value under capitalism, but only its appropriation.

The two essential features of the labour process, for Althusser, are its material nature, and the dominant role of the means of production in that process. Althusser correctly notes that Marx's insistence on the material character of the labour process, on the importance of use-value to political economy, led him to give proper consideration to the necessity for material reproduction. But he also sees this as the key to the discovery of "the concept of the economic forms of existence of these material conditions", the distinction between constant and variable capital. Althusser seems blissfully unaware of the fact that the latter distinction is a value relation and not a physical relation, and so derives from the (social) relations of production and not from the (technical) nature of the labour process. He shares his ignorance with classical political economy, which could not distinguish fixed and circulating from constant and variable capital precisely because it could not understand the dual nature of production. The capacity for capital expended on labour power to vary has nothing whatever to do with the material features of the labour process, but depends on the ability of the capitalist to compel the labourer to work beyond the time of necessary labour. This is not the only example of Althusser's confusion: it is consistent. Thus we find that such a technologicistic interpretation also emerges from Althusser's

discussion of the supposed dominance of the means of labour over the labour process. This dominance is simply asserted in the wake of a quotation to the effect that the means of labour can be used to indicate "the degree of development of the labourer" and "the social relations in which he labours". It is similarly asserted that "the means of labour determine the typical form of the labour process considered: by establishing the mode of attack on the external nature subject to transformation in economic production, they determine the mode of production, the basic category of marxist analysis (in economics and history); at the same time they establish the level of productivity of productive labour". The asserted dominance of the means of labour is central to Althusserianism both in establishing the autonomy of theoretical practice and in founding the domination of capital. It is used in two senses: firstly that of the dominance of the means of labour over labour. However, this dominance, for Marx, is simply the expression within the labour process of the domination of capital over labour, and as such is specific to the labour process under capitalism. Secondly in the sense of the quote above, that the means of labour determines the labour process. In an empirical sense the assertion is trivial: given certain tools only certain operations can be performed. But in the theoretical structure of marxism this is very far from being true. The basic category of marxist analysis is the (historical) concept of the social form of production and not the (technical) concept of the means of labour.

Given Althusser's Ricardian conception of production, it is inevitable that he should also have a Ricardian conception of the relations of production. These are seen as co-determinant of the mode of production. This is not, however, in the marxist contradictory unity of forces and relations of production, but in the classical harmony of the "unity of this double unity", unity of the technically determined relations of production and the socially determined relations of

distribution. The former represents the distribution of functions, the latter the distribution of agents.

This conception of the "relations of production" makes it very difficult to give any meaning to "determination in the last instance by the economic". The economic cannot be determinant in the first instance because the "relations of production" are fundamentally political or ideological, and not economic relations. This is because Althusser's "relations of production", like those of classical political economy, are relations of distribution mapped on to production by law or custom which assign rights to shares in the product by virtue of the ownership of factors. Hence "relations of production" can only be legal or ideological relations, they "presuppose the existence of a legal-political and ideological superstructure as a condition of their peculiar emphasis". This means that the political or ideological levels are in fact determinant. Althusser tells us that it is the relations of production which establish "the degree of effectivity delegated to a certain level of the social totality", but since the "relation of production" is itself constituted by such a level it is difficult to see how this could establish that the economic is determinant in the last instance. In the end Althusser has recourse to a new concept of causality to escape the dilemma: the idea of structural-causality-in - a - complex - whole - structured - in - dominance - in - the - last -instance-by-the-economic.

As part of an interdependent whole the economic is an effect of the structure of the whole itself. The causality is therefore one in which the whole is a cause visible only in its effects. It is this invisible whole that is secretly dominated by the economic. This idea of the complex pre-given whole structured in dominance is not as original as it may sound. Althusser has managed to reproduce the theoretical structure of contemporary bourgeois sociology. This is not surprising as the theoretical foundation of both is the conception of production also found in classical political economy. It is this "absent presence" in the

Althusserian discourse that makes it possible for "sophisticated" readers to find a content for its rhetoric. Although the rhetoric is unfamiliar to the sociologist, the content is very well known. Althusser asks how we can conceptualise the levels of a social formation and their interrelation. The starting point is the "pre-given" whole, the irreducible appearance with which bourgeois sociology begins. The principle of articulation of this whole must be prior to any of the pre-given levels of this whole and is found, in bourgeois sociology, in the idealist fiction of "society", which is a cause visible only in its effects. Scandal is normally avoided by adopting a "nominalist" interpretation of this fiction, which exists only in theory which, of course, must not be confused with the real. This theoretical fiction determines the differentiation of global social functions, the functions being hierarchised into material, social and ideological reproduction on the basis of an "anthropology of needs".

The pre-given whole of bourgeois sociology is thus complex, and it is structured in dominance in the last instance by the "economic", or material production. Corresponding to these functions are specific, relatively autonomous, institutional levels which ensure that the functions in question will be fulfilled. Economic institutions ensure material reproduction by assigning functions to agents through the division of labour. Political institutions assign agents to functions by means of the law of property and contract. Ideological institutions "assure the bonds of men with one another in the ensemble of the forms of their existence, the relation of individuals to their tasks fixed by the social structure".

The domination of Althusser's "marxism" by the theoretical "problematic" of bourgeois sociology is total. The consequences of ignoring Marx's critique of Ricardo are grave, for Ricardo is not simply a historical figure, he is the very foundation of contemporary bourgeois sociology. Marx avoids the need to introduce concepts of "overdetermination" and "determination in the last instance" by transforming the concept of production. The relations of production are

not the expression in production of politically or ideologically constituted relations of distribution. The latter are subordinate to the former. Marx is not so naive as to believe that relations of production do not presuppose, either empirically or analytically, relations of distribution: If it is said that, since production must begin with a certain distribution of the instruments of production, it follows that distribution at least in this sense precedes and forms the presupposition of production, then the reply must be that production does indeed have its determinants and preconditions, which form its moments. At the very beginning these may appear as spontaneous, natural. But by the process of production itself they are transformed from natural into historic determinants. . . . The questions raised above all reduce themselves in the last instance to the role played by general-historical relations in production, and their relation to the movement of history generally. The question evidently belongs within the treatment and investigation of production itself.

The question concerns, therefore, the primacy of production in the historical development of a differentiated totality. It has nothing to do with the question of the empirical possibility of production without superstructures, nor with the metaphysical question of the possibility of a concept of production defined without reference to superstructures. The primacy of production is founded in history and not in the mind, a fact of history, not the condition of its possibility. Marx takes production in society as his starting point. In this sense he starts with society as a pre-given whole. But this pre-given whole is the concrete historical anchorage of his analysis, and not its theoretical point of departure. The theoretical starting point is production, and the specific differentiation and articulation of "levels" is developed on the basis of the analysis of production. Marx makes the point in a quote which Althusser uses to establish "over determination": The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of

production itself, and, in turn reacts upon it as a determining element. Upon this, however, is founded the entire formation of the economic community which grows out of the production relations themselves, thereby simultaneously its specific political form . . .

In his analysis of this quotation Althusser collapses these two sentences into one in arguing that the text proves "that a certain form of combination of the elements present necessarily implied a certain form of domination and servitude indispensable to the survival of this combination, i.e. a certain political configuration (Gestaltung) of society". But (aber) this is not at all what Marx says. The first sentence (Satz) makes no reference to political configuration, but refers rather to the "relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself, and it is this relationship which reacts back on the economic form of surplus labour extraction. The second sentence is separated from the first by the emphatic "however" and argues that the economic community and its specific political form is founded on "this", the "this" referring to the combination of specific economic form and relation of ruler to ruled which grows out of production as forms of the relation of production. To argue that economic, political and ideological relations have to be analysed as historically developed forms of the relations of production is not to offer an "economist" position. It is to argue that the unity of the different forms of social relation as relations of class exploitation is more fundamental than any separation or specification not only of "political" and "ideological" but also of "economic" relations as distinct forms of the relations of production. If the differentiated forms of appearance of these class relations are taken as they present themselves, as pre-given, "relatively autonomous" levels, any attempt to explain one in terms of another, even "in the last instance" is bound to be reductionist. Marx's analysis reveals, however, that class relations whose immediate foundation is the production of surplus value in the process of production, are not purely "economic", but are in class societies multidimensional power relations which are

expressed in particular ideological forms. This is why *Capital* is not simply a work of economics. In it Marx does develop rigorously the economic form of the relations of production, but he also develops an analysis of the typical ideological form of the capital relation as the basis of his critique of political economy, and he at least indicates the way to develop the political form, as exemplified in the quote above.

Balibar's contribution to *Reading Capital* brings out clearly the connection between the anti-historicist project of that work and the adoption of the bourgeois concept of production. In order to construct an analytical version of Marx the basic concepts must be purged of historicity and founded entirely "within theory". History will then be a construct of the mode of production and not its starting point.

Classical political economy and its ideological heir, functionalist sociology, provide precisely the transhistorical foundation on which to construct the concept "mode of production". Balibar bases his concept of the mode of production on a universal, transhistorical conception of production-in-general as the invariant of history. Each specific mode is then a variant combination of the invariant elements and relations which enter this combination, and history the succession of such modes. The concept "mode of production" is thus the basis of the theory of history (as the basis of comparison), and of the science of society (in specifying each mode as a series of articulated practices whose articulation is the object of the science of society). The elements of the mode of production are the labourer, the means of production and the non-worker. The relations which combine these elements are the relation of real appropriation and the property relation. In the capitalist mode of production "capital is the owner of all the means of production and of labour [sic], and therefore it is the owner of the entire product", and this is the specifically capitalist form of the property relation. The relation of real appropriation is that designated by Marx as "the real material appropriation of the means of production by the producer in the labour process..., or simply as the appropriation of nature by man".

Initially in Balibar's presentation this relation involves only the labourer and the means of production.

However we subsequently find the capitalist intervening as well, the capitalist's control being a "technically indispensable moment of the labour process", so that the relation of real appropriation comes to be defined as "the direct producer's ability to set to work the means of social production". Although Balibar's exposition is hardly clear, it eventually emerges that the difference between these relations is previously that between the classic relations of distribution and relations of production. Hence the difference is assimilated to that between supposedly distinct technical and social divisions of labour: the organisation of production and the organisation of exploitation. The mode of production is the combination of these relations, "the relationship between these two connections and their interdependence". Balibar develops the obvious anti-historicist implications of the concept at some length in his second chapter.

Textual support is given for this position, the texts in question being those of Freud seen through the eyes of Lacan. Unfortunately, however, Balibar has little more of substance to say about the concept itself, and gives us no reason to believe that it is Marx's concept at all. In a section which did not appear in the first edition of *Reading Capital* Balibar informs us, without evidence, that "Marx constantly defines the 'relations of production'... by its kind of ownership of the means of production, and therefore by the mode of appropriation of the social product which depends on it". This "property" connection must be sharply distinguished from the law of property, we have to look for "the relations of production behind the legal forms, or better: behind the secondary unity of production and law". We are not, however, told either how to do this, or what we will find.

The section on the productive forces is no more illuminating. Balibar describes the respective labour processes characteristic of manufacture and modern industry, noting that the former can be

characterised by the "unity of labour-power [sic] and the means of labour", the latter by "the unity of the means of labour and the object of labour".

Balibar then concludes that "as a consequence of the relationship between the elements of the combination, the natures of those elements themselves are transformed" (my emphasis), although he has merely noted that the two change concomitantly and hasn't even discussed the causation of the change. Although Balibar adds very little to Althusser's brief comments on the concept of "mode of production", he does raise the question of "determination in the last instance" which Althusser essentially ignored. The argument is terminologically confused. It begins with an extraordinary discussion of fetishism, which even

Balibar has subsequently recognised is "bad", which I shall charitably ignore. Balibar develops the concept of determination in the last instance in relation to the feudal mode of production, basing himself on a quotation from *Capital*, vol. III, in which Marx considers labour rent. In this passage Marx notes that the non-coincidence of necessary and surplus labour in time and space implies that the surplus labour of the direct producer must be extorted by "other than economic pressure". Balibar argues that this is the "characteristic difference between the feudal mode of production and the capitalist mode of production". This difference in turn derives from "the form of combination of the factors of the production process" in the two modes of production. Hence in the capitalist mode of production "the coincidence of the labour process and the process of producing value" implies that the "corresponding 'transformed forms' in this social structure, i.e. the forms of the relations between classes, are then directly economic forms (profit, rent, wages, interest), which implies notably that the state does not intervene in them at this level". (This is the theory of "revenue sources".) On the other hand "in the feudal mode of production there is a disjunction between the two processes. . .

. Surplus-labour cannot then be extorted by 'other than economic pressure'. . . . Even before we have analysed the 'transformed forms' for themselves, we can conclude that in the feudal mode of production they will not be the transformed forms of the economic base alone, . . . not directly economic but directly and indissolubly political and economic".

Finally, Balibar reaches a definition of determination in the last instance: "The economy is determinant in that it determines which of the instances of the structure occupies the determinant place." The fundamental error which underlies this account is located in its initial premises, the belief that the defining feature of the feudal mode of production is its domination by the political. A number of points in Balibar's analysis lead us to seek an alternative basis for the differentiation of the social forms of production. Firstly, the passage from Capital on which it is based concerns labour rent, the simplest form of feudal ground rent, and not the feudal "mode of production". In the continuation of the passage Marx discusses other forms of feudal rent in which labour and surplus labour are coincident in time and space. None of the passage makes any reference to determination by the political level, but merely to the use of "other than economic pressure". Hence the attempt to explain the supposed domination by the political by reference to the "form of combination of the factors of the production process" does not even get off the ground.

Secondly, it is worth noting that in the very quotation with which Balibar introduces the discussion Marx refers not to politics but to Catholicism as appearing to play the chief part in the middle ages. Thirdly, as he realises in his "Self-Criticism", Balibar's claim that capitalist relations are directly economic gives the economic an autonomy which would undermine the whole theory of over determination. Fourthly, if the economic is not determinant in the first instance, it is difficult to see how a theoretical argument can establish that it is determinant in the last instance without relying on an

anthropology of needs which would assert that material reproduction is the prime function of society, an assertion which is not only theoretically unacceptable, but which is also demonstrably false: in the capitalist mode of production mass starvation is a far less significant barrier to reproduction than the threat of a declining rate of profit. The belief that the political is dominant/determinant in feudal society is not a marxist belief, but one which bourgeois historians counter pose to marxism. It is a conception which derives very directly from the ideology in which the bourgeois revolution was conducted, an ideology whose most systematic expression is to be found in classical political economy. Although the latter was a historical, regarding bourgeois relations of production as eternal, it was not so naive as to believe that capitalism had no prehistory.

It's a historical character lies precisely in seeing this prehistory as no more than the prehistory of capitalism. It does this by contrasting the eternal bourgeois relations of production with historically given relations of distribution, the latter only coming into harmony with the former with the triumph of capitalism. Hence the pre-capitalist modes are all characterised by political intervention which distorts relations of distribution that would otherwise have arisen spontaneously as capitalist relations on the basis of the eternal structure of production. Political intervention is required because in non-capitalist modes the surplus does not accrue "naturally" to the exploiting classes. The feudal lord is therefore seen as a disfigured capitalist landowner, using his political power to secure not only his land rent, but also the "profit" of the capitalist or "self-employed" petty producer, and even to depress the "wages" of the direct producers.

Classical political economy is a very revolutionary doctrine, expressing the alliance between capital, artisan and peasant in its critique of feudal relations of production. The problem with Althusserianism is that it is mixed up with the wrong revolution.

There is no more basis for the claim that the political is determinant in feudal society than for the claim that it is determinant in capitalist society. There is no difference in principle between the two. In every class society relations of exploitation are not simply economic relations between particular individuals, they are class relations in which those individuals relate as members of social classes. Thus the existence and the perpetuation of a class relation is the historical presupposition of particular relations of exploitation, and the perpetuation of class relations in any class society requires a state that will act politically in an attempt to confine members of the exploited class within the boundaries of the dominant class relation. The state is as much a class state in capitalist society as it is in feudal society, and capitalist society, as much as feudal society, requires a class state.

Within capitalist society the state is necessary to preserve the commodity character of labour power, and it has to do this not only in the period of "primitive accumulation", when capitalist social relations are being formed, but also as the fundamental aspect of its everyday operation in capitalist society. It is the commodity character of labour power that defines the class character of the capital relation, and the subordination of the labourers to the wage form involves the intervention of the state. Within feudal society the state is necessary to preserve the dependent character of the labourer, a necessity which is all the more pressing to the extent that land has not been entirely engrossed by the dominant class. Thus the characteristic feudal class relation, the relation of personal dependence, presupposes historically the existence of an authority that is able to impose and to preserve that relation of dependence.

Thus neither feudal nor capitalist class relations can be considered in isolation from the class state that is one aspect of those relations. In order to construct a transhistorical concept of the mode of production Balibar takes as his starting point Marx's definition of the labour process, found in *Capital* but as likely to be encountered in any

engineering textbook. From this Balibar derives the elements which enter his concept of the mode of production, although the elements do not exist outside the mode of production, their content being specified by the two relations of the mode of production. Although marxist terms are applied to these relations they are, as I have noted, essentially the classical conceptions of the relations of production determined by the technical requirements of the labour process, and relations of distribution which receive a politico-legal or ideological definition in terms of the distribution of (relation of ownership to) the means of production. If these two relations are to be superimposed on one another as relations which define a single combination they must connect the same elements with one another. This is awkward, since the non-worker who appropriates surplus labour and figures in the relations of distribution does not play any role, as a non-worker, in production itself. Various expedients are adopted to avoid embarrassment: in the capitalist mode of production the capitalist is insinuated into the process of production as a technically indispensable element of the labour process, the element of co-ordination and control. In the Asiatic mode of production the non-worker appears to play a part in the labour process as personification of the "higher unity", "the communal conditions of real appropriation".

The non-worker is therefore implicitly assigned a place in the labour process as expression of a general requirement of co-operation. This, however, raises further difficulties, for the non-worker is not a feature of all societies, but only of class societies. He cannot therefore appear as a transhistorical element of the invariant without eternising exploitative social relations. Further problems arise in the treatment of the "labourer (labour power)", for it is not the same element which enters the forces and relations of production, as is indicated by the parenthesis. It is precisely its attempt to root relations of distribution in technical features of the labour process that explains the classical failure to distinguish the concept of labour from that of labour power,

and the two are systematically confused in Balibar's treatment. If we define the relation of production in terms of property, then the non-worker owns the means of production and the labourer in the slave mode of production, and the means of production and labour power (in one phase of the circuit of capital) in the capitalist mode of production. On the other hand, the forces of production implicate neither labourer nor labour power, but concrete labour. The distinction between these totally different concepts is the basis of Marx's critique of political economy. It is only because he saw the capitalist mode of production as a historical phenomenon that he could unravel the confusion of the physical aspect of labour as concrete useful labour and its social aspect, under capital, of value-creating abstract labour. It is no use arguing lamely that the elements have no content until specified in a mode, because this argument is circular and so vacuous. There is no sense whatever in which labour, labourer and labour power are the same thing, just as there is no sense in which the non-worker and the form of co-operation are the same thing. If the two relations of Balibar's combination can only be brought together by eternising exploitative relations of production and by confusing the social and the physical, his characterisation of the relations is also faulty. I shall focus on the concept of relations of production. The relation of production is conceived as a relation of distribution mapped on to the general structure of production, hence as a relation of distribution of means of production, hence as a property relation. This is the orthodox Stalinist definition. "The economic relation of production appears ... as a relation between three functionally defined terms: owner class/means of production/class of exploited producers."

This relation is consistently defined in terms of the legal relation of ownership. The immediate problem this poses is that of disentangling the relation of production from the legal forms in which it appears. This is doubly difficult for the Althusserians. First, because their epistemology demands that the extraction of the non-legal relation

should be effected in theory, hence analytically. If "we are obliged ... to describe it in the peculiar terminology of legal categories" it is difficult to see how this can be done.

Secondly, and more fundamentally, because the "relation of production" is simply a relation of distribution mapped on to production by the legal connection of ownership of means of production, it is only the latter legal connection that constitutes the relation of production. Hence there is no relation of production other than that defined legally for the Althusserians. This is because they do not ask what is the basis on which the surplus product is produced, but rather what is the basis on which the already produced surplus product becomes the property of the exploiter, a question which is a purely legal question of title to shares in the product. Hence Balibar cannot do anything more than to specify this legal relation at the level of production. Thus the Althusserians are consistently and necessarily unable to specify any concept of "property relation" that is distinct from the legal relation of ownership. There is, certainly, a relation between ownership of the means of production and ownership of shares of the product, but it is the ideological relation constituted, in capitalist society, by the "trinity formula" which ascribes revenues to "factors": the capitalist is entitled to the surplus product because he has title to one of the factors of production. That this formula is indeed ideological can be established even at the level of the isolated process of production. The capitalist cannot own the surplus product because he owns the means of production, for the latter are soon used up in production. He owns the surplus because he owns the whole product. He owns the whole product because he owns means of production and labour power. However, so long as the proletariat is dominated by "bourgeois romantic illusions" about their "human" rights and dignities, it is ideologically more sound that they think of the wage as their share in the product than as the price of their substance.

Marx goes beneath the level of appearances to ask not what is the basis of the property of the exploiter in the surplus product of the direct producer, but rather what is the basis of the production of the surplus product by the direct producer? This question leads us directly to relations of production and is prior to any questions of relations of distribution and so of legal relations. Having established the basis in production of the expenditure of surplus labour, the question of the appropriation of that surplus labour is relatively trivial. Hence the relation of production is more fundamental than the property relations which express it. To see this it is worth working back from the "trinity formula". The capitalist owns the surplus product because he owns the means of production and labour power. But he owns means of production and labour power because he is a capitalist, because he can constantly replace means of production and labour power as they are used up. He is therefore a capitalist before he is owner of the means of production. As an owner the capitalist is in a formally symmetrical position to the labourer, for it is in the market that labourer and capitalist meet as owners. The question we have to ask concerns the basis of the substantive asymmetry of this encounter: why can the capitalist buy the worker's labour power, while the worker cannot buy the means of production? Why can the labourer be united with the objective conditions of labour only under the domination of capital? The answer lies in the circumstances in which capitalist and labourer enter not production but circulation, the capitalist as owner of money capital (not means of production), the worker as owner of nothing but his or her labour power. The capitalist relation of production is, correspondingly, not founded on the relation between labourer and owner of means of production, but on that between free labour and capital, and this is why it cannot be seen as an interpersonal relation. The relation with which we are concerned is not fundamentally a property relation, but a relation between classes. This relation is not defined by the legal connection of the members of these classes to the

elements of the labour process, but by the modes of participation of the different classes in the total process of social production (which includes not only production, but also circulation, distribution and consumption). The basis of this relation in the capitalist mode of production must be sought in the conditions which determine that the capitalist as owner of money confronts the labourer as owner of no more than his labour power. This is not the question of the historical conditions of the capitalist mode of production, but rather of the process within the capitalist mode of production by which the latter reproduces its own conditions of existence. In other words the key to the capital relation is not to be found in the isolated process of production, but in the process of total social reproduction. Although Balibar recognises that the analysis of reproduction is important, he fails to understand that it is fundamental to the definition of the mode of production itself.

Balibar's separation of production and reproduction is a common one, based on an over hasty reading of Capital. In Capital Marx does consider the different moments of the circuit of capital independently of one another, in turn, before he looks at the circuit of capital as a whole. It is only when he turns to reproduction in volume one and to the circuit of capital in volume two that Marx ties the argument together and situates the previous discussion. It is only when he does this that the social form of the capitalist mode of production is revealed, because it is only in the circuit as a whole that the production and reproduction of capital has its rationale. This should be clear if we consider the moments of the circuit separately, for if we do so we are unable to find the fundamental class relation of capitalist society. In the consideration of the commodity form, the moment of circulation considered in isolation, Marx cannot find any class relations, but only relations between free and equal owners of commodities. In the consideration of the production process Marx cannot find class relations either, for here we have only relations between individual capitalists and individual workers. The capitalist process of production is a process

of production of capital, only to the extent that it is a process of production of surplus value. Surplus value is the difference between the value expended in variable capital and the value realised in the sale of the product, after deduction of constant capital, and neither of these sums exist if production is considered in isolation. Thus the production of surplus value presupposes the commodity form of the product and of labour power, while the capitalist form of circulation presupposes the production of surplus value: capitalist production and circulation presuppose one another in the unity of the circuit of capital. The circuit of capital describes the series of economic forms taken by capital and labour in the subordination of labour to the production of capital. This series cannot be reduced to one of its forms: the class relation is the unity of forms expressed in the circuit of the reproduction of the capital relation. This unity is expressed in the confrontation of capital with free labour, and the persistence of the capital relation depends on preserving the "free" character of labour, i.e. the commodity form of labour power. In parts VII and VIII of volume one Marx shows how this commodity form is preserved through the permanent dispossession of the worker in the circuit of capital, through the expansion and contraction of the reserve army of labour, and through the use of the law and of force. It is this class relation, i.e. a total social relation that is the presupposition of the production and accumulation of capital, whose forms are described in the metamorphoses of the circuit of capital. This relation cannot be reduced to the economic forms in which it appears (this is precisely the fetishism of the commodity that inverts the relationship between social relation and economic category), let alone to one of those forms. The basis of capitalist social relations is the commodity form of labour power, and not the capitalist's ownership of the means of production. The latter is only one aspect of one form of capital within its circuit, an aspect which is, moreover, technically, rather than socially, necessary for the capitalist to be able to set in motion the labour power which he has purchased, and as such the

foundation for the illusions about the technical necessity of capital expressed in the "trinity formula" and destroyed by Capital. Having discussed the relations of production at some length there is little to be said about the Althusserian conception of the forces of production, for it is simply the other side of the coin. It is because the technical division of labour is seen as a set of positions determined by the technology of production, because relations of production are eternised, that the forces/relations distinction is seen in terms of a distinction between technical relations of production and social relations of distribution, expressed in terms of the technical and social division of labour or of the supposedly distinct relations of real appropriation and relations of production. It is because Marx sees the relations of distribution as moments of the relations of production, and sees the latter as indissolubly technical and social, that he had "difficulty" in "clearly thinking the distinction between the two connections".

Analytically we can argue that the technical characteristics of the forces of production impose constraints on the relations within which production takes place, just as analytically we can argue that the relations of production impose constraints on the forces which can be brought into play. But this does not mean that we can isolate two sets of relations of production, two divisions of labour, one technical and one social. The distinction between the two is not "a real distinction but simply a modal distinction, corresponding to two ways of conceptualising the same process. Technical and social division are two aspects of the same division. The functions which ensure the technical reproduction of the process are the same as those which determine its social reproduction".

The analysis of Capital is founded on the contradictory unity of use value and value, not on the harmonious "unity of this double unity". It is small wonder that Balibar's concept of the relation of real appropriation is difficult to decipher. Either he is unable to separate

technical and social divisions of labour, or he reduces the relation to a technical characteristic of the labour process.

Having specified the inadequacy of the Althusserian concept of mode of production in relation to the capitalist mode of production, I shall turn briefly to indicate its weakness in relation to pre-capitalist modes. I have already noted in relation to the feudal mode of production the classical bourgeois terms in which Balibar poses the question. We are now able to see the significance of the Ricardian definition of relations of production in terms of ownership of means of production for the analysis of pre-capitalist modes. This definition is in essence the imposition of the ideological form of the "trinity formula" on pre-capitalist modes of production. Pre-capitalist "relations of production" are, as I have noted, seen as politically imposed relations of distribution. To define these relations of distribution theoretically, in accordance with the trinity formula, it is necessary to seek "factors" to which to attribute the "revenues" of the various classes, revenues which fall to the class by virtue of its "ownership" of the factors. Hence it is necessary to transpose capitalist legal forms, most notably capitalist "ownership", into pre-capitalist modes of production to understand the relations of production of those modes as debased forms of the ideological interpretation of capitalist relations of production. The application of this analysis to pre-capitalist modes produces (bourgeois) revolutionary conceptions. I have discussed the feudal mode above. The view of other modes also reflects the relation of capital to such modes. Thus the slave-owner of the ancient world is seen as a capitalist farmer-landowner, free of the burden of rent, but whose idyllic world was destroyed by the Barbarian hordes who brought, precisely, feudalism. In Asia the despot exploited his control of governmental functions to divert the surplus to himself by force, a conception which could legitimate colonial exploitation of the more "backward" peoples, and serve as an awful warning to the civilised world of the dangers of absolutism.

The development of capitalism, in this conception, can be identified with the march of reason and universality, sweeping away these various artificial barriers so that the social relations already inscribed in the "relation of real appropriation" can assert themselves. The development of capitalism is then seen as an essentially political development. Marx did not study any but the capitalist mode of production systematically. He has, however, offered us a schematic account in the section of the Grundrisse on the "forms which precede capitalist production". While it is true that this section is primarily concerned to distinguish these forms from the capitalist form, it is sufficiently clear that it does not need to be transformed by a "symptomatic" reading. At first sight this text appears eminently suited to an Althusserian reading since it is centred on the concept of property. However, the term is not used in any juridical sense in this text, but refers to the specific way in which "the worker relates to the objective conditions of his labour". The term "property" is therefore essentially a synonym for the term "mode of production", referring to specific forms of co-operation in total social production. The property relation in this text is therefore the form of that co-operation which is essential both technically and socially as form of relation to the objective conditions of labour, co-operation which expresses the fact that "the human being is in the most literal sense *zoon politikhon*". It is difficult to distinguish the property relation from the relation of real appropriation, because the two are essentially the same thing, the juridical property relation being simply an expression of the relation of real appropriation.

Relations of exploitation emerge on the basis of the latter not as superimposed relations of distribution, but as exploitative forms of co-operation. Marx's discussion of the pre-capitalist forms of property is aimed precisely at the attempt to establish an "extra-economic" origin of property. In a passage which a symptomatic reading reveals as being aimed at Althusser himself Marx notes: What Mr Proudhon calls the extra-economic origin of property ... is the pre-bourgeois relation of the

individual to the objective conditions of labour . . . Before we analyse this further, one more point: the worthy Proudhon would not only be able to, but would have to, accuse capital and wage labour as forms of property of having an extra-economic origin. . . . But the fact that pre-bourgeois history, and each of its phases, also has its own economy and an economic foundation for its movement is at bottom only the tautology that human life has since time immemorial rested on production, and, in one way or another, on social production, whose relations we call, precisely, economic relations.

The "determination by the economic" which is expressed in Marx's concept of the mode of production does not therefore consist in the attempt to erect pre-bourgeois modes of production on the basis of a bourgeois "economic" foundation. It consists rather in specifying the forms of the social relations within which production takes place, in different forms of society. The relations of production on which these various modes of production are based will articulate different forms of exploitation, and correspondingly different relations of distribution. They will be manifested in specific and interdependent economic, ideological and political forms, which must be understood as historically developed forms of the relation of production. This emerges very clearly from Marx's notes on the various pre-capitalist forms. The first form is that in which the individual only relates to the objective conditions through the community. The basis of this mode of production is a particular form of "property" defined, without any reference to its ideological "appearance" or its political "expression", by the mediation of the relation of the individual to the objective conditions of his or her life by the community. -This form of relation "can realise itself in very different ways", from the clan community to various forms of Asiatic, Slavonic and pre-Colombian societies. In the clan community the community appears natural or divine presupposition, and each individual conducts himself as co-proprietor. In the Asiatic realisation the community appears as a part of a more comprehensive unity

embodied in a higher proprietor, so that real communities appear only as hereditary possessors.

The political expression of the community may take a more democratic or despotic form. "In so far as it actually realises itself in labour," this may be through independent family labour or through communal labour. These various ideological, political and economic forms are quite explicitly conceived as the forms in which the communal relation of production is articulated. Of course the analysis is rudimentary, and in particular Marx doesn't pose the question of the relation between the various forms in which the relation of production is expressed and the different forms of that relation. The account provides the starting point, however, which is not the relation of distribution, not the physical labour process, nor the articulated combination of the two, but the social form of production, which is prior to both. Marx's discussion of the other forms of property is more fragmented, but follows the same lines. The ancient form is seen as a product of the modification of the communal form. Communal and private "property" now coexist. The community is based on the need for collective organisation to defend the land against encroachment by others, and so has a warlike organisation and is based in the town. This means that "membership in the commune remains the presupposition for the appropriation of land and soil ... a presupposition regarded as divine etc." The third, Germanic, form has only vestigial communal property, as "a unification made up of independent subjects, landed proprietors, and not as a unity". The commune does not in fact exist as a state or political body.

In these sketches Marx offers the starting point, if no more, for a marxist theory of modes of production. The starting point, the transhistorical absolute, is not provided by an abstract and empty structure of unspecified elements, but by the "tautology that human life has since time immemorial rested on production, and, in one way or another, on social production". The task of the theory of pre-capitalist

modes of production is to take this as the starting point and to do what Marx has done for the capitalist mode of production, to specify the "one way or another". Two points might be raised in immediate objection to this approach, however. The account has made no reference to exploitation, nor has it made any reference to the forces of production. The former objection is misguided. To start with forms of appropriation of the surplus is to risk implying a teleology in which modes of production are instituted in order to effect exploitation.

Such an approach is inadequate, for exploitation can only take place within a constituted mode of production, so that modes of production cannot be theorised simply as modes of exploitation. We have already seen that in the case of the capitalist mode of production the condition for capitalist exploitation is a specific form of organisation of total social production in which co-operation is effected through commodity circulation. The forms of exploitation characteristic of the modes of production discussed here can be analysed in a parallel way. Thus in the Asiatic form exploitation of the community by the despot and/or the priest depends on communal relations of production and on specific forms of ideological and political expression of these relations. Slavery and serfdom, likewise, are "only further developments of the form of property resting on the clan system". Here the worker is excluded from the community, and so "stands in no relation whatsoever to the objective conditions of his labour" but rather "himself appears among the natural conditions of production for a third individual or community". Hence "slavery, bondage, etc. ... is always secondary, derived, never original, although (it is) a necessary and logical result of property founded on the community and labour in the community".

The question of the forces of production is one which Marx does not adequately cover in these notes. It is clear that the "form of property" is underlain by particular forms of the forces of production. In one sense the form of property corresponds to, "depends partly on . . . the economic conditions in which it [the commune — S.C.] relates as

proprietor to the land and soil in reality". Thus the differences in forms of property depend on differences in the extent to which "the individual's property can in fact be realised solely through communal labour" (aqueducts in the Asiatic mode, warfare in the ancient).

However the extent to which communal labour is possible depends in turn on the presence of communal forms of social organisation. We cannot therefore derive the form of property from the form of the forces of production. Perhaps at last we have come upon the need for structural causality. Perhaps the complexity of Marx's totality lies, as Balibar indeed argues, in "the relation between these two connections and their interdependence", even if Balibar misidentifies the connections. The question of the relationship between forces and relations of production is intimately connected with the question of history, which brings us back to Balibar's text. Having established a structuralist definition of the mode of production in terms of the combination of forces and relations of production the classic structuralist problem of the reconciliation of structure and history appears. The mode of production has to establish some temporal mode of existence. The concept of reproduction provides an initial means of deriving a temporality from the synchronic structure of the mode of production. But since the forces and relations of production form a harmonious unity, this dynamics of the mode of production simply projects the structure into its "eternity" as a constant and unchanging structure.

This is illustrated by Balibar's treatment of the concept of contradiction. The concept of contradiction defines the dynamics of the structure in the sense of the existence of the structure in time. But it is inscribed within the structure, and so cannot be the means by which the suppression of the structure is effected. Contradiction is not, therefore, fundamental, and its resolution does not take the form of transformation of the structure, but of renewed structural equilibrium. The concept of contradiction is therefore the basis of the understanding

of the dynamics of the mode of production, which takes the form of stasis, but cannot help to understand its diachrony, the transition from one mode of production to another.

To explain this Balibar introduces a different sort of mode of production, a "transitional mode", whose dynamic is also a diachrony. In the capitalist mode of production, according to Balibar, the forces and relations of production "correspond" to one another. The relationship between them is one in which there is a "reciprocal limitation of one connection by the other", so that the contradiction between them is non-antagonistic, in the sense just discussed. On the other hand, there are modes such as the manufacturing mode in which the forces and relations are in a state of "non-correspondence" so that we see a "transformation of one by the effect of the other", in this case of the forces by the relations, to bring the two back into correspondence in the capitalist mode of production. Reproduction in a transitional mode therefore takes the form of supersession, but as the product of the effect of the relations of production on the forces, and not of the development of contradictions. This sounds suspiciously like a new variant of "historicism", and Balibar seems aware of the danger, suddenly dissolving his transitional mode and announcing it as a combination of modes of production, bringing the analysis back into the purity of the synchronic but leaving diachrony once more unexplained.

The transitional mode of production brings us back to the concept of the "conjuncture", the current situation, in which it is political practice which takes the whole social formation as its object, and so to the historicism of the class subject which keeps creeping back. In a transitional mode of production the relations of production transform the forces of production. They are able to do this because the "non-economic" levels of the mode of production are no longer limited by the "economic". Their autonomy is unambiguously absolute, for it is political practice "whose result is to transform and fix the limits of the mode of production".

This theory of displacement, drafted in to fill gaping theoretical holes, is given no content. We are simply told that when forces and relations do not "correspond" the political will be dominant and transformation will be possible, but the concept of "correspondence" remains empty. It seems that for Balibar, or for Classical Political Economy, it is only the capitalist and primitive communist modes which are characterised by correspondence, and so are non-transitional. The concept of the transitional mode does not even formally solve the problem which gave rise to it, for it is still necessary to explain how the transition to the transitional mode is effected. Balibar's "Self-Criticism" provides the means of dealing with diachrony without relapsing into teleology. In his self-criticism Balibar makes three related points.

First, he notes that reproduction is not automatic in the capitalist mode of production since it is not, as he had thought, a purely economic matter, but also involves the "superstructure", at least in the reproduction of labour power. This makes it possible for the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production to be interrupted.

Secondly, he notes that the combination of forces and relations of production cannot be seen simply as a combination of independently constituted sets of relations, as they are in Reading Capital, but must be seen as a combination made "in the (social)form and under the influence of the relations of production themselves". This means that the mode of production can be transformed by a transformation of the relations of production, by political practice. Thirdly, Balibar points out that the object of his text was the concept of the "mode of production", whereas it is social formations which change.

This undermines the attempt to offer a general theory of modes of production or a theory of history. The net result of these three points is that it becomes possible for any mode of production to change, the class struggle taking the relations of production as its object and so transforming the mode of production. Hence teleology is eliminated only at the expense of reintroducing the class subject of history, and

seeing modes of production as creations of such class subjects. We are thus back with a structuralist version of that "left historicism" which is the butt of so much criticism in *Reading Capital*. But the ambition has been achieved, marxist science has been divorced from marxist politics, and so this version of "left historicism" can, paradoxically, be put at the service of revisionism: If the effects within the structure of production do not by themselves constitute any challenge to the limits . . . there may be one of the conditions (the "material base") of a different result, outside the structure of production: it is this other result which Marx suggests marginally in his exposition when he shows that the movement of production produces, by the concentration of production and the growth of the proletariat, one of the conditions of the particular form which the class struggle takes in capitalist society. But the analysis of this struggle and of the political social relations which it implies is not part of the study of the structure of production. (Last emphasis is mine.)

The theoretical recourse to a class subject is dictated by the absence of any principle internal to the mode of production which can be the basis of an explanation of transition. The concept of class is then introduced as the transcendent principle which, guided by the scientifically attested programme of The Proletarian Party, will create an entirely new structure from the debris of the old. The absence of an internal principle of transition depends on the interpretation of the relationship between forces and relations of production as one of correspondence or non-antagonistic contradiction. Let us examine this thesis a little more closely.

It should not be necessary to point out that such a conception derives from classical political economy and can find no support in Marx's work. It is embarrassing to have to point out to "marxists" that the contradiction between forces and relations of production is antagonistic, since production both reproduces and suspends the general conditions of production. The Preface to the *Critique* is not ambiguous: "At a certain stage of their development, the material

productive forces come into conflict with the existing relations of production . . . From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution . . ."

This is not simply a rash, crude, hasty, misguided, "Hegelian" formulation, but rather is the way in which Marx constantly conceptualises the relation between the forces and relations of production. The whole of Capital is no more than an elaboration of this contradiction in the capitalist mode of production. In the text on pre-capitalist forms Marx notes, in discussing the ancient mode, that "the presupposition of the survival of the community is the preservation of equality among its free self-sustaining peasants, and their own labour as the condition of the survival of their property".

However, reproduction does not simply represent the "general form of permanence" of these general conditions of production, for "the survival of the commune as such in the old mode requires the reproduction of its members in the presupposed objective conditions. Production itself . . . necessarily suspends these conditions little by little . . . and, with that, the communal system declines and falls, together with the property relations on which it was based".

The unity of forces and relations of production is thus a contradictory unity of the form of co-operation and its objective conditions. Since production is simply the action of men and women, through determinate relations of production, on the objective conditions of production, it is a tautology to note that the development of economic conditions, within determinant economic relations, will alter the material foundation of the latter, ultimately to condition their replacement by new economic relations consistent with new economic conditions: "The aim of all these communities is survival; i.e. reproduction of the individuals who compose it as proprietors . . . This reproduction, however, is at the same time necessarily new production and destruction of the old form... Thus the preservation of the old

community includes the destruction of the conditions on which it rests". Marx concludes that "in the last analysis, their community ... resolves itself into a specific stage in the development of the productive forces of working subjects — to which correspond their specific relations amongst one another and towards nature. Until a certain point, reproduction. Then turns into dissolution".

Marx's own position is clear and consistent. Two objections might be raised to it, however. Firstly, the last quotation might be interpreted as the basis of a philosophy of history in which the productive forces are seen as the autonomous motor of history acting on history from outside. It might be argued that, just as Hegel projected his own society into the past as the end already inscribed in the beginning of history, and Ricardo, more mundanely, founded the eternity of his own society in the technical features of production in general, so Marx inscribes the communist future in both the present and the past through an alternative mechanical materialist philosophy of history. This is not the case for two reasons. First, it is true that Marx appears to regard it as the historical tendency of every mode of production to develop the forces of production, and he appears to regard modes of production as succeeding one another according to the level of development of the forces of production. However, he does insist on analysing each mode of production as a specific historical phenomenon, characterised by its own particular form of conditions and relations of production. Marx only established the progressive character of the capitalist mode of production so, until and unless this is done for other modes as well, Marx's tentative suggestions must be taken to be speculative and hypothetical. Secondly, this speculative suggestion that history is progressive is not a suggestion that the history of any particular society is progressive. In Hegel's philosophy of history world history, as the progressive self-realisation of the Idea, is dissociated sharply from the history of particular societies, which go into decline once they have played their world-historical role. Marx

takes this idea from Hegel, but sets it on a materialist foundation, recognising that it is only with capitalism that world-history makes its appearance, so that it is the expansion of capitalism on a world scale which first defines the historical position of non-capitalist modes of production, and so defines the progressive development of the productive forces as a world-historical phenomenon. The second objection which might be raised is less serious: it is the objection that Marx's conception of the dialectic of forces and relations of production yields an idealist theory of history, because forces and relations of production are seen as generating history of themselves, without any reference to the class struggle, "motor of history". This objection depends on the conception of society in which forces and relations of production are purely economic phenomena, while class struggle, and the history it produces, are purely political. As we have seen, this is far from Marx's conception of the relations of production, according to which these social relations are not technical relations but are the social basis of both the "economic community" and "its specific political form". The development of the relations of production, under the impact of changes in the conditions of production, is therefore a development of these relations in their economic, political and ideological forms. In a class society these relations are differentiated class relations, and their development, under the impact of changes in economic conditions, and subject to the constraint of those conditions, is the development of a multi-faceted class struggle. This struggle is not, however, something divorced from production, located in some relatively autonomous political instance, taking the whole social formation as its object. The class struggle is the form of development of the developed forms of the relation of production, an omnipresent economic, political and ideological struggle.

Conclusion:

Althusserianism as intellectual counter-insurgency

Althusserianism is based on a polemical technique which can only be described as intellectual terrorism. Three terms, "historicism", "empiricism" and "humanism" are drafted in to sweep away all possible opposition. To be labelled by such a term is to be labelled a class enemy, an intellectual saboteur. The power of the terms, however, depends on the claim that marxism represents a radical break with all forms of "historicism", "empiricism" and "humanism" in the name of science. In this paper I have argued that far from defining marxism, Althusser uses his triple banner to expunge the revolutionary theoretical, philosophical and political content of marxism in favour of bourgeois sociology, idealist philosophy and Stalinist politics.

The most fundamental aspect of Althusserianism is its anti-historicism. I have dealt with this question at considerable length in discussing Reading Capital. I have argued that Marx rejects not "historicism" but the idealist philosophy of history, found in Hegel and in classical political economy. This philosophy is based on the eternisation of the present and the projection of this eternity into both the future and the past. In this sense such a philosophy of history is ahistorical, for it dissolves real history in favour of the ideal play of concepts. Marx's historicism is a materialist, but dialectical, historicism which counterposes real history to these idealist fantasies, and so which historicises the present. Althusserianism takes up not Marx's critique of Hegel but that offered by mechanical materialism, criticising the speculative aspect of Hegelianism, but not its idealism. Althusserianism does this by adopting the position of classical political economy, which offers the mechanical materialist variant of Hegel's philosophy of history, emulating the unfortunate Proudhon. It does not abolish the ideological implications of this conception, but ignores them. They are concealed by the foundering of the Althusserians as they seek to come to terms with history. Having rejected Proudhonism to discover the

capitalist mode of production as the terminus of history, they have to choose between the dominance of the forces of production, giving the economism of Meillassoux or Terray, or that of the relations of production, giving the historicism of Balibar (revised), Cutler, or Hindess and Hirst (mark one), or else to abandon all marxist pretensions by abandoning reality altogether (Cutler, Hindess, Hirst and Hussain).

Their opposition to Marx's "historicism" leads the Althusserians to reject the method of historical materialism which sees the dialectic in thought as the retracing, in thought, of the dialectic in operation in history. This leads them to separate "dialectical" from historical materialism, and to replace the marxist dialectic by the most avant-garde versions of absolute idealism, denying the reality of either subject or object of knowledge in favor of the unique reality of knowledge itself. The abolition of its material foundation returns the dialectic to its mystical form, and so leads to its rejection in favour of an analytical logic. Such logic is metaphysical, in the Hegelian and marxist sense that it takes moments of processes for absolute categories, and so eternises the historic. This analytical philosophy of knowledge is therefore the epistemological foundation for the adoption of the bourgeois conception of capitalist society. "Theory" is content to take bourgeois society as it presents itself, and so to present the forms of bourgeois society as eternal conditions of existence of society. Thus the critique of "empiricism" conceals the truly empiricist foundations of Althusserianism. Its adoption of the most banal forms of appearance of bourgeois society is presented as a process which takes place entirely in theory. When the concepts of that ideology generate in thought the world of appearances we live in from day to day the relation between concrete-in-thought and concrete-real becomes unproblematic. The concepts on which the edifice is based have the obviousness of bourgeois ideology, and so their origin is never questioned. When they generate the ideology from which they were plucked, their adequacy is

not questioned either. It is in Althusserianism itself that we find the reflexive structure of ideology, it is Althusserianism which produces the

"effect of recognition-misrecognition in a mirror connection". The third sin in the Althusserian canon is "humanism". In For Marx theoretical humanism was a prime target, although ideological humanism could be tolerated. Since Reading Capital (or is it since "Prague Spring"?) even ideological humanism has come under attack. The critique of "humanism" is not of major theoretical significance. There can be few marxists who believe that Marx takes the "free social individual" as his point of departure, and few who would disagree that in this sense marxism is based on the idea of the "process without a subject" derived from Hegel.

Althusser's attack on humanism is of primarily ideological significance. It is clear that humanism has become a serious political threat to the dominance of orthodox party marxism in the period of the "historic compromise" and the "alliance of the left". Although in this political confrontation humanism could hardly be accused of adopting proletarian political positions, it is not so clear in the ideological confrontation of humanism and orthodox marxism that the former is the bearer of bourgeois, the latter of proletarian, ideology. Indeed Rancière argues at some length that the reverse is the case. On the one hand, argues Rancière, although there have been bourgeois humanist ideologies, such as that of Feuerbach, humanism is only a peripheral bourgeois ideology.

The conception of "man" embodied in the dominant bourgeois ideology is not at all man the subject, but the man whose human nature must be molded to fit society, the man of eighteenth-century mechanical materialism, "the man of philanthropy, of the humanities and of anthropometry: the man one moulds, helps, surveys, measures". This is precisely the man of classical political economy, the man who must be planned, regulated, governed, instructed by a superior class, the man who underpins the functional interpretation of the class

division of society. This bourgeois conception of man persists in the ideologies of Owenism, of radical philanthropy, and even of Marx in *The German Ideology* (and, it might be added, in his and other marxists' conception of women). It is also precisely this bourgeois conception of man which dominates the revisionism of the orthodox communist parties, the conception of the proletariat who must continue to be led, planned, co-ordinated, disciplined and instructed by the superior class of apparatchiks. It is the conception which Althusser adopts, but with which Marx broke definitively in the third thesis on Feuerbach when he asked who educates the educators.

On the other hand, Rancière continues, the same word, "man", whose nature in bourgeois ideology condemns him to servitude, is appropriated by the proletariat as the means of articulating its rejection of this servitude. It is a word which emerges spontaneously time after time, in the practical struggles of the proletariat, as the expression of a revolutionary aspiration, as the locus of the possibility of a different society than that in which bourgeois man is encased. In the context of these struggles the concept of man the subject (and increasingly of woman the subject too) is the practical expression of the revolutionary philosophical concept, the negation of the negation, for it is only in that concept that the aspirations of the oppressed can be given a revolutionary form, looking forward to a possibility which transcends the negation of humanity rather than back to a past which was its precondition. It is not surprising that having followed Stalin's lead in eliminating the negation of the negation from marxism, Althusser can see no need to retain the concept of "man". It is not only because his own thought is dominated by the bourgeois concept of man that Althusser is unable to understand that the same word can have very different meanings in different practices. It also follows directly from his conception of ideology. For Althusser a word does not derive its meaning from its insertion in a social practice, but rather conceals a concept whose meaning derives from its position in a set of concepts.

The word "man" conceals the bourgeois concept of man, and so its intrusion into a proletarian discourse must represent the intrusion of bourgeois ideology (and not simply of sexism). Ideology is embodied in a word, and is to be fought by the theorist who can sift the good from the bad words, draw the "theoretical dividing line between true ideas and false ideas" (cf. note 60). Althusser cannot see that the revolutionary concept of humanity emerges as the expression of a political struggle not against the word of bourgeois humanism, but against its practice, against the practical tyranny of domination in every institution of bourgeois society of which the bourgeois concept of man is but the ideological expression. He cannot see this because he cannot divorce himself from the sociological conception of ideology as a representation, a distorted vision, an imaginary interpellation of the subject, divorced from the practice of bourgeois domination which is, for Althusser, simply an expression of the technical division of labour. Althusserian politics is summed up in his reply to John Lewis. The meaning Althusser gives to the slogan "the masses make history" which he counterposes to Lewis's slogan "men make history" is quite the opposite of the Maoist emphasis on the impotence of the bourgeoisie confronted with the collective power of the masses. For Althusser the proletariat must be taught the omnipotence of the bourgeoisie: When one says to the proletarians that it is men who make history, one doesn't need to be a scholar to understand that sooner or later one will contribute to their disorientation and disarming. One leads them to believe that they are all powerful as men, while disarming them as proletarians in the face of the real omnipotence, that of the bourgeoisie which controls the material (means of production) and political (state) conditions which direct history. When one sings the humanist song to them, one distracts them from the class struggle, one prevents them from giving themselves and using the only power they have: that of organisation in a class and of the organisation of the class, the unions and the party.

